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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with the nature of theological truth claims. The problem
it addresses concerns what model of theological truth best allows for the
comprehensiveness religious belief offers, without either superseding or being
reduced to, a moral imperative. It focuses this concern upon an analysis of
contemporary attempts to forge a middle-way between religion and ethics using
the idea of the creative imagination as a critical theological principle. The thesis
defends the viability of theological truth claims in the current epistemological
situation, and argues that while possibility may be the key notion that
distinguishes them, nevertheless, to rely upon the creative imagination as that
critical principle by which theological truth claims are to be judged, is to risk
privileging metaphysics over morals.
The thesis focuses upon two contemporary revisionist theologians - David Tracy
and Stewart Sutherland - who both share a commitment to a 'mediating' role for
theology in the current situation. It suggests that Tracy's understanding of a
theological truth claim as the imagined possibility of self-authenticity founders
upon the fact that art distances the individual from the existential moment
wherein possibility becomes real, and therefore fails to demonstrate how
possibilities-in-principle can become possibilities-in-fact. The thesis suggests by
way of a contrast that Sutherland's understanding of theological truth as lived
possibility in the light of eternity may escape some of the criticisms made of
Tracy's model.
At the same time as being a critique of revisionist thought on theological truth
claims the thesis offers itself as a contribution within revisionist theology, and
supports the ideal of a publicly accessible theological truth claim. The
substantive contribution that it offers is a warning against a model of theological
truth that is over-dependent upon the idea that art is the one particular that has
universal scope. The constructive elements of this critique are first, the
suggestion that theological truth claims may more successfully bridge
metaphysics and morals by deconstructing the idealised existence that the
imagination presents us with, and second, that the legitimation of theological
truth can best be achieved by employing a phronesis model of reason as a
critical principle.
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"The most evident bridge between religion and morality is the idea of virtue."
Iris Murdoch1
1. The argument of the Thesis
This thesis deals with a challenging question - "What does religion add to
ethics?" Little explanation is needed to justify the importance of the question
itself, for it has a long and venerable history in theology, and theologians have
offered a variety of answers to it.2 Though the question is a complex one and
the options for answering it wide indeed, I have chosen it as the focus of this
thesis. It could be asked why yet another contribution on this subject is needed.
After all, what more can be said having read and absorbed Kant's, Otto's,
Kierkegaard's or Tillich's considerable and brilliant renderings of the question?
What more indeed, unless the 'more' we talk of, is a hermeneutical more, that
sees in every new interpretation a ^interpretation which opens up previously
unimagined possibilities before us. The justification ofmy thesis lies herein. My
hope is that in dealing with an old question in a new way, using new resources,
a previously unimagined possibility emerges, and becomes real.
1
Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (London, Chatto and Windus 1992),
p.481. This book was based upon Iris Murdoch's 1982 Gifford Lectures given at the University
of Edinburgh.
2
Kant, for example, believed religion added an unconditional demand to ethics. Otto
believed religion added a sense of the numinous to ethics, Tillich, the depth dimension, and
Kierkegaard the possibility of authenticity in the face of the teleological suspension of the
ethical.
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The question "What does religion add to ethics?" is a question concerning the
nature of theological truth claims. So what is a theological truth claim? Some
will suggest that a theological truth claim is a truth claim that transcends reason
through faith. When rationality exhausts itself, they will say, then faith begins,
and theological truth claims are expressive of faith. This thesis agrees that
theological truth claims are expressive of faith, but disagrees that such
expressions can take leave of reason. In fact, I will argue, that when properly
understood, faith redirects reason by the light of an ultimate goal, to be
conducive towards the transformation of the human situation. This thesis
suggests that to achieve this, theological truth must occupy the hinterland
between metaphysics and morals. It understands metaphysics in terms of the
ontological and universal hopes expressed in the comprehensiveness offered by
a religious worldview, and morality as the imperative to act virtuously in the
face of particularity. It is the central claim of the thesis that the expression of
faith that theological truth claims represent, is the imagined possibility of
goodness. My argument is that this understanding of a theological truth claim
provides the best way of bridging metaphysics and morals. As the opening
quotation to this introduction indicates, others, notably Iris Murdoch, have made
similar claims. Although the conclusion of the thesis largely concurs with
Murdoch, what keeps my argument firmly in the world of theology is the claim
that the imagined possibility of goodness is a gift that comes from without.
Metaphysics and morals have always been concerns of religion but the
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relationship between them has at times been strained. This thesis closely
scrutinises an idea that has gained a significant following in recent times, that
art can be a theological via media between metaphysics and morals. That art
should be suggested for such a role, is largely due to the influence of Kant's
Third Critiqued In the Third Critique, art is seen as the one particular that has
universal scope, and is successful in reconciling the realms of nature and
freedom.4 In possessing this capability, art has been taken to hold out the
possibility of a way of making truth claims that satisfies both their particular
context and their universal scope. If art does function in this manner it offers
solutions to a number of questions that vex theologians. From questions about
interpretation, to questions about pluralism and truth, art promises a way through
many theological impasses. Nevertheless, the key question is to what extent art
can yield a critical principle by which competing theological truth claims can be
judged.
In this thesis we will examine how one stream of theology in particular has
attempted to make the creative imagination a via media between metaphysics and
morals. This idea suggests that the creative imagination holds the key to many
of the problems facing theologians, through the imagined possibilities it
2
For a good account of Kant's aesthetic judgement see S. KOrner, Kant (London, Penguin
1955), Chapter 8 "Kant's Theory of Aesthetic Taste", pp. 175-195.
4
"In carrying out his plan to unify or at least reconcile nature and freedom, Kant uncovered
a priori elements in our judgements of the beautiful and the sublime in nature and in art." Lewis
White Beck, ed., Kant Selections (London, Macmillan, 1988), p.332.
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generates. I will argue that while the creative imagination is indeed a powerful
tool for theology, it is questionable whether it can provide us with the critical
leverage necessary to make the transformation of the human situation a real
possibility unless a distinction is made between different types of imagined
possibility. As we shall see, certain revisionist attempts to forge a via media
using an understanding of theological truth as imagined possibility rely heavily
upon the belief that an imagined possibility can do enough to turn a possibility
in-principle into a possibility-in-fact. However, in this thesis I shall argue that,
if left unfettered, the imagination is just as liable to produce idealised and
consequently false possibilities, as real possibilities. I therefore advocate the
centralisation of the imagined possibility of goodness in theological thought.
This thesis is a critique of one type of revisionist theology in particular. The
strength of revisionist approaches lies in their commitment to the public
availability of theological truth claims. In today's 'postmodern' and
'deconstructive' climate it seems increasingly necessary to defend the fact that
theology can, and should, make publicly available truth claims. For some, as we
shall shortly see, theology can apparently go happily on its way without
justifying itself or its claims. This is not my belief, and is one of the reasons
why I have chosen to locate the thesis in the revisionist school of theology, for
revisionist theology is above all things concerned that theology should make
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truth claims.5
What has come to be called the postliberal school of theology, is another
contemporary movement that is also concerned with theological truth, and an
overview of its claims are given in the first Chapter. There, it emerges that truth
for postliberals need not be connected to public rationality. For postliberals, it
is not of primary importance that theological truth claims are accessible in the
broadest possible sphere. Postliberalism does have its own rationality, but it is
of a type that does not offer theological truth the kind of public accessibility that
it needs. Revisionist approaches in theology strive to make theological truth
claims open to public scrutiny. They will not allow that theological truth claims
have only a local and particular scope, or that they are justified only through
authority. Revisionists argue that theological truth claims possess a universal
scope and they are prepared to provide reasons to back up the viability and
legitimacy of such claims. Revisionist approaches to theological truth are
therefore critical approaches. The postliberal approach to theological truth does
possess certain virtues, Lindbeck's as we shall see possesses the virtue of
coherence. Nevertheless, insofar as theology is concerned with making
theological truth claims publicly accessible and available to the widest possible
audience, then it appears that in the contemporary scene revisionist approaches
5
'Revisionism' is a term which is also applied within Marxist theory. See The Fontana
Dictionary of Modern Thought, ed. Alan Bullock and Oliver Stallybrass (London, Fontana,
1977), p.541. The kind of 'revisionism' this thesis purports to deal with is theological.
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are uniquely qualified for the task.6 The strengths of revisionist theology are
therefore many, however, the claim of this thesis is that when revisionist
approaches focus on art as that which secures a public rationality, then the
original intention of revisionists to articulate a via media between metaphysics
and morals begins to err on the side of metaphysics to the detriment of morals.
As we shall see, revisionists do assume that the realm of aesthetic experience has
a publicness that qualifies it uniquely as a theological via media, but this thesis
will reveal that such a belief is only adequate when the object of aesthetic
experience is conceived as the imagined possibility of goodness.
While names such as Edward Farley, Gordon Kaufman, Schubert Ogden and
David Tracy are thought to be the usual representatives of revisionist theology,
the list can also be extended to include others, more likely to be described as
liberal, like Bultmann, Tillich, Rahner and Schillebeeckx.7 Despite the
limitations of attempting to marry such a diverse group of thinkers under one
heading, it is possible to identify a number of broad themes shared by all the
above. In James J. Buckley's Chapter on "Revisionists and Liberals" in The
6
See David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of
Pluralism (London, SCM Press Ltd., 1981), Part One, for an extensive debate on the question
of publicness in theology; also Don S. Browning and Francis Schiissler Fiorenza ed., Habermas,
Modernity and Public Theology (New York, Crossroads, 1982).
7 See James Buckley's Chapter, in David F. Ford ed., The Modern Theologians (Oxford,
Blackwell, 1997), p.327, for a good account of those theologians in the revisionist school.
Buckley discusses revisionists and liberals in the same Chapter, and suggests that while
revisionists try to shape Christian belief and practice in dialogue with modern philosophies,
cultures and social practices, liberals on the other hand try to do so on the basis of modern
philosophies, cultures and social practices.
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Modern Theologians, it is suggested that four themes are held in common by all
revisionists. These are:
1. A belief that, "Christian theology makes truth claims and provides reasons
for its claims".
2. A concern with "human beings as free subjects embedded in a physical and
social and historical world, radically threatened by ambiguity and suffering and
evil, and seeking ways to overcome this situation".
3. An agreement that "the monarchical God of classical theism must be
replaced by a God related to human, religious, or specifically Christian
experience."
4. An agreement that "life and thought in relationship to the specific figure of
Jesus is shaped by the previous issues."8
Using Buckley's four definitions of revisionist theology, I also find it possible
to include the work of Stewart Sutherland under the label revisionist. Sutherland
is a self-declared revisionist, although sometimes his use of the term carries
connotations that Buckley does not include in his definitions, describing his
approach as "revisionary rather than descriptive".9 Nevertheless, with atone that
echoes David Tracy to the letter, he says,
"A successful piece of revisionary work, as Schleiermacher clearly saw, will
take account of the central questions posed by our culture to Christianity, and
in so doing interrogate the presuppositions of that culture."10
David Tracy and Stewart Sutherland are the revisionist theologians that feature
most prominently in this thesis. David Tracy has, in his numerous theological








theology can and does make truth claims: and secondly, that such claims are
open to critical revision in the broadest possible public sphere on the basis that
"the truth claims of art and religion stand or fall together".11 Stewart
Sutherland, who shares many ofTracy's commitments, also adheres to much that
characterises the revisionist agenda, though as we shall see, with less emphasis
upon the centrality of art. In discussing the work of these two theologians I shall
argue that, for Tracy, the critical principle of a theological truth claim may be
understood in aesthetic terms, and thus what religion adds to ethics is an
aesthetic and imagined possibility of self-authenticity. For Sutherland, on the
other hand, theological truth must be understood in the light of the priority of
moral beliefs over religious beliefs, and thus what religion adds to ethics is the
imagined possibility of goodness.12
Talk of possibility immediately brings the imposing figure of Heidegger, and his
theological disciple Rudolf Bultmann to mind. It can legitimately be argued that
the outstanding theological contribution on possibility is indeed Bultmann's. For
Bultmann possibility was the key distinguishing feature between theology and
philosophy, where philosophy takes a possibility in principle to be already
"
David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, p. 185 n.37.
12
See Stewart Sutherland, God, Jesus and Belief, p. 16, "A religious belief which runs
counter to our moral beliefs is to that extent unacceptable."
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a possibility-in-fact.13 Though the questions he was concerned with run
throughout this thesis, there is little mention of Bultmann himself in it. The
simple reason for this being that my chosen focus has been on contemporary
formulations of the problem.
2. Outline of Chapters
Theological truth claims have not fared well in modernity and in the first part
of this thesis we shall examine why this has been the case. Nevertheless, in spite
of the constraints placed by modernity upon theological truth claims, there has
emerged a window of opportunity that now promises to allow theology to regain
its voice in the contemporary conversation. Such an opportunity cannot be
neglected if the mistakes of the past are not to be repeated. Consequently, the
development of an understanding of a theological truth claim, which is both fully
theological and open to critical evaluation as truth, is a fundamentally valuable
project.14 That this is a project with no guarantee of success cannot be denied,
and as we shall see by Chapter Seven, is demanding of the highest of theological
virtues; faith, hope and wisdom. In Part One, I therefore explore the
13 See Rudolph Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology" (1941), New Testament and
Mythology and Other Basic Writings (London, SCM Press Ltd., 1985), tr. Schubert M. Ogden,
pp.27ff.
14
In the introduction to The Promise of Critical Theology: Essays in Honour of Charles
Davis (Ontario, Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1995), ed. Marc P. Lalonde, Lalonde defines
critical theology as, "a term which designates those theologies in constructive dialogue with the
Marxist tradition of social criticism in general, and with the critical theory of the Frankfurt
school (ie the work of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse) and Jurgen
Habermas in particular.", p.2.
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opportunities that contemporary thinking on a number of issues might offer a
nascent theological truth claim. The issues examined include the problems of
foundationalism and incommensurability, the role of reason and the nature of
religious language. Although all of these issues relate to the central thesis, the
primary focus of Chapters One to Four is as a defence of the viability of
theological truth claims.
In Chapter One I begin by discussing what kind of understanding of a
theological truth claim can succeed in balancing the requirements ofmetaphysics
and ofmorals, where the comprehensiveness that metaphysics offers often seems
to militate against the particularity demanded of morals. With the question thus
stated I explore those aspects of the contemporary situation that make an answer
to the question possible in the context of a discussion about postmodernity. After
outlining the postmodern critique of theological truth I explore postliberal and
revisionist responses to it, and ask which offers us the most plausible model for
an understanding of a theological truth claim in the current situation. By the end
of this Chapter I establish my initial premise, where the notion of a revisable
theological truth claim situated in a form of public rationality is one that can
offer an understanding of theological truth between metaphysics and morals
better than any contemporary alternatives.
With the main argument of Chapter One established, Chapter Two sets out to
explore an alternative understanding of public rationality. The Chapter begins by
12
examining how the dominant form of reason in modernity has made the issue of
public rationality so pointed, and explores the failure of instrumentalist notions
of reason with respect to the cognitive claims of religion and modernity's own
choice of a repository of ultimacy, the self. Next, it examines the idea of a
communicative rationality found in the work of Jiirgen Habermas. In this
Chapter we ask how far communicative rationality allows theological truth
claims the space to be revisable. The conclusion of the Chapter suggests that
while the setting of theological truth claims within the context of a
communicative rationality does offer theology some opportunities, nevertheless,
it is questionable whether communicative rationality by itself can make
theological truth revisable without recourse to an ultimate goal. Thus, I argue,
communicative rationality needs the supplementation of an eschatological
dimension to allow for the revisability of theological truth. Chapter Two,
therefore, shows that neither instrumental nor communicative understandings of
reason provide all that is needed for a response to the problems of modernity
that may permit public theological truth claims.
In Chapter Three I argue that faith - that which theological truths are expressive
of - is the principle of transformation which Habermas neglects to pay sufficient
attention to. Faith succeeds in facilitating the radical transformation that
Habermas hopes for, because it is focused upon an adequate goal. In making this
claim it is nevertheless still incumbent upon me to show what form of rationality
might legitimate such faith. Chapter Three sets out to do this by first examining
13
how faith can facilitate radical transformation without totalisation, i.e., the
cognitive privilege of one truth over another. I then examine the way that
phronesis models of rationality can help the legitimation of faith. It is therefore
the argument of Chapter Three that if a theological truth claim is to prevent the
loss of critical adjudication as truth, then it must adopt phronesis models of
rationality.
Chapter Four brings the first part of the thesis to some kind of culmination by
identifying the epistemological framework within which theological truth can
best operate. This Chapter deals with the distinctiveness of theological truth in
the context of a discussion concerning the resources in a renewed reading of a
Kant. After exploring Kant's understanding of a theological truth claim, we next
look at Adina Davidovich's claim that Kant in fact does not reduce religion to
ethics, and explore the potential in her notion of religion as a province of
meaning. My argument in this Chapter is that an understanding of religion as a
province of meaning accords theological truth claims validity as claims about the
possible conditions of meaningfulness. Theological truth claims need not be
sacrificed on the altar of a fact/value dichotomy, and by using Adina
Davidovich's reading of Kant,
"theology need not detach itself from its foundation in human experience to
secure a general audience",15
15 Adina Davidovich, "Kant's Theological Constructivism", Harvard Theological Review,
86:3 (1993), pp.323-351, p.351.
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Consequently, the conclusion to Part One is to argue that religion can be said to
represent a province of meaning that is distinct from ethics, and the making of
theological truth claims in the contemporary situation is still a valid exercise.
Nevertheless, in the light of Kant's Third Critique the province that religion
occupies is that of the human imagination.
In Part Two of the thesis I attempt an exercise in theological constructivism. The
question is no longer whether we are justified in talking of theological truth
claims, but what exactly do we mean when we do so. It is the premise of the
second part of the thesis that the virtues of praxis and phronesis highlighted in
previous Chapters as desirable of theological truth in the contemporary situation,
are acquired through the articulation of possibility. In Part Two I therefore
explore the implications of focusing upon imagined possibility, as that which is
most distinctive of theological truth claims. In Chapter Five, we explore Paul
Ricoeur's idea of the imagined possibility of self-authenticity. Here, I argue that
Ricoeur fails to distinguish between different types of imagined possibility, and
consequently invests a great deal in believing that the imagined possibility of
self-authenticity is sufficient for the transformation of the human situation from
self-centredness to other-centredness. With this criticism made, we move on in
Chapter Six to examine an explicitly theological appropriation of Ricoeur, in
David Tracy. After exploring Tracy's theology generally, we identify the similar
role that the imagined possibility of self-authenticity plays in it. Here I argue that
Tracy make certain presuppositions about art that leaves his theological model,
15
unable to distinguish holiness from fanaticism. In Chapter Seven and the
Conclusion to the thesis, I begin to offer a constructive suggestion for a renewed
understanding of the imagined possibilities that theology might offer. In Chapter
Seven I draw from Stewart Sutherland the idea that theological truth claims
represent the possibility of a life of holiness lived sub specie aeternitatus. Here,
I suggest that the type of imagined possibility that theological truth claims stand
for is better thought of as the imagined possibility of goodness rather than the
imagined possibility of self-authenticity. The problem this raises concerns the
resources that the imagined possibility of goodness might have, that the imagined
possibility of self-authenticity does not have. I therefore deal with this question
in the Conclusion and follow Iris Murdoch in defending the primacy of the
concept of the Good over other concepts. Here, I argue that the concept of
goodness is not vulnerable to the vicissitudes of art in the same way that other
concepts are.
To set up a 'straw man' only to be knocked down for the benefit of the
aggressor has never been the intention behind the thesis. The strengths of
revisionist approaches like Ricoeur's and Tracy's are many. In one light
therefore, my conclusion need not necessarily be seen as inflicting irreparable
damage to their position, but one which can be worked into their programmes
in the future. My critique of revisionist approaches to ground theological truth
claims in the creative imagination is not, in itself, a critique of the place that
imagined possibility has in theology. It is merely the suggestion that some
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imagined possibilities are more likely to facilitate the transformation of the
human situation than others. At the end of the thesis my constructive suggestion
for an epistemological framework that might facilitate this is seen to lie in the
adoption ofphronesis models of rationality. There, I suggest that the strength of
phronesis as an epistemological bridge between metaphysics and morals lies in
it being a form of rationality which is itself a virtue.
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PART ONE
THEOLOGY, TRUTH AND POSTMODERNITY
In the First Part of this thesis I explore the nature of truth claims in
contemporary philosophy. According to many contemporary philosophers
postmodernity has made truth vulnerable in previously unprecedented ways.
Consequently, to make a truth claim at all has been seen to be an expression of
power, an attempt to dominate or the will to subdue. As Michel Foucault has said,
"What defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does
not act directly and immediately on others... Instead it acts upon their actions:
an action upon an action, or existing actions or on those which may arise in the
present or the future."1
The impact these insights have had upon theological truth claims has been
immense. As a result theologians have been faced with a challenge. Some have
responded by ignoring the insights that postmodernity affords us and have tried
to go on making theological truth claims as if there was no doubt in anyone's
mind as to what truth is. Others have sought to assimilate postmodern insights,
and have been prepared to accept that the vulnerability of truth calls for new
understandings of the nature of theological truth claims. For both of these groups
postmodernity presents a challenge. For one it is a most unwelcome challenge
that only offers danger, for the other it is an opportunity that promises to
1
Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power" Afterword to Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul




In Part One we will explore the challenge that the contemporary postmodern
situation presents to theology. We shall examine the ways in which truth has
become vulnerable in it and what kind of future theological truth has as a result.
By the end of Part One it will be clear that I believe that theological truth does
have a future. However, it is not a future that can ignore postmodernity, or its
findings. Hence, the insights about the vulnerability of truth have to be
recognised. Throughout Part One I shall highlight certain key notions. These
represent the positive side of the challenge that the contemporary situation
presents to theology and will reappear in Part Two in a more explicitly
theological guise.
The most significant insights disclosed by postmodern thinkers about truth focus
on an apparently unbridgeable gap between metaphysics and morals. Chapter
One therefore opens by discussing this problem.2 The comprehensiveness
offered by religion often seems to militate against the particularity demanded of
morals. As we shall shortly see, Abraham's call to sacrifice his son Isaac is
2
The literature on metaphysics is as vast as the subject itself. For a lucid treatment of the
problem ofmetaphysical realism. See, Hilary Putnam, Realism With a Human Face (Cambridge,
Mass; Harvard University Press, 1992). Metaphysics is most generally discussed in connection
with theology, in terms of realism and anti-realism. Although that debate is of concern in my
thesis, I have tried to avoid allowing it to dominate. Consequently, the term 'metaphysics' is
used in this thesis in a non-technical way, and is intended to denote that type of universal
ontology that theological truth claims often naively endorse which is to the detriment of moral
action.
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an example, if perhaps an extreme one, of this conflict. The most pressing
question facing theology today therefore concerns whether a theological truth
claim can allow for the comprehensiveness that religion provides without either
becoming a moral imperative, or seeking to supersede a moral imperative. In
Chapter One I explore those aspects of the contemporary situation that provide
the best way forward for theology in the light of this problem. After outlining
the postmodern critique of theological truth I explore two responses to it in the
forms ofpostliberal theology and revisionist theology, and ask which offers us
the most plausible model for an understanding of theological truth in the light
of the problem. By the end of this Chapter both the field of reference for the
exploration of the question and my initial premise are established; where the
notion of a revisable theological truth claim situated in a form of public
rationality is argued at the outset, to be one that promises to maintain some kind





"The real subject is the ethically existing subject." Sdren Kierkegaard3
"Christianity is praxis, a character task." Spren Kierkegaard4
1. Between Metaphysics and Morals: A Theological Truth Claim?
In the Presidential address to the American Academy of Religion in 1989,
Huston Smith explored the relationship between postmodernism and religion.5
Smith made the claim that modernity has interpreted religion without reference
to its transcendent dimension. The dominant model of modernist ontology, being
linear, one-dimensional and horizontal, meant that the extra dimension of
religious ontology was uninterpretable. According to Smith, the failure of
modernism to make sense of this dimension has thus led to the frustrated
contradictions of phenomenological philosophy of religion.
3
Spren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 1941), tr. D F. Swenson and W Lowrie, p.281.
4 Cited in David J. Gowens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1996), p.28.
5
See Huston Smith, "Postmodernism's Impact on the Study of Religion," Journal of the
American Academy of Religion 58 (1990), pp.653-670, p.653. According to Smith the change
that postmodernism makes to modernity's rejection of hierarchical ontology is not to return to
transcendence, but to resist the idea that reality can be wholly explicable.
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The central posit of religion for Smith, is the notion of a hierarchical universe.
Nevertheless, Smith argues that the way that modernity has dealt with religious
ontology is to make suspect this hierarchical dimension. Modernity has preserved
the notion of ontology within an empiricist, scientistic framework and has
rejected a transcendent hierarchical ontology ie. meta-physics. Smith concludes
his address by quoting from Darrol Bryant,
"The problem with the modem study of religion is that it unfolds with a
modern view of reality that is, in principle, hostile to the truth known in
religion. For in the modem view reality is wholly explicable from within, there
is no Beyond that must be appealed to understand what is.... How then can we
understand religion when the implicit ontology, or view of things that we bring
to the study of religion rules out a priori the ontologies of the religious
traditions within which religion unfolds?"6
On balance Smith is optimistic about the future because science itself has
exposed the bankruptcy of reductionism, and therefore raises the possibility that
religion is meaningful. Consequently, it is legitimate to see the religions of the
world as traditions of wisdom, that point to, and bear evidence of, a hierarchical
ontology. In Smith's view, in spite of the inhospitable context that modernity has
created, religion is still worth learning from.
I also believe that religion is still worth learning from and that modernity has
railroaded religion into a subjectivist ghetto. In doing so it has impoverished the
cultures we live in by denying any real validity to the traditions of wisdom that
can help put moral flesh on the bare skeleton of human existence. I also believe
6
Darrol M. Bryant, "To hear the stars speak: Ontology in the Study of Religion(s)" in
Fragments of Infinity: essays in religion and philosophy (Dorset, Prism, 1991), ed. A Shamra,
pp.46-62.
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that theology can be the interface between the flesh and the skeleton, and can
function as the medium through which the wisdom of religion is expressed.
Like Smith also, I believe the postmodern climate we live in to be a constructive
one for theology. The old, modern 'knock-down' criticisms of religion no longer
have the same impact, and we have discovered that clear-cut secularist rebuttals
are not sufficient. For today, we (rightly) expect our intellectual probings to be
more nuanced. Today we have a justified suspicion of the invasiveness of theory
and the corrupting tendencies of method. Today, we are acutely aware of the
need to respect the integrity and truth value of the object of our attention, while
recognising that the very process of attending can never be neutral. Today in the
postmodern context we find ourselves in, we are even coming to recognise that
the limitations of reason are something that religion has, at the very least, been
conscious of for a long time. Nevertheless, the key question is to what extent
postmodernity can allow for a return of theological truth claims.
The central problem facing theological truth claims, as we shall gradually come
to see in the course of this thesis, is how to provide an understanding of
theological truth which marries the idea that religious belief is both something
that helps make comprehensive sense of the world and yet is something which
is neither reducible to a moral imperative, nor something which supersedes a
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moral imperative.7 This is the problem the thesis seeks to address. That religion
occupies the role of providing a comprehensive worldview is clearly the case.
This is in fact what has made religion so problematic for modernity, where, as
we shall see, comprehensiveness and totalisation have been linked together.8
Nevertheless, it is precisely here that postmodernity has licensed us to rethink
our understanding of what it means for something to be comprehensive.9 The
comprehensiveness that religious belief once stood for was of a type that
brooked no disagreement and generated no dialogue. Theological truth claims
were once thought to possess privileges other truth claims did not have.
'Revelation' was the means by which such privilege was justified, but this idea
was not exclusively borne out of religion alone. The idea of a truth that could
have privileged access to reality has not only been a temptation for theologians,
but can be found throughout the history of philosophy. In both theological and
philosophical versions of it, the idea of a truth that possesses privileged access,
7
As we shall see, these are two of Stewart Sutherland's criteria for assessing any system
of belief. See, God, Jesus and Belief (Oxford, Blackwell, 1984), pp.16-17.
g
We shall explore this question further in Chapter Five, where we discuss what kind of
understanding of theological truth can permit us to defend its comprehensiveness yet deny that
it needs to have cognitive privilege over other truth claims. My suggestion will be that an
understanding of reason as a phronetic-sense making activity can help to overcome this problem.
9 David Tracy's approach to theological tmth is a good example of one that has taken up
the opportunities postmodernism has to offer, and will be subjected to analysis in this thesis,
"postmodern hermeneutics is the test of any interpretation of any religion; at the same time,
religion, as the most pluralistic, ambiguous and important reality of all is the best test of any
theory of interpretation". See David Tracy, Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion,
Hope (London, SCM Press Ltd., 1987), p.ix.
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relies upon an understanding of truth as universal adequacy, and is premised
upon the argument that, if true at all, a thing must be true in all particular
instances of itself or not at all. In the case of religion those that disagreed with
the theological truth claims of the ascendent powers, were not only wrong - for
this kind of truth allowed for no nuances of certainty - they were evil.
Consequently, a theological truth sadly became something which - by virtue of
it being true in all particular instances of itself - was something that was worth
destroying for.
Thankfully truth can now be thought of in less oppressive ways. Postmodernity
offers us an understanding of truth as relative adequacy that need not involve the
totalisation or privileged access, of other understandings of truth. With this
understanding of truth postmodern forms of thought have created a context
within which theological truth claims can prosper. Using the vocabulary of
postmodernity Tracy, for example, can say that theological truth claims are
paradigmatically hermeneutical. He can say that theological truth claims are
comprehensive in a dialogical sense, allowing for many participants and possible
disagreements. That they do not provide a neat linear progression from known
to known, but a wandering, vagrant therapy, through a variety of only partially
adequate truths, that point towards the possibility of a different way of life. This
understanding of theological truth makes much sense of the way religion often
functions in the life of the individual believer. For most believers religion offers
more than just a philosophy of life, religion offers a total way of being. Such a
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total way of being, is furthermore, one in which there is a creative moment that
reveals previously hidden possibilities. Consequently, theological truth claims
function as articulations of possible ways of being. In this thesis we will be
examining, and eventually questioning, how far a model of theological truth as
relative adequacy - premised upon the idea that the creative imagination is the
critical theological principle - is sufficient with respect to the question of how
a possible way of being in principle can become a possible way of being in fact.
Nevertheless, at the outset it is my claim that such a model at the very least
promises us a way of marrying the comprehensiveness that religion provides,
with the ideals of pluralism and tolerance.
A theological truth claim is therefore something that helps us make sense of the
world in which we live. It provides comprehensiveness, but it must be a form
of comprehensiveness that is revisable. Theological truth claims are
conversational, but not all forms of conversation are desirable. Similarly not all
comprehension-providing beliefs are worthwhile. Theological truth claims
therefore need to be submitted to a test, and the test is that of morality.
Consequently, a theological truth claim is viable only insofar as it does not run
counter to a moral belief.10
Again, justification for this claim is not hard to find. The paradigm religious case
10 See Stewart Sutherland, God, Jesus and Belief, p. 16.
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of the dilemma facing Abraham in his call to sacrifice his son, is a vivid
illustration of the point; the will of God or the moral sense ofman? Metaphysics
or morals? Religion or ethics? But does the choice need to be so stark? Does one
have to be resolved into the other? Does the comprehensiveness religion offers
have to be sacrificed in the interests of morality, or does morality have to be
sacrificed in the interests of maintaining comprehensiveness? Does the
understanding of a relatively adequate theological truth claim, which insists that
it is acceptable only insofar as it does not run counter to a moral belief,
inevitably have to translate into saying that a theological truth claim is merely
an injunction to strive to be moral and thus reduce religion to ethics? Or does
it add something that makes a moral life more attainable?
This is at the heart of the problem with theology in the contemporary situation.
My answer is yes, theological truth claims add something to morality, and no,
it is not inevitable that religion is reduced to ethics. This thesis claims, that what
religion adds to ethics is something that makes the moral life more attainable,
but that what is added is not something which can be reified into a metaphysical
claim that privileges itself over ethics. What religion adds to ethics is the
possibility of an authentic life and does lead to theological truth claims that
function as comprehensive world-views, but the key ingredient of such claims
is not the reality they point to but the life they issue in.
The question of religion between metaphysics and morals is demanding of urgent
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consideration and has become acute in the contemporary context. Indeed it is the
contemporary context that in largely unprecedented ways has allowed for a more
vigorous philosophical defence of the viewpoint I shall be representing than ever
before. For, to a large extent, the apparent conflict between religion and ethics
that necessitated the reduction of one to the other has been brought about by a
commitment to certain philosophical premises that have lost some of their
credibility in postmodernity. Though this loss has also had some adverse affects
on theologians, the opportunities that it brings with it are more numerous than
the disadvantages. We shall briefly look at these now.
2. Foundationalism: The Agony and the Ecstasy of Postmodernism
The impact, and precise nature of postmodernity itself, is of course extensively
debated. In Anglo-American Postmodernity: Philosophical Reflections on
Science, Religion and Ethics, Nancey Murphy suggests that modern thought has
been characterised by three interrelated philosophical positions; foundationalism
in epistemology, representationalism or referentialism in language, and atomism
and reductionism in metaphysics.11
Murphy's third characteristic, "atomism and reductionism in metaphysics", is
perhaps the most significant of all. With it she suggests that modern science has
progressed with at least three forms of reductionism, ontological (which reduces
11
See Nancey Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity: Philosophical Perspectives on
Science, Religion and Ethics (Colorado, Westview Press, 1997), p. 8.
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complex entities to simple entities, and militates against the possibility of
mind/body dualism); causal reductionism (which assumes that causality works
from the bottom-up); and methodological reductionism (which insists on an
analysis of any entity in terms of its parts rather than as a whole). Metaphysical
atomism-reductionism, therefore involves the overriding assumption that the
nature of any entity is determined in the first instance by the parts that make up
the whole, and not the other way around.12
The impact of the reductionism of science upon theological truth claims, is of
course a well-rehearsed debate by now. Anyone that begins the task of exploring
religion at all will soon discover a number of conflicting definitions, and quickly
become conscious of the difficulty involved in reducing it to only one. While
this awareness can lead to the conclusion, that the truth of religion must be
reduced to the positivist methodology of the interpretative approach used to
investigate it, others refuse to accept that reductionism does justice to the actual
meaningfulness of religion and will therefore defend the view that religious truth
claims are transcendent. The question then becomes polarised between those that
believe a theological truth claim is a truth claim about what it is to be human,
and those that believe it is a truth claim about God. But is such a forced choice
necessary? Why can a theological truth claim not be about both? It is ultimately
reductionism that forces this choice upon us, and, as Murphy rightly observes,
12
Ibid., p.14.
its exposure can aid us in articulating a model of theological truth that allows for
a more balanced metaphysics.
The problem of epistemological foundationalism therefore relates closely to the
question of metaphysics. The critique of foundationalism is a critique of
everything that would ground human experience in such a way as to negate all
creative freedom, and as such is a critique of certain understandings of
metaphysics.13 It perhaps offers theology more agony than ecstasy, though as
we shall see in Chapter Five, deconstructionist theologians argue that some form
of intelligible 'mystical ecstasy' is precisely what the foundationalist critique of
metaphysics bequeaths to us. Nevertheless, the criticism that metaphysics is
fundamentally foundationalist and prevents the development of human potential
before it has begun, is not without purchase power. As Fergus Kerr says,
"The desire to bring the passing show to a halt, to secure it to immoveable
objects, lies deep in the metaphysical tradition. From Plato's forms to Bertrand
Russell's atomism there is a powerful inclination to get up or down to
something simple and ultimate: that which defies all further analysis, something
self-sufficient and elemental."14
W V. Quine and Richard Rorty are the main sources for the philosophical
critique of foundationalism. Quine's article "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", was
an early attempt to discredit the idea that a statement had to be reducible to
13 The question of metaphysical realism will occur again in Chapter Seven. Suffice to say
that metaphysics can be thought of in realist terms, critical/non realist terms, and explicitly anti-
realist terms.
14
Fergus Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986), p.62.
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terms that referred directly to immediate experience for it to be meaningful.15
Quine therefore presented an understanding of knowledge as 'web-like'. It was
an understanding of knowledge in which there were no unrevisable beliefs, but
only degrees of difference between different beliefs over how far a belief was
from its horizon in immediate experience.16 The 'web' metaphor for truth in
Quine was also linked to the idea of holistic truth, and suggested that truth was
not so much something that corresponded with a reality external to the web, but
was coherence within it.
Richard Rorty's more recent contribution to the question of foundationalism has
further developed some of Quine's ideas, and explored the way that knowledge
has been believed to mirror reality without distortion.17 Although Rorty
identifies the origins of foundationalist thinking as early as Plato, it is with
Descartes that foundationalism entered its prime. Rorty believes that the mirror
metaphor for knowledge ought to be abandoned and replaced with the idea of
knowledge as a 'conversation'.18 Knowledge in this model, is more like a therapy
15
See W V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" Philosophical Review 40 (1951), pp.20-
43.
16
See W V. Quine and J S. Ullian, ed. The Web ofBelief, 2nd edition. (New York, Random
House, 1978).
17
See Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, N.J; Princeton
University Press, 1979).
18
D Z. Phillips parts company with Rorty's when he says that, "The hidden values of
hermeneutics are not the necessary consequences of exposing the defects of foundationalism. The
postulate of exposing the hermeneutic conversation is prescriptive, and there is no reason why
religious believers should follow the prescription." D Z. Phillips, Faith after Foundationalism
(Colorado, Westview Press, 1988), p.xv.
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that cures itself of its own ills. Rorty repeatedly draws on three philosophers
(Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Dewey) whom, he claims, unitedly set aside the
Cartesian notion ofmind. Rorty claims that the distinctive and separate existence
of something mental is dependent upon the notion of "phenomenal entities",
which is in turn dependent upon the belief that something metaphysical informs
the human consciousness. Rorty argues that Descartes used the notion of the
"incorrigibly known" to bridge the gap between the intentional and the
phenomenal, and thereby introduced the idea that the mind has privileged access
to an incommunicable entity. Such an idea is anathema for Rorty, and is
demonstrative of the kind of epistemological foundationalism that has lured
philosophy into a false confidence. In rejecting it, Rorty urges us to abandon the
quest for an absolute truth which has universal adequacy, and rest content with
relative and only partially adequate truths.
With Rorty, the childlike confidence that there is a Truth outside the
contingencies of space and time has been shattered.19 Rorty also shows us how
the problems of epistemological foundationalism lead on to the further problem
19
Rorty is often criticised for having abandoned ethics and encouraged a slide towards
ethical relativism, nevertheless, in fairness to him it has to be said that the hermeneutic model
is not without a moral agenda (of a type), since improvements in our human situation do occur,
albeit as a result of the free creation of new meaning by the diverse use of language. It is the
occurrence of differences in linguistic behaviour and the new vocabularies that are formed as a
result that are the principle engines of personal transformation. Whether such a moral agenda
is sufficient for real transformation is open to question? Can Rorty's version of hermeneutics
provide us with a principle of criticism with which we can judge between interpretive practices?
Or must Rorty's position slide into an epistemological relativism that abandons all critical
leverage to the wind and relies on ethnocentric criteria of judgement?
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of linguistic representationalism. Nancey Murphy endorses a Rortian point of
view when she says,
"The referential theory of meaning in philosophy of language is the equivalent
of foundationalism in epistemology: Referentialism is not merely a parallel to
foundationalism, it is an integral part of the modern epistemological project
itself'.20
The critique of foundationalism is therefore also a critique of the idea that
language is a perfectly neutral medium that can act in a foundational way. It is
a critique of the idea that words are transparent upon reality and represent that
to which they refer, without distortion. This was the idea that positivism tended
to rely upon, believing that language was thought to map reality, on a one-on-
one basis. But the critique of foundationalism has raised suspicions over whether
language works like this. It has exploded once and for all the idea that there are
inviolable propositions, but even more problematically has led to the issue of
incommensurability. It is the idea that, it is not simply the means of our
expression that might be incommensurable with one another, but that the actual
contents of our expression might be incommensurable with one another, that
makes incommensurability so problematic. For the problem of
incommensurability suggests that conceptual schemes might be irreconcilably
different from one another!21 This idea has captivated thinkers for a long time
20
Stanley Hauerwas, Nancey Murphy and Mark Nation ed., Theology Without Foundations:
Religious Practice and the Future ofTheological Truth, (Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1994), p.14.
21
As we shall see in Chapter Two, Donald Davidson does not accord any credibility to the
idea that conceptual frameworks can be radically incommensurable, and thus offers theologians
the possibility of non-exclusive theological truth claims. For Davidson, interpretative practice
always involves us in a number of true beliefs.
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now. Its negative side, as we shall see in a later Chapter, issues in an
unnecessary scepticism which contradicts the very notion of a symbol, and ends
in an epistemological relativism which negates any attempt at a truth claim.
However, its positive side has been to pursue the idea that human knowledge,
while being fundamentally conditioned by the act of interpretation, need not
result in the denial of all claims to truth. As David Tracy says,
"Interpretation seems a minor matter, but it is not. Every time we act,
deliberate, judge, understand or experience, we are interpreting. To understand
at all is to interpret. To act well is to interpret a situation demanding some
action and to interpret a correct strategy for that action, to experience in
anything other than a purely passive sense (a sense less than human) is to
interpret and to be "experienced" is to be a good interpreter. Whether we know
it or not, to be human is to be a skilled interpreter."22
As Fergus Kerr notes, it was with the expansion of ethnography and social
anthropology in the wake of European colonisation of the rest of the world, that
the reality of interpretation and the idea that our conceptual frameworks might
be incommensurable, began to take hold.23 Both negatively and positively, the
idea that real communication between different human cultures could be an
illusory myth, has exercised considerable power. In the main, as Hilary Putnam
notes, the prevalent view had previously been that interpretation was "something
second class".24 Admittedly, interpretation was a lens, but it was a dirty,
disfiguring lens, the accuracy of which could not be trusted. But today, the
22
David Tracy, Plurality and Ambiguity, p.9.
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See Fergus Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein, p. 105.
24
Hilary Putnam, Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge, Mass; Harvard University
Press, 1990), p. 131.
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critique of foundationalism has placed the problem of interpretation in the
premier league. Today, interpretation has becomes neither merely second class,
nor a morally neutral medium, it is for the postfoundationalist mind, the nearest
thing to reality we can hope for. As Donald Davidson puts it, in interpretation
we seek to come out "believers of truth and lovers of the good".25
Many of the problems connected to linguistic representationalism and
incommensurability come from Wittgenstein. The early Wittgenstein's work
consisted of an attempt to establish a working distinction between meaningful
and non-meaningful language. Wittgenstein wanted to establish conditions for
meaning in language and the Tractatus argued that words denote objects, and
carry meaning because the structure of a sentence can be believed to reflect the
structure of reality.26 Although this did not apply to ordinary language - the
logical constants 'on', 'not', 'if, do not denote objects - nonetheless, language
reveals to us certain elementary structures that directly relate to the structure of
reality.
The early Wittgenstein therefore offered a way to make judgements about
legitimate and illegitimate uses of language (which is what positivism took from
him), but also offered us a means by which we can escape language to have
Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," Inquiries into Truth and
Interpretation (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984), pp.183-198.
26 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London, Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1961), tr. D F. Pears and B F. McGuinness.
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knowledge about that to which language refers. After completing the Tractatus,
Wittgenstein left philosophy apparently dissatisfied, no doubt conscious of the
severe limitations his work placed upon whole fields of enquiry represented by
religion, art and ethics. However, if the early Wittgenstein's work made it
possible to step outside language and legislate for appropriate and inappropriate
uses, in later writings Wittgenstein reversed this view. As emphatically as Kant
once declared "sapere aude", in Wittgenstein's later work we find the insistent
claim "Worte sind Taten", words are deeds.27 The later Wittgenstein argued
that we cannot stand outside language; that sentences do not have meaning
because they refer to a reality outside their use, but that they have meaning
through association with an action instead of a mental idea. Moreover, the later
Wittgenstein placed philosophy itself in an altogether different context. In the
later Wittgenstein the problems of philosophy are seen as originating with the
displacement or "holidaying" of words,
"Denn die philosophischen Probleme enstehen, wenn die Sprache feiert."28
As well as providing us with a fundamentally new way of understanding
language as inherently related to the community of language users,
Wittgenstein's appeal to practice also emphasises that the claim that religious
language is necessarily confused, is wrong. Such a claim is in fact a
demonstration of the way that practice has been ignored. Consequently, in
27
See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1953),
ed. GEM. Anscombe and R. Rhees, tr. GEM. Anscombe, p.546.
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stressing the practice of langauge use in this way, Wittgenstein helps us call into
question the modernist assumption that religion is an outmoded way of thinking
and that theological truth claims must inevitably be reduced to ethics. If the task
of philosophy is, as Wittgenstein claims, to reflect the use of language, and keep
from interfering with it as much as possible, then the claim that theological
language is necessarily confused, demonstrates that the ideal of this task has not
been attained.
Some have understood Wittgenstein's religious point of view to suggest that
theological truth claims can only be understood in the context of the
Wittgensteinian notion of a 'language game', and as a 'form of life'.29 In
essence such understandings take certain key themes from the later Wittgenstein,
and argue that theological truth claims are not open to criticism from outside the
culture they arise in, because a culture, as a form of life, has its own internal set
of linguistic rules. Religious discourse can consequently be seen as the internal
language of a form of life. As we shall shortly see, this idea is of vital
importance in the approach of one particular theological response to the issue of
foundationalism. Whether theological approaches such as these have interpreted
Wittgenstein correctly is a hotly debated question. Kerr's Theology After
Wittgenstein is at pains to argue that, serious as Wittgenstein's philosophical
29
This issue is clearly connected to the still-popular debate over Wittgensteinian fideism.
The primary text on this debate remains Kai Nielson's "Wittgensteinian Fideism" Philosophy 42
(1967), pp.206-238. Further discussion is also found in Kai Nielson's An Introduction to the
Philosophy ofReligion (Macmillan, London, 1982).
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intentions were, it was never his intention to apply the notion of a 'form of life'
("eine Lebensform"), to religion, even though others have been inspired along
those lines.30 To use Wittgenstein's notion of "eine Lebensform", in relation to
religion is to go far beyond Wittgenstein's use of the term. Furthermore, the
notion that a language game functions in isolation from others cannot be argued
to have any basis in Wittgenstein. For Wittgenstein, a game was not meant to
be something which connoted triviality, and thus the suggestion that a 'form of
life' can be assimilated within some kind of relativist perspective is mistaken.31
A more legitimate way to view Wittgenstein's religious point of view is, as Kerr
points out, to see his critique of language as an attempt to set the boundaries of
the sayable, with the intention of defining the unsayable more clearly.32 The
fact that Wittgenstein chose the primary classic of Western Christianity - St
Augustine's Confessions - to open the Philosophical Investigations with, goes
some way to establish his religious point of view. Kerr argues that the role that
Augustine's picture of the child learning language plays in the Philosophical
Investigations is as a picture of an individual with two languages. One is un-
30 Bertel Wahlstrom, Religious Action, a Philosophical Analysis (Abb, Abo Akademis
Forlag, 1987), for a discussion of the nature and distinctiveness of religious action inspired
largely by Wittgenstein's work.
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useable because the individual is in an alien land which does not speak his
tongue. The other is being learnt anew. The importance of this picture is
however, as an example of the epistemological predicament of the self.
Therefore, whatever else is meant by it, Wittgenstein's religious point of view
included an overwhelming critical interest in the philosophy of psychology, and
the theological conception of the self that had dominated Western thought.
Those who insist on applying Wittgensteinian ideas to religion are usually
theologians who are securely rooted in one religious tradition, and seem to
develop an approach which denies that an Archimedean point of reference
outside of any religious tradition or culture, is at all possible. This consequently
raises a serious question over what criticism can mean in such approaches. They
are also flawed with respect to the fact that religious believers do not often share
the same understanding of their religion as the Wittgensteinian interpreters.
Religion is indeed, in some sense, a 'form of life', but it is seldom a game.
Consequently, if the principle consequence of approaches concerned to employ
Wittgensteinian insights is, as I have suggested it to be, a denial of the
possibility of religious pluralism, then they become difficult to reconcile with the
universal ambitions of most religions.
On closer examination, difficulties also emerge with Wittgenstein's own
understanding of the task of philosophy. His appeal to practice may in the end
even be thought to constrain any attempts to reform, or revise practice. If the
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task of philosophy is simply to reflect without distortion, then the question that
is raised concerns how any real criticism occurs. Where is the critical leverage
in Wittgenstein's philosophy? Wittgenstein himself seemed to assume that the
primitive, pre-reflective nature of practice, would in the end be conducive to
human flourishing, but this is a big assumption. Furthermore, we could ask how
a Wittgensteinian model of religion can distinguish between religious practice
and merely superstitious practice? Using Wittgenstein, how can we argue that
the celebration of the Eucharist is any better, or worse, than a Satanic ritual, or
a revived Druidic celebration?
The best that we can take from Wittgenstein is an awareness of words as
epistemic practices, within which the notion of action is central. He (rightly)
suspends the necessity of a simple choice between metaphysical realism and anti-
realism, and provides a conceptual framework which does not insist on
establishing the nature of that which is described, before an epistemic claim can
be deemed valid. This may assist us in understanding the relationship between
religion and ethics as mutually open to revision, but it should not be used as a
new argument for non-public theological truths claims. The agony of
postmodernity goes deeper than the Wittgensteinians think.
We have so far sketched some of the problems postmodernity presents for
theological truth claims. Though they are considerable, they are, I would suggest,
outweighed by the opportunities that postmodernity affords theological truth. It
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seems that modernity forced upon all who would sincerely consider the
meaningfulness and rationality of theological truth claims a choice between two
models, where either the rationality of theological truth claims must be judged
according to criteria of rationality external to the culture that those claims are
made within, or judged according to criteria of rationality internal to the culture
that they are made within.33 But the impossibility of such a stark choice is seen
in the fact that externalist approaches risk reducing theological truth claims to
the allegedly detached criteria of rationality held to be foundational for all truth
claims, whereas internalist approaches on the other hand, risk elevating
theological truth claims, to the point where theological propositions themselves
become inviolable, and faith alone becomes the ultimate guarantor. Both
approaches therefore risk complying with foundationalism in different ways. The
externalist approach risks making criteria of rationality that are successful in one
sphere of experience, foundational for a different sphere of experience, while the
internalist approach risks making faith foundational as criteria for the rationality
33
Nancey Murphy argues in Anglo-American Postmodernity, pi 10, that postmodernism
presents theological truth claims with a forced choice between Scripture and experience as a
foundation for theological method. She argues that scriptural foundationalism involves
propositionalist understandings of language, and fails to acknowledge the way that language
interacts with other aspects of living, consequently criticism under this model can only ask how
far any theological truth measures up to the accepted interpretations that the sect, cult or religion,
has authorised of their scriptures. Criticism cannot extend to the interpretations of scriptures
other than the sect's own, nor can it even justify the uniqueness of its own scriptures.
Experiential foundationalism on the other hand means that different sects, cults or religions, do
at least have the possibility of critically evaluating each other's theological truth claims since
they have a common basis in the nature of universal religious experience. Nevertheless
experiential foundationalism involves expressivist understandings of language, and consequently
deprives truth claims based on theological language - as mere symbolic expressions of religious
experience - of the certainty of other truth claims, and consequently risks the meaningfulness of
criticism altogether.
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of theological truth claims.34 While both approaches risk different kinds of
foundationalism, the internalist approach seems also wedded to the added
problem of fideism.35 What the awareness of epistemological foundationalism,
linguistic representationalism and metaphysical reductionism constructively does
for us, is increase our awareness of the possibility of alternatives beyond this
impasse. And it is because theological truth claims are intimately connected with
the generation of possibility that we can interpret postmodernity with hope.
Postmodernity can offer theological truth claims a context wherein rationality is
both internal and external.
3. Postliberalism versus Revisionism: A Coherent Truth or a Correlated
Truth?
The context postmodernity has created for theological truth claims has led to the
development of two distinct approaches.36 These are postliberalism (the Yale
approach - represented in the work of Hans Frei, George Lindbeck, David
Kelsey, Stanley Hauerwas, Ronald Thiemann and Charles Wood) and
revisionism also called correlationism, (the Chicago approach - represented in
the work of David Tracy, Gordon Kaufman, Edward Farley and Schubert
34 This is because of the necessary conflict between its own internal 'sacred' rationality and
that perceived to lie outside in the 'secular' world.
35 As we shall see further in Chapter 6, Tracy has performed a clever marriage of public
rationality and art.
36
Although I deal with deconstructive postmodern theology in Chapter Five, where the
relationship between theological truth claims and language is discussed, I do not think its
proponents are at all interested in the idea of a theological truth claim as I have defined it.
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Ogden). The distinctions between the Yale and Chicago schools are sometimes
stressed to the exclusion of those things they share in common, yet even here
there is disagreement. Ronald Thiemann has himself claimed adherents of the
Chicago school to be foundationalist, and adherents of the Yale school to be
awft'-foundationalist.37 Gary Comstock has said that, "it is not at all clear that
Chicagoans Paul Ricoeur and David Tracy are philosophical foundationalists"38,
and Thomas Guarino has included Tracy amongst his descriptions of "moderate
postmoderns", "whose fundamental features include nonfoundationalist
ontology".39
Although Lindbeck in particular has tried to distinguish his position from Tracy
in recent years (as we shall see in Chapter Six), there is much to suggest in
Tracy's later work a more powerful non-foundationalist stance. To make sense
of what the two schools might share in common Nancey Murphy has pointed out
some interesting parallels between Tracy and Lindbeck. Firstly, like Tracy,
Lindbeck is concerned with providing a comprehensive theory of religion
generally, and not merely with a theory of the Christian religion. Secondly, like
Tracy, Lindbeck also treats religion as in the first instance a human phenomenon
37 See for example, Ronald Thiemann, Revelation and Theology, (Notre Dame, University
of Notre Dame Press, 1985), pp.44-46.
38
Gary Comstock, "Two Types of Narrative Theology," Journal of the American Academy
ofReligion LV/4 (1987), pp.687-717, p.688.
39
Thomas Guarino, "Between Foundationalism and Nihilism: Is Phronesis the Via Media
for Theology?" Theological Studies, 54 (1993), pp.37-54, p.46.
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in the form of language and culture.40 Richard Lint also offers some helpful
clarification over the distinctions between postliberalism and revisionism when
he discusses both as postpositive responses to the issue of foundationalism, and
says furthermore that they,
"ought not to be construed as theological visions themselves but rather as sets
of procedures by which a theological vision may be judged adequate."41
For all the possible similarities, nonetheless the differences between
postliberalism and revisionism are fundamental and concern the question of
public rationality. While revisionism relies on the liberal confidence that some
form of public reason will suffice in allowing understanding between cultures,
and that truth is therefore a correlated thing, postliberalism is self-confessedly
positibexdX, acknowledging only an internal rationality that prizes truth as a
coherent thing. Both postliberalism and revisionism therefore present the
question of theological truth claims with different sets of opportunities. Both
interpret the critique of foundationalism constructively as the exposure of the
weaknesses of positivism, but interpret the importance of the demise of
positivism differently. For the Yale school, the demise of positivism is most
acutely expressed as the failure of an Enlightenment notion of public rationality
that might act as a foundation for truth claims. It argues against models of
theological evaluation that rely on such notions, and for their replacement with
40
Nancey Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernism, p. 118.
41
Richard Lint, "The Postpositivist Choice: Tracy or Lindbeck" Journal of the American
Academy of Religion LXI/4 (1990), pp.655-677, p.658 n.7.
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models that understand rationality in non-foundationalist, i.e., narrative terms.
The Chicago school, on the other hand, understands the importance of the
demise of positivism in terms of the objectivity of knowledge and consequently
suggests a turn to a hermeneutic epistemological paradigm that functions within
the overarching norms of a public rationality.
Which, then, is the better approach that promises an understanding of a
theological truth claim between metaphysics and morals - one that neither
reduces to a moral command or privileges itself over a moral command?
Postliberalism has been keen to use some of the ideas found in Wittgenstein to
suggest that religion is more like a language or a culture than like an
epistemologically foundationalist body of knowledge.42 It has suggested that
religious beliefs function like grammar for life. For postliberals, religions
consequently resemble cultures or languages in that they are frameworks, or
idioms, within which reality can be construed and lived. For Lindbeck, the
grammar of religion shapes the lives of individuals by providing conditions for
both knowledge and experience, in the form of doctrinal rules.
It is because of this later point that Lindbeck has criticised Tracy's claim that
doctrine is the symbolic expression of the bearer's inner convictions. This, he
42
See D Z. Phillips' Chapter "Grammar and the Nature of Doctrine" in Faith After
Foundationalism (Colorado, Westview Press, 1988), pp.l95ff, for a good account of Lindbeck's
use of Wittgenstein.
45
argues, militates against the contextual nature of belief, and consequently does
not take adequate enough account of the actual use of doctrine. Speaking of all
those thinkers he believes follow in a liberal current which he terms
"experientialist-expressivist", he says,
"whatever the variations, thinkers of this tradition all locate ultimately
significant contact with whatever is finally important to religion in the pre-
reflective experiential depths of the self and regard the public or outer features
of religion as expressive and evocative objectifications (i.e., non-discursive
symbols) of internal experience."43
According to Lindbeck, theologians like Tracy have understood inner pre-
reflective experience as foundational, and language and culture merely expressive
of that foundational pre-reflective experience.
"the rationale suggested, though not necessitated, by an experiential-
expressivist approach is that the various religions are diverse symbolisations
of one and the same core experience of the Ultimate, and that they must
therefore respect each other, leam from each other, and reciprocally enrich each
other."44
However, Lindbeck argues that it is not possible to give any substance to the
notion of experience that such approaches hold to.45 For Lindbeck, since
experience and the language used to express it have an intimate, causal
relationship, it is not possible to strip away language or culture, and be left with
43




In "Lindbeck's New Program for Theology", The Thomist 49 (1985), pp.460-472, Tracy
says he prefers "hermeneutical-political" to "experiential-expressivist" as a description of his own
approach, though more recently he has used a term with more religious resonance - "mystical-
prophetic"."! now see more clearly... that in practice and thereby in theory, (the) pervasive
religious dialectic of manifestation and proclamation is best construed theologically as mystical-
prophetic." David Tracy, Dialogue With the Other: The Inter-Religious Dialogue (Louvain,
Peeters Press, 1990), p.7.
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pure experience. Lindbeck fundamentally does not believe it is possible to give
an intelligible account of Tracy's notion of experience and offers a challenge to
him,
"it is difficult or impossible to specify its distinctive features and yet unless
this is done, the assertion of commonality becomes logically vacuous". 46
There can be no doubt that Lindbeck puts his finger on one of the central
problems with liberal attempts to shift the metaphysical locus of theology. As
we shall see, even in Tracy's conception of the transformative role of faith, the
priority of transformed human subjectivity comes to the fore. Nevertheless, apart
from the obvious risks of confessionalism inherent in Lindbeck's own
grammatical understanding of theological truth claims, the problem of finding
something in grammar that will allow us to judge between rival truth claims, still
remains. Under Lindbeck's rubric, when one grammar meets another, there is the
real possibility of incommensurability. Religious people may in the end simply
be living within different grammars of life, and therefore incapable of mapping
their own experiences onto another's.
Where postliberalism is strong, is in terms of its appreciation of the role of
narrative. Gary Comstock's article, "Two Types of Narrative Theology", argues
that the defining distinction between Tracy and Lindbeck is in fact to do with
approaches to narrative.47 Postliberalism argues that narrative in religion is
46
George Lindbeck, The Nature ofDoctrine, p.32.
47 See Gary Comstock, "Two Types of Narrative Theology", p.687.
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irreducible (in Comstock's terminology "pure"), and that meaning is conveyed
by narrative, and in narrative. The revisionist approach, on the other hand, holds
that meaning is conveyed in narrative through interpretation (in Comstock's
terminology "impure"). Both are concerned to make a theological response to the
issues of postmodernity but believe in different ways of making that response.
Bolstered by the work ofAlasdair Maclntyre, postliberalism consequently argues
that it is only in narrative that we find rational criteria for any kind of moral
discourse; that there is no such thing as a non-narrative form of rationality that
demands commitment from all humans.48 Modernity's attempt to impose order
upon the diversity of moral frameworks found in human culture has failed. To
refuse to acknowledge the failure of public rationality and to insist upon a moral
philosophy that is dependent upon the notion of a global public discourse, is to
perpetuate disharmony and conflict. Such a global discourse does not exist, and
consequently, what is required is a return to localised, and sectarian moral
communities.49
There is much to say for the postliberals centralisation of narrative.
Nevertheless, if a theological truth claim remains forever a narrative truth, as it
seems to in postliberalism, then one person's story becomes as good as the next,
48 rSee Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press,
1981); also Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press,
1988).
49 See for example, James Wm. McLendon Jr., Ethics: Systematic Theology Volume /,
(Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1986).
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and we render ourselves incapable of the criticism and legitimation of any and
all claims to truth. The narrative truth of religion must therefore, in the interests
of conversation, be at some point interpreted; it must be made available in the
broadest possible public sphere.
While postliberal claims prevent us from taking the power of narrative at all
lightly, they nevertheless cannot provide us with the truly global public
necessary for the adjudication of religious truth claims. By prioritising
exclusivity, sectarianism and non-public discourse it can even be argued that
they encourage an abrogation of personal responsibility in the sphere of action.
Often accompanied by a deep-rooted suspicion of the modern political State,
communitarian ethicists and the narrative theologians that utilise their beliefs,
rely on a presupposed stability of culture. They assume that out of each local
community there will emerge a consensus on behaviour which will work for the
good of all communities. But where does evidence for this consensus come
from? What if the communitarian premise that discourses are incommensurable
leads also to the belief that actions are incommensurable? Even Nancey Murphy
criticizes Lindbeck for this, saying that his understanding of ontological truth
possesses no criteria for the assessment of theological truth claims.50 And as
Tracy himself says in response to Lindbeck's criticisms,
"his own cultural-linguistic model needs to manifest far more than the present
work does its ability to handle the question of truth-claims in theology to avoid
50 See Nancey Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity, p. 122.
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the obvious charges of 'relativism', 'confessionalism', and even 'fideism'."51
Ultimately therefore, as Murphy points out, it can be argued that Lindbeck
cannot evaluate the truth of different cultures because his understanding of truth
owes too much to a communitarian model which invites religious relativism.52
It therefore seems fair to suggest, that Lindbeck's vehement rejection of
foundationalism might owe more to his insistence upon a highly prioritized
position for Christian theological truth claims than to any conviction that the
problem foundationalism poses for theological truth claims is quite as he has
thought it to be. It is a damning charge, but is it the case that in the final
analysis Lindbeck has a sectarian agenda? According to Gordon Michalson,
"the postliberal position on the intelligibility of the Christian faith... controls
the total action of the book".53
and Lindbeck himself says,
"the motivations for this book are ultimately more substantively theological
than theoretical".54
Consequently, does his criticism of what he tags the 'experiential-expressivist'
theological model of Tracy and others, hinge on the fact that it does not do
enough to preserve the particularity of Christian truth claims. While it would be
unfair to answer these questions outright, they are nevertheless questions we are
51 David Tracy, "Lindbeck's New Program for Theology: A Reflection", p.461.
52
See Nancey Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity, p. 118.
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left with. What seems unquestionable, is that postliberalism does not do enough
to preserve the idea of theological truth claims as open to public, critical
evaluation. Lindbeck, it would appear, is in the end not really interested in such
an understanding of theology. As Richard Lints says, in speaking of Lindbeck
and his followers,
"ultimately, questions of criticism become unimportant to this camp of
theologians".55
We can possibly even draw a more pointed analogy, with earlier attempts like
Barth's to make theological truth claims immune to cultural criticism, which, as
Adina Davidovich says,
"threaten, perhaps unwittingly, to free the dark forces of religious fanaticism
and sectarian bigotry from the burden of justifying themselves before a court
of reason and before the claims of morality and science".56
It therefore seems fair to argue, that an approach to theological truth such as
postliberalism's will not find an audience. At least, not an audience that
approximates to the fully public forum, needed for the evaluation of theological
truth claims. Consequently, it is because of the absence of a fully public
audience for theological truth claims that postliberalism cannot promise an
understanding of a theological truth claim that is a successful mediator between
metaphysics and morals. With theological truth somehow trapped in culture, how
is it able to exercise any critique ofmorality, other than the morality it witnesses
55 Richard Lints, "The Postpositivist Choice: Tracy or Lindbeck", p.669.
56
Adina Davidovich, Religion as a Province ofMeaning: The Kantian Foundations of
Modern Theology (Minneapolis, Fortress Press,; 1^93), p.307ff.
in its own local spheres? Postliberal theological truth claims may indeed offer
insight and coherence, for lives lived within the agreed fabric of the culture they
come from. But confronted with another culture, outside that which they come
from, does a postliberal theological truth claim have anything to say to anyone?
Is there even the possibility of the constructive criticism of another culture's
morality? Or do we end up with a return to a truly 'dark age' in which the only
culture that there is, is the one I exist in? And if so, consequently, how can
postliberals avoid privileging the metaphysics that spring from their own
cultural-religious ethics, over the moral claims of all cultures apart from their
own?
In contrast to postliberals, revisionists insist that such incommensurability that
exists between different systems of belief (and they admit to some) is only real
to the extent that a public rationality allows it to be. Lint brings this point out
well,
"The postliberal leans in the direction of the postpositivist critique of the
verifiability criterion and Tracy and moderate postmoderns lean in the direction
of the postpositivist critique of the objectivity of knowledge. The one is
concerned more narrowly with the structures of human knowledge and the
other is concerned with the relative objectivity of that knowledge. Tracy wants
to affirm the underdetermination of all knowledge and thereby maintain some
criteria of epistemic adequacy for the larger public of the academy."57
Following Schleiermacher, and in the tradition of liberal and mediating theology,
David Tracy is a prime example of a revisionist theologian. Tracy believes that
57 Richard Lints, "The Postpositivist Choice: Tracy or Lindbeck?", pp.670-1.
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theology is not merely a function of, and within, one particular section within
society, but is at its very heart a function of society in its totality. All authentic
theology must, in principle, be accessible to all in society. Theology must be
public discourse. As we shall see, for Tracy, theology has three publics, the
church, the academy and society itself. The role of the theologian in being
responsible to these three publics is to,
"explicate the basic plausibility structures of all three publics through the
formulation of plausibility arguments and criteria of adequacy".58
It is this responsibility which ensures the publicness of theology because the task
of the theologian is to lay bare the various forms of truth claims that arise from
both the contemporary situation and the religious tradition, within which the
theologian stands. Tracy's explicit desire is therefore to move the theological
conversation forward into a framework whereby the validity of theological truth
claims are secured by centralising criteria of publicness. How successful Tracy
is, as we shall see, relies on his claim that the aesthetic is the most public of
human realms. The question that Tracy believes has been successfully answered
in revisionist approaches to theological truth, is how a religious culture might
make truth claims accessible in the broader sphere of culture, and retain both a
universalistic appeal and a particular meaningfulness.
To say that the theological conversation must inquire into the major symbols of
religious belief and practice is not meant to exclude broader cultural symbols.
58 David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, p.31.
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It is meant merely to set some disciplinary boundaries that makes a move
towards a publicly accessible theological truth claim plausible. As we shall see
when we discuss David Tracy's work in detail, his way of establishing this move
uses the notion of the classic, as a means by which specifically religious
symbols have apivotal though not necessarily exclusive place in the development
of a systematic theology. The means by which Tracy's pluralistic and public
theological truth claim is justified, relies on an idea which has a long pedigree,
and which sees the truth claims of religion and art as standing or falling
together. However, whether this idea is sufficient to ensure that a theological
truth claim is neither reducible to a moral command, or privileged above a moral
command will be the key question discussed in Chapters Five to Seven. Can
such a model of theological truth, such as Tracy's, enable a move from imagined
possibilities to real possibilities?
Conclusion
In this Chapter I have first, outlined the problem this thesis hopes to deal with.
Secondly, I have described the philosophical context that the problem is located
in. Thirdly, I have demarcated the field of scholarship wherein the most fruitful
exploration of the problem can take place. I have argued that at the heart of the
problem of theological truth claims lies the issue of religion between
metaphysics and morals, and that the pertinence of the question is sharpened in
the epistemological debates of postmodernity. Postliberalism's response to the
problems raised by postmodernity fails because it fuels a sectarian division
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between cultures and has a model of theological truth claims that does not
promise to allow theological truth a successful mediating role between
metaphysics and morals. Consequently, I have argued in contrast, that Tracy's
approach, with the central category of revisability, lives up to the ideal of
publicly accessible theological truth claim, and provides the better of the two





"To escape the impasses of modernity, theology must more than ever
investigate itself and its epistemological foundations as fides quaerens




In Chapter One I have argued that a revisable understanding of theological truth
is one that offers the best possibility of a bridge between metaphysics and
morals, and that such a category is best preserved within an approach that relies
on some form ofpublic rationality. Since there is much debate over models of
public reason, in this Chapter I will explore one option that theologians have
been keen to pursue. I will begin by examining how the dominant form of
reason in modernity has made the issue ofpublic rationality so pointed, and will
explore the failure of instrumentalist notions of reason with respect to the
cognitive claims of religion and modernity's own chosen repository of ultimacy,
the self. Next, I will examine the idea of a communicative rationality found in
the work of Jtirgen Habermas, before asking to what extent communicative
1
Anne Fortin-Melkevik, "The Reciprocal Exclusiveness of Modernity and Religion among
Contemporary Thinkers Jiirgen Habermas and Marcel Gauchet", in C. Geffre and J. Jossua The
Debate On Modernity (London, SCM Press Ltd, 1992), pp.57-66, p.66.
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rationality allows theological truth claims the space to be revisable. My
conclusion is that the setting of theological truth claims within the context of a
communicative rationality does allow for the possibility of religious pluralism,
because by moving truth into the sphere of action we circumvent the problem
of incommensurability. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether communicative
rationality by itself can make truth revisable, without recourse to an ultimate
goal. Models of communicative rationality have the possibility of the future unity
of mankind as their goal, but is this goal enough to realise the possibility of the
future unity of mankind? Thus, I argue communicative rationality needs the
supplementation of an eschatological dimension to allow for the revisability of
truth and the distinctiveness of a theological truth claim.
1. Instrumentalist Rationality, Religion and Human Identity
In Chapter One we have seen something of how postmodernity alters our
perspective on the question of truth. Arising out of the as-yet ill-defined demise
of modernity is an awareness that the failure of modernity has to do with the
priority given to one highly individual form of rationality, and that a
supplementation with a more public rationality is long overdue.2 It is, I shall
argue, the failure of modernity's reification of instrumentalist rationality with
respect to both the cognitive claims of religion and an adequate model of human
2 For a good discussion of contemporary models of reason see Richard Bernstein, "The
Rage Against Reason" in The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of
Modernity/Postmodernity (Cambridge, Mass; MIT, 1992), pp.31-56.
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identity, that has made this supplementation an urgent requirement.
The contemporary theological conversation is deeply indebted to the critique of
rationality that is provided by the Frankfurt school of critical theory.3 Their
achievement has been to further demonstrate the ways in which modernity has
given precedence to a form of rationality which, although apparently successful
in the techno-economic sphere, has been deeply destructive within other spheres
of human life. The socio-political inadequacies of instrumental reason are
therefore by now well-known. Instrumental reason is successful in establishing
the means by which goals can be accomplished, it allows for the maximum
possible procedural economy, but is incapable of establishing the goals
themselves. As Alasdair Maclntyre has said,
"it (instrumental reason) can assess truths of fact and mathematical relations
but nothing more. In the realm of practice it can speak only of means."4
The question we will be faced with by the end of this Chapter is whether the
alternative to instrumental rationality - communicative rationality - is any better
at establishing goals!
The crisis of instrumental rationality (the language of 'crisis' is very much the
language of the Frankfurt School), clearly goes beyond the inadequacies of any
See Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York,
Seabury Press, 1972); Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory (London, Routledge Kegan & Paul,
1984) and Negative Dialectics (New York, Seabury Press, 1966).
4
Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue (London, Duckworth, 1981), p.52.
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one philosopher or tradition of philosophy. The key problem it creates is the
positing of an unbridgeable gulf between the good and the true. An everyday
example will demonstrate this point. How many times do we see and hear the
suggestion that the model of human personhood that all persons ought to aspire
to holds rational competence to be its primary quality? We need not look far in
society to see the redundancy of such a model, yet who is regarded seriously that
mounts a platform and calls for a model of human personhood that equates
intelligence with goodness? Witness the confusion in just about every aspect of
contemporary society over an adequate model for understanding the relationship
between the objective world of facts and the subjective world of values. As if
it is not plain from the outset that the confusion comes not from the failure to
find an adequate model, but from the impossibility of the premised distinction.
The fact/value dichotomy is then one of the clear weaknesses in instrumental
rationality. Modernity's chosen account of reason threatened the realm of the
ethical with obsolescence, and introduced the real prospect of ethical relativism.
Hilary Putnam puts his finger on the problem when he says,
"an adequate philosophical account of reason must not explain away the ethical
facts, but enable us to know how they can be facts, and how we can know
them."5
a. Instrumental Rationality and Religion
The crisis precipitated by modernity's version of reason is demonstrated
5
Hilary Putnam, Realism With a Human Face (Cambridge, Mass; Harvard University Press,
1990), p.162.
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powerfully in relation to the cognitive claims of religion. From the ordinary
family occasions that we invest with a surplus of meaning to the symbols and
rites of a complex and powerful political democracy, something which can be
described as ritual, and which affords the opportunity of faith, informs and
guides human action. Yet instrumentalist notions of reason have persisted in mis¬
interpreting both ritual and faith as superstition. The function of religion in
providing a framework within which sense could be made of random
occurrences has been usurped by means-dominated models of science as the
most effective way of predicting and altering the course of events. But the claim
that humanity has somehow progressed beyond primitive superstition, and that
religious faith and ritual is devoid of meaning, is a denial of the power of human
creativity. Such a claim is, I believe, an unnecessary concession to the totalising
influence in instrumental reason, that should in the first place be the target of
any responsible criticism.
When we attempt to understand religious belief and behaviour using the variety
of human/social science approaches that have become familiar within the general
field of the humanities, we are inevitably forced to accept that religious belief
and practice carries a remainder for the participant. That is, that any explanation
that we offer is only provisionally adequate, and does not exhaust the meaning
of the belief or practice for the believer. We are therefore forced into choosing
between two conclusions. Either the believer is deluded about the excess of
meaning his/her religion provides. Or, that it is the science that we bring to
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religion that is at fault. In the positivistic climate of modernity the latter option
has been unthinkable and so, even in the field of religious studies, the former
option triumphed, creating the familiar secular scepticism of theological truth.
But both of these options are unacceptable and stem from a fundamental flaw in
understanding religious truth claims as exclusively propositional. As Bertel
Wahlstrom says,
"To say that a belief system consists of 'an enduring organisation of cognitions
about one or more aspects of the universe' and to apply this view to the belief
system of religion can be misleading in fundamental ways. For one thing, this
view suggests that understanding beliefs is like understanding propositions. It
ignores the fact that we can understand what it is to hold a belief only if we
understand what people do. This is so because different beliefs are held in
different ways. We cannot tell what kind of beliefs religious beliefs are without
knowing the place they occupy in the lives of people."6
How then has instrumentalist rationality failed the cognitive claims of religion?
How does instrumental reason marginalise theological truth claims? Anne Fortin-
Melkevik is unambiguous in her answer to this question.
"The thinkers of modernity, from Kant to Max Weber, radicalize the
fundamental problem of the reciprocal exclusion of faith and reason and restrict
the practice of theology to the sphere of that which is not knowledge and has
no rationality".7
While some might take issue with Fortin-Melkevik's analysis of the legacy Kant
has left religion with (in Chapter Four we will see Adina Davidovich present a
different picture of Kant's view on religion to the one we are accustomed to),
6
Bertel Wahlstrom, Religious Action, a Philosophical Analysis (Abb, Abo Akademis
Forlag, 1987), p.23.
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we can nevertheless agree that instrumental rationality has led to the
marginalisation, if not ghettoisation, of theological truth claims. It is also the
case that the main cause of this has been, as Fortin-Melkevik says, the perceived
"reciprocal exclusion of faith and reason". The history of the debate over the
relationship between faith and reason is indeed a long one, and is perhaps the
distinctive and paradigmatic theological debate. What I am suggesting here is
that the debate needs to take account of the way that instrumental rationality has
been allied with an understanding of a conceptual scheme that has not served the
interests of religion well, and which has robbed theological truth claims of any
ordinary cognitive content.8
In modernity, the conceptual scheme has been seen as a system of categories
responsible for the organisation of raw experience. The picture that this
understanding has relied upon is of a giant railway network. The railway-
network provides a basic infrastructure that ensures continuity and uniformity.
It facilitates easy communication and the speedy transfer of information with the
minimum of distortion. Through its connections with the rest of known culture
it gives identity to places that lack any. However, the railway network is in fact
its own system of reference. In modernity, the conceptual scheme has a similar
nature. It has also become its own system of reference, to the extent that in
g
See for example Terry F.Godlove Religion, Interpretation and Diversity of Belief: The
Framework Model From Kant To Durkheim To Davidson, (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1989), in which it is argued that religions are alternative conceptual frameworks.
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modernity reality derives its identity from the shape of the conceptual schemes
that have been imposed upon it.
The problem with this is that it fosters a scheme/world dualism which
marginalises much that constitutes ordinary human experience. Anything which
turns out not to be scheme-like, cannot 'hook onto' reality. The realms
represented in the worlds of art and religion are the most obvious losers in this
respect but ordinary human experiences equally suffer under this understanding.
Although critics will argue that implicit in the notions of art and religion lie
some kind of unavoidable correspondence between them and a conceptual
scheme that manages all that they are taken to represent, still it is fair to say that
the notion of a conceptual-scheme must come up against the basic human
experiences of love, desire and suffering.9 Conceptual schemes are therefore
only partially adequate, and involve an inevitable conflict between the scheme
itself, and the reality it represents.
The origins of the problem of scheme/world dualism can of course be traced
throughout the history of philosophy. However, nowhere has it become more
acute than in the work of Immanuel Kant. Although Kant is widely held to have
endorsed a fundamental scheme/world dualism, his own philosophy makes subtle
distinctions which attempt to limit its negative consequences. Kant's greatest
9
As we shall see later, Tracy's notion of an analogical imagination is an attempt to
overcome the sterility of the modernist notion of a conceptual scheme.
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achievement was to add nuances to a crude distinction between the passive
incoming data which constitutes experience, over against the active organising
framework that are the categories of understanding.
"But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that
it all arises from experience. For it is quite possible that even our empirical
knowledge is a compound of that which we perceive through impressions, and
of that which our own faculty of knowledge (incited by sense impressions)
supplies from itself."10
For Kant, we are able to know the world because and precisely to the extent that
we organise it through the categories of understanding. Therefore, although Kant
argued that we see the world through a conceptual scheme, for him, this did not
mean that the empirical world was forever distorted or hidden from us. It was
the necessary condition of empirical knowledge that our conceptual scheme was
transcendent to us. What Kant holds to is a view of human knowledge that
differs radically from the one pre-supposed in earlier empiricist formulations and
corresponds more with something Adina Davidovich hazards to call religious.
A similar view of cognition can be found in Simone Weil. Weil's model begins
with a conception of the human self as action.11
10
Immanuel Kant Critique of Pure Reason, in Lewis White Beck (ed.) Kant Selections,
(New York, Macmillan, 1988), p. 104.
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Peter Winch suggests in The Just Balance, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
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Press, 1993), p.78. "Simone Weil wants to bring us back from metaphysical words to real words.
Instead of drawing a sharp distinction between speculative and practical knowledge she urges
us to give practice, human action, a central place in our speculations."
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"Existing, thinking, knowing are merely aspects of a single reality: ability to
act",12
also,
"What I am is defined by what I can do".13
Central to the formation of concepts for Weil is the idea that perception is
active.14 Perception itself involves a human reaction which she describes as "a
sort of dance",
"The very nature of the relationship between ourselves and what is external to
us, a relationship which consists in a reaction, a reflex, is our perception of the
external world. Perception of nature, pure and simple, is a sort of dance; it is
this dance that makes perception possible for us."15
Weil indicates in this statement that even primitive, pre-reflective experiences are
not passive, but active, and that by recognising the centrality of action in
concept-formation we can give an account which does not create an un¬
bridgeable gulf between experience and the world. When we move away from
Weil's more directly philosophical claims and consider her interest in religion,
12 Simone Weil, Lectures in Philosophy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978),
tr. Hugh Price, p. 10.
13
Peter Winch, The Just Balance (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989) p. 10,
quoting from Simone Weil's Lectures in Philosophy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1978), tr. Hugh Price.
14
Weil's earliest intimations of an anti-Cartesian turn is found in her student dissertation
"Science et perception dans Descartes". In this work she modified the Cartesian argument to read
"I (can) act therefore I am". Although, as Winch suggests, unlike Descartes Weil does not
emphasise the existential and ontological import of the statement, it is nevertheless clear that
from the outset thought, for Weil, is characterised by activity. Her student dissertation goes on
to argue that the activity of thought cannot be understood to be a power over anything because
it cannot be demonstrated that thought itself achieves the things it supposes itself to be causally
related to. See Winch, The Just Balance, p.9.
15 Simone Weil, Lectures on Philosophy, p.52.
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we can identify certain potential insights which have a clear bearing on the
problem of theological truth claims. For example, religion, as in the case of
perception, can also be understood alongside the centrality of action in concept-
formation. Indeed to fail to do this, which is the root flaw in philosophy of
religion, means that the context in which concepts have their sense, is ignored.
By thinking of any experience as passive, including that which we would wish
to call religious experience, we create an unbridgeable gap between the
experience and its object. But the gap must be fdled with the idea of experience
as active. And this is why, according to Weil, we can talk meaningfully of a
"case of contradictories which are true",
"God exists: God does not exist. Where is the problem? I am quite sure there
is a God in the sense that I am quite sure my love is not illusory. I am quite
sure that there is not a God in the sense that I am quite sure nothing real can
be anything like what I am able to conceive when I pronounce this word. But
that which I cannot conceive is not an illusion."16
What might distinguish a post-instrumentalist theological truth claim, is the idea
that experience is not passive, and therefore can contain within itself the seeds
of disclosive possibility. As we shall come on to see, the place possibility
occupies in a theological truth claim is of central importance for the argument
of this thesis. In Ricoeur and Tracy, theological truth claims disclose the
possibility of authenticity. While I will concur that theology is indeed about the
16
Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace (London, Routledge Kegan & Paul, 1952), tr. Emma
Craufurd, p. 103. For Weil, it is a mistake to think that the theological confusion that exists over
what the word 'God' refers to, negates its use. What makes God real, in her account is the
human desire for the good expressed in love. See for example, Simone Weil, First and Last
Notebooks (London, Oxford University Press, 1970), tr. Richard Rees, p. 157. "If God should be
an illusion from the point of view of existence, He is the sole reality from the point of view of
the good... God exists because I desire Him, that is as certain as my existence".
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disclosure of possibility, I will not agree that what is disclosed in Ricoeur's and
Tracy's model, is adequate.
Part of the problem with theological truth claims in modernity is clear.
Modernity's model of reason has been intimately linked to a model of a
conceptual scheme that has fared badly for theological truth claims because there
could be no validation of religious experience outside the scheme/world dualism
which modernity fostered. But conceptual schemes cannot be abandoned
altogether. We must therefore ask if a theological truth claim inevitably involves
a conceptual framework, then do such frameworks not involve exclusive truth
claims, or can a conceptual framework be both permanent and provisional at the
same time? Donald Davidson thinks the latter. In response to the claim that
different conceptual schemes, implies incommensurability between schemes,
Davidson has produced an argument which associates having a conceptual
scheme with having a language.17 Davidson argues that this understanding
avoids implying an incommensurable relationship between differing schemes.
Davidson is accurately described as a "non-reductive materialist", and as such
he breaks with a long tradition associating materialism with reductionism.18 He
is a materialist in the sense that he affirms that a person's physical state
17
See for example Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" in On
Truth and Interpretation (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984), pp.183-198.
18 Simon Evnine, Donald Davidson (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991), p.5.
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constrains their mental state, but by continuing to argue for the "anomalism of
the mental", for the idea that mind is not governed by laws, he follows Quine
in making a break with the connection between forms of materialism and the
idea that every meaningful statement is translatable into a statement about
immediate experience. The problem of interpretation in Davidson's account of
it, arises out of his discussion of the truth conditions for language, in Tarski's
formal theory ofmeaning. The question of how such truth conditions can apply
in a more universal context is what he describes as the problem of "radical
interpretation", and this problem is in essence the problem of the
incommensurability of conceptual schemes.
According to Davidson a conceptual scheme is held to be a "way of organising
experience", a "system of categories that give form to the data of sensation", a
"point of view from which individuals, cultures or periods, survey the passing
scene".19 Although the notion of a conceptual scheme is useful in explaining
differences in belief and behaviour, the paradox of it is that such differences can
only be understood if there is a common co-ordinate system on which to plot
them. Consequently, the existence of such a system rules out from the outset the
possibility of radical incommensurability.
To make his argument work, the first move Davidson makes is to identify
19 See Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme", p. 183.
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conceptual schemes with language. The definition of a conceptual scheme is for
Davidson that it conforms to certain norms identifiable as language. This done,
the second move Davidson makes is to argue that the definition of language is
that it is something that can be translated. Consequently, since a conceptual
scheme is a language, there can be no ultimate incommensurability between
different conceptual schemes. His argument appears to hinge on a simple
syllogism. All languages are translatable. A conceptual scheme is a language,
therefore a conceptual scheme is translatable. To unsettle Davidson's argument
we would need to undermine either of the two premises.
Assuming that the premises of Davidson's argument can be defended, it can be
useful in a number of areas of debate. With it the problems of religious
pluralism and the secular/sacred and Church/world dichotomies can be alleviated.
The tension between the universal and the particular in religious ways of seeing
the world may be resolved. As one enthusiast of a Davidsonian schema has
written,
"Suitably redirected, it shows that Taoists and Druids, as well as primitives and
Presbyterians, must agree on most matters, though not, perhaps, on most
religious matters."20
Most importantly for this thesis, as Tracy himself points out, the use of
Davidson's understanding of a conceptual scheme can allow the idea of
possibility to have more cognitive leverage and therefore help define a
20
Terry Godlove, "In What Sense are Religions Conceptual Frameworks", Journal of the
American Academy of Religion 52 (1984), pp.289-305, p.290.
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theological truth claim more precisely,
"That a Davidsonian position can also be developed into a fuller hermeneutical
position where possibility and analogy would play the major conceptual roles
continues to seem to me to be a promising alternative."21
The argument that I have so far been pursuing in this Chapter therefore suggests
that the problem with theological truth claims in modernity relates to the pre¬
eminence modernity has given to a certain model of a conceptual scheme. In this
model, cognition is understood entirely passively. Religious experience
consequently has to be interpreted as either y?re-cognitive or non-cognitive.
However, neither of these understandings provides any opportunity for
something that purports to be a theological truth claim. Nevertheless, using
Davidson's understanding of a conceptual scheme, there may be a way of
holding on to the cognitive dimension of a theological truth claim without
incurring conceptual relativism.
b. Instrumental Rationality and the 'Self
There is some irony in the confidence that modernity invested in the self as its
own chosen repository of ultimacy. For it is precisely with the self that
instrumental rationality has been seen to be most vulnerable, and has precipitated
the crisis which has demanded a more public form of reason. Nowhere more was
modernity's notion of reason expected to achieve lasting results than in relation
to the self. However, the Enlightenment confidence in the fact that, firstly the
21
David Tracy, Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion and Hope (London, SCM
Press Ltd, 1987), p. 138 n.30.
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deepest workings of the human condition could be described with all the
precision of a timepiece, then secondly that such a description could create a
more just society, rested upon the success of instrumental reason in avoiding
describing a self which could only view the other as external to it. Modernity's
model of reason has not made good on this promise, with the other not simply
being viewed as external to the self, but as the enemy whose subjugation is
necessary for survival.22
At the heart ofmodernity's notion of the self is the picture of an essentialist self
that can order reality with the divine competence of a Medieval God. Frank
Farrell makes the suggestion that the idea that God "knows all things by
knowing his own essence" and "sees everything in one, namely, in himself
alone"23, passes directly into modern notions of subjectivity as the idea that the
relationship with what is other is in fact a self-relation, that what is encountered
in the other, is in fact one's own interiority.24 The consequent struggle for
22
Religious fundamentalism is probably the fullest expression of the crisis of modernity's
notion of the self.
yi
Frank Farrell, Subjectivity, Realism and Postmodernity; The Recovery of the World
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.7, quoting from Aquinas' Summa Contra
Gentes (Rome, 1984), tr. A C. Pegis et al and Summa Theologiae (London, 1989), tr. Timothy
McDermott.
24
Many others have sought to identify this problem in terms of the thesis that the modern
self still bears the damaging imprint of a religious worldview. Frank Farrell's approach follows
in this tradition by attempting to identify the theological model that he believes still remains
imbued in modern notions of the self. In Subjectivity, Realism and Postmodernism he documents
what he regards as being certain outmoded models of subjectivity. Farrell is clear that although
one aspect of this disenchantment is the disillusionment experienced by the modem self, his
interest lies more in the "loss of the world's or subjectivity's enchanted status," p.3. Farrell
argues that the maintenance of theological models of the self have contributed to the problems
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mastery and domination that ensues is therefore easy to identify. As Farrell
says,
"Subjectivity can then be thought of as possessing an awareness of content
independently of how things happen in the world, and as secure in a rich self-
presence, because of its relation, implicit or explicit, to a divine reality."25
For Fergus Kerr, this model of the self coincides with the notion of objectivity,
as the only sure criteria for knowledge. With objectivity as the only criterion of
knowledge, the role of the human knower becomes devalued, and the assertion
consequently becomes possible that,
"the only perfect depiction of reality would have to be from nobody's point of
view".26
Kerr furthermore suggests that paradoxically, the outcome of this claim is to
assert once again a positive and naive metaphysics that makes God's point of
view the only fully valid point of view. Although Kerr does not intend to reject
outright the Cartesian turn in theology (the notion of a self-conscious,
autonomous individual is a powerful metaphysical preconception and is not
simply wrong, as if it can be replaced), it is, nevertheless, a philosophy of the
self which contains an inverted theology. It suggests (wrongly) that there is a
metaphysically real and distinct, centre whose existence confirms and guarantees
of modernity by the progressive "thinning" of the world, with a nominalism (meaning the denial
of the real existence of abstract entities), that has placed the least possible constraint on human
willing and ordering.
25 r
Frank Farrell, Subjectivity, Realism and Postmodernity: The Recovery of the World, p.9.
26
Fergus Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986), p.24.
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our humanity. This, for Kerr, is untenable not because the self can be replaced
by something more legitimate, but because such a suggestion ends in a denial
of our material existence.27
The failure of instrumental rationality with respect to the self is therefore two¬
fold; on the one hand the subject and ego-centred self of modernity is incapable
of viewing otherness as anything other than a threat; on the other hand it is a
self which leads to the creation of a radical dichotomy between the spiritual and
the material, mind and matter, God and man. Criticisms of this kind from
theological stables are of course not hard to come by but constructive proposals
that successfully engage the problem are. One such constructive proposal is to
assert that what being a self means is intimately linked to the question of what
it means to be good. In Sources of the Self Charles Taylor offers a sustained
analysis of the modern view of the self, with exactly this aim.28 Taylor wishes
to avoid the picture of the self forced upon us by instrumental reason, and offers
a carefully articulated moral ontology which attempts to make discussion of the
sources of the self, "the goods, reflection on which, morally empower us", viable
27
In Anthony C. Thistelton's Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self (Edinburgh, T &
T Clark, 1995), we are shown how the self ofpostmodernity, although possessing greater realism
than the illusory optimism of the self of modernity, nevertheless can only find fulfilment in the
context of a theology of hope. Thiselton's claim is that while postmodernity is successful in
exposing truth claims as disguised attempts to legitimate power bids, the task of distinguishing
between manipulative and non-manipulative (ie Christian/religious) truth claims still remains,
and falls to the practice of theology. See Chapter 3, "Do All Controlling Models in Religion
Serve Manipulative Purposes?", pp 19-26.
28 See for example Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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in an increasingly difficult moral context.29
Taylor suggests that where modernity's view of the self has gone astray has been
by separating identity and the good. What it means to be a self is inseparable
from what it means to be good. Taylor believes that our moral choices are
determined by more than simple behaviourist principles; that our moral choices
cannot be reduced, as they are in modernity's account, to the level of one
subjective choice against another, because there exists certain intuitions, what he
calls "strong evaluations", which demonstrate our commitment to something
which transcends our personal preferences and to which we accord more than
passing value.
"[These] involve discriminations of right or wrong, better or worse, higher or
lower, which are not rendered valid by our own desires, inclinations, or
choices, but rather stand independent of these and offer standards by which
they can be judged."30
For Taylor, these intuitions can be divided into three related fields of conviction
relating to the human condition; intuitions relating to the sanctity of human life;
intuitions relating to the ideal of the good life or happiness; and finally,
intuitions relating to the nature of human dignity. They provide us with the
bedrock hope of consensus in the public realm and personal satisfaction in the
individual sphere. However, Taylor also claims that the peculiar context of






precedented way, that our contemporary situation is one which has lost the
frameworks or horizons that once made our intuitions more self-evident. His
intention is therefore to defend the need for an articulation of our deepest moral
intuitions and thus hopefully preserve a horizon within which we can form
criteria of judgement.
What Taylor shows us, therefore, is that the crowning achievement ofmodernity
has been to cap its understanding of the self, as something which denies
otherness and enforces unwanted dichotomies, with a model of selfhood which
renders us helpless in deciding upon how we should behave in the world. With
such a catalogue of errors the limitations of instrumental rationality are fully
exposed. The model of selfhood that has emerged out of modernity is one that
betrays at least three less desirable characteristics; it views the other as external
and threatening to its own integrity; it separates inherently related spheres of
human experience; and it is devoid of a dimension which might achieve the
unity of identity and morality. Modernity's hope of establishing a more just
social order on the basis of such an understanding of the self, is therefore fatally
compromised; and at the root of this is the failure of modernity's own model of
reason. Modernity's favourite son must therefore take his place along with his
siblings. Instrumental rationality must be regarded as only one possible model
and the recovery of more inclusive notions of reason must be made. A
communicative model of rationality is an alternative. This accepts both the
critical theorists suspicion of the adequacy of modernity's model of reason in
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articulating a more adequate understanding of the self, and yet attempts to cling
onto the principle of universalizability. We shall examine this alternative next.
2. On the Promise of Communicative Rationality
Modernity's failure is obviously a grave one with far-reaching consequences.
Aware of this failure and of the immensity of the problem it poses, Jiirgen
Habermas asks,
"If world views have foundered on the separation of cognitive from socially
integrative components, ifworld-maintaining interpretive systems today belong
irretrievably to the past, then what fulfils the moral-practical task of
constituting ego and group identity"?31
Emerging out of the Frankfurt school of critical theory, this question has
dominated Habermas's work and has led to the development of a possible route
out of the impasse that modernity has created.32 While rejecting any overly
simplistic resolution to the problems created by epistemological foundationalism,
Habermas has nevertheless sought to defend and reformulate an older, classical
view of reason. This view of reason attempts to uphold the inseparability of truth
and morality, of facts and values, of theory and practice. He defends the view
that,
"the truth of statements is in the last analysis linked to the intention of the
31
Jiirgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston, Beacon Press, 1975), tr. Thomas
McCarthy, p. 120.
32
The story of Habermas's relationship with the Frankfurt School is well documented. See
Stephen K. White Cambridge Companion to Habermas (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
1995), Chapter One. Habermas claims to be continuing in the critical spirit of the early Frankfurt
school which is more optimistic about political and social reconstruction than the work of its
later representatives, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno.
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good and true life".33
Habermas's efforts coincide with a stream of philosophy described as praxis
philosophy, which includes,
"radically democratic kinds of American Pragmatism (GH Mead, Dewey) and
of analytic philosophy (Charles Taylor)",34
Habermas writes,
"Praxis philosophy is guided by the intuition that it still makes sense to try to
realise the idea of an ethical totality even under the functional constraints set
by highly complex social systems."35
The emphasis upon praxis in thinkers like Habermas, has been occasioned by a
powerful recognition of the nature of theory and its relationship to practice.
Richard Bernstein's Praxis and Action discusses the four major schools of
modern philosophy Marxism, existentialism, pragmatism and analytic philosophy
in the light of the notion of praxis and points clearly to a retrieval of an
Aristotelian usage of the term.36 Bernstein shows how Aristotle's distinction
between theoria and praxis is the direct ancestor of the more modern distinction
between theory and practice and that Aristotle furthermore prefigured
contemporary interest in the subject by viewing reason in non-instrumentalist
terms. For Aristotle, praxis in contrast to theoria, does not have as its goal the
33
Jiirgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests: A General Perspective (Boston,
Beacon Press, 1971), tr. Jeremy J. Shapiro, p.303.
34
Jiirgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse ofModernity (Oxford, Basil Blackwell,
1987), tr. F. Lawrence, p.394 n.15.
35
Ibid., p.62.
36 See Richard J. Bernstein, Praxis and Action (University of Pennsylvania Press,
Philadelphia, 1971).
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acquisition of knowledge for its own sake, but has as its goal a good life.37
Bernstein goes on to suggest that it was only in the post-Hegelian environment
of Germany in the 1840's that the appeal of the notion of praxis reached its
peak, issuing in the development of a comprehensive and systematic theory of
praxis in the work of Karl Marx.38 According to Bernstein, the concept of
praxis that was originally fundamental to Marx's work had somehow been
overlooked in pre-war developments of Marxist thought, and it was only with
Sartre's Critique de la raison dialectique, allied with the development of post-
Wittgensteinian notions of action, that praxis has come to receive some attention
again.39 40
At root the emphasis on praxis is meant to deny the assumption that practice is
merely the un-reflective and mechanistic application of theory. To emphasise
praxis is consequently to emphasise the dynamic that practice itself brings to
theory. Philosophers who concentrate on praxis are therefore at the very least
concerned to prevent the subversion of practice by theory, and in the more
37
For Aristotle, the notion of the good life was inseparable from the notion of the
individual's role in the polis. See Bernstein, Praxis and Action, p.ix.
38
Bernstein, Praxis and Action, p.xi.
39
See Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique ofDialectical Reason (London, Penguin, 1976), (tr.) A M.
Sheridan-Smith.
40
See also Simone Weil, First and Last Notebooks (London, Oxford University Press,
1970), tr. Richard Rees, p.362, whose categoric commitment to the priority of praxis is brought
out in her comments in a notebook entry from the period near the end of her life, "Philosophy
(including problems of cognition etc.) is exclusively an affair of action and practice".
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adamantly Marxist forms, are concerned to facilitate the subversion of theory by
practice.
As a praxis philosopher, Habermas is a complex thinker whose work, already in
his lifetime, has generated a mini-industry of commentary. The following
comments do not pretend therefore to be exhaustive, but are intended to
highlight those areas of Habermas's thought that relate particularly to the
question of public theology. In essence, the promise that Habermas holds out to
us, is of a universalistic rationality that does not risk the errors we saw in
Chapter One with postliberal communitarian models of reason. His is,
furthermore, a form of rationality, that is at the very least aware of the
marginalisation and distortion of truth that modernity's chosen model of reason
has led to.
As part of his critique of modernity Habermas seeks to explore a form of
transformative praxisf He resists the contextualism and relativism of people
like Alasdair Maclntyre and George Lindbeck, and defends the Enlightenment
ideal of universalism without abandoning its model of rationality. This is not
41
We shall contrast Habermas' work with that of Hans George Gadamer in the next
chapter. Both share an acute awareness of the impact of instrumental rationality in modernity,
and both have a commitment to overcome the sublation of practice by theory. Where they differ
is in terms of the models of truth employed in the strategies they propose to overcome such
sublation. For Gadamer, tmth is primarily hermeneutical, and rests on the viability of rhetoric.
Whereas for Habermas, Gadamer's confidence in the power of rhetoric, ignores the fact that
rhetoric can incapacitate a full social critique, and thus lend support to the systematically
distorted communicative situation we find ourselves in modernity. Habermas consequently
maintains that only a model of truth as transformative praxis, which includes a theory of
communicative competence, can succeed in such a situation.
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however simply a response to fickle changes in philosophical climate, it is based
on the conviction that traditional accounts of reason and the Western economic
and political models that spring from them, are incapable of enacting real
change.
While encouraged by poststructuralist critiques of reason, especially the
connection they make between instrumental reason and domination, Habermas
therefore rejects the drift in critical theory that minimises confidence in political
action per se.42 The task he sets himself is to reconceive of subjectivity in such
a way that does not, in contrast to the political apathy of the post-structuralists -
regard emancipation itself as illusory. Like the post-structuralists, Habermas also
believes that all ethical reflection is governed by discourse. Unlike the post-
structuralists however, he insists that precise criteria must be used to determine
that which can be properly thought of as discourse. Hence, for Habermas
discourse is very carefully defined as action oriented towards understanding.
To achieve the transformative praxis latent in action oriented towards
understanding, Habermas suggests a radical paradigm change in philosophy and
social theory, arguing that the paradigm of a 'subject-centred' philosophy of
consciousness is defunct, and that consequently,
"the critique of subject-centred reason is thus a prologue to a critique of a
42
Habermas believes Foucault's criticisms of the totalisation of reason are valid but do not
necessitate the kind of response Foucault himself encourages.
80
bankrupt culture."43
Habermas suggests that such a change must be to a paradigm that stresses the
structures of inter-subjectivity which are implicit in understanding, and this
paradigm he calls "communicative action".
For Habermas the paradigm of communicative action is meant to escape the
constraints of instrumental forms of rationality. It does this with a
communicative rationality.44 In Habermas's schema, the growth of science,
technology and bureaucratization has caused reason to adopt a purely
instrumental character and become no longer the liberator of humanity, but rather
its oppressor. Communicative action and communicative rationality are therefore
potential vehicles for a successful answer to the problem of the relationship
between theory and practice.
"The theory of communicative competence is a sweeping attempt to
reconceptualize the philosophical foundations of the theory-practice
problematic".45
For Habermas the single entity of Enlightenment reason, with all its
foundationalist certainty must be differentiated into what he calls "distinct
rationality complexes". In modernity a metaphysical conception of reason was
43
Jiirgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse ofModernity (Cambridge, Mass; MIT
Press, 1987), tr. Frederick Lawrence, p.viii.
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See Don Browning and Francis Schussler Fiorenza, ed. Habermas, Modernity & Public
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related to a philosophy of origins which attempted to connect the whole of
reality with one originating moment. However, an adequate pas/metaphysical
conception of reason, according to Habermas, has not one moment, but three.
Furthermore, these three moments correspond to the activities within the
cognitive spheres of science, morality and art. The postmetaphysical conception
of reason is consequently a truly eclectic, post-idealist, one based on a weak as
opposed to a strong concept of theory. In modernity metaphysical reason has
(wrongly) been allied with a strong conception of theory, where,
"true knowledge relates to what is purely universal, immutable and
necessary".46
But the final death blow to this metaphysical understanding of reason has come
from instrumental rationality, from a,
"new type of procedural rationality that has asserted itself since the 17th
century",47
This new "procedural rationality" also confronts us with new requirements for
justification. And it is these requirements which, like Rorty, Habermas believes
have irreversibly, "shattered the cognitive privilege of philosophy" for ever.48
For Habermas, metaphysical reason assumed a privileged and pre-critical vantage
point over all reality. Such a vantage point automatically meant that
46
Jiirgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical thinking; Philosophical Essays (Cambridge, Mass;
MIT Press, 1992), p. 13.
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metaphysical reason was incapable of revision or of engaging constructively with
counter-argument. It was consequently opposed in principle to the kind of
society that tried to solve its problems through conversation, dialogue and mutual
acceptance. Inevitably therefore, metaphysical reason endorsed the "direct and
strategic use of force", as an acceptable solution to social disharmony.
Postmetaphysical reason consequently attempted to expose any position that tried
to close conversation, or tried to evade open argumentation in an unassailable
foundationalism.
With such a powerful critique of the failure of instrumental rationality to make
truth revisable, it is easy to see why theologians have been interested in Jiirgen
Habermas. Habermas has been seized upon by some theologians as the answer
to the problem of theological truth claims, even though he himself rejects overtly
theological attempts at communicative ethics.49 Peter Hodgson for example has
suggested that Habermas's notion of reason as communicative action can be
appropriated into a doctrine of salvation,
"Perhaps 'communicative rationality' can be taken as a cipher for reason under
the condition of redemption. Communicative rationality at its highest involves
a discursive or dialogical rationality in which literally everything is open to
question, in which consent is sought only through agreement rather than by the
imposition of authority... What we are describing is a religious condition, and
a Utopian one at that, for which the word 'salvation' or 'redemption' is
49
Helmut Peukert's work is a more systematic theological appropriation of both early and
late Frankfurt schools, but is explicitly devoted to a theological outworking of Habermas's ideas
in particular. See Helmut Peukart's Science, Action and Fundamental Theology, (Cambridge
Mass; MIT Press, 1986).
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appropriate."50
Hodgson even goes so far as identifying God with the liberation that springs
from perfected communicative rationality,
"Thus we can say that God simply is the perfection of communicative freedom,
the One who loves in freedom."51
Tracy has sometimes been thought of as attempting a similar thing to Hodgson
(see for example Thomas Guarino's article where he describes Tracy's Plurality
and Ambiguity as an attempt to use Habermas to move beyond the weaknesses
of Gadamer by supplementing the phronesis tradition with a theory of
communicative action).52 Nevertheless, Tracy makes a significant number of
criticisms of Habermas.53
Like Habermas, Tracy is aware that the marriage of a dominant instrumental
form of reason with an unbridled techno-economic culture lies behind the crises
of meaning in modernity. While instrumental reason is useful in establishing
rational means for determined ends, it fails when it is expected to establish the
50
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surely remains in some sense, a loving being?
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"The major problem with instrumental rationality is also obvious: its relative
inability to define ends for the polity and culture on other than either an
instrumental or a merely intuitive basis".54
Consequently what is required are paradigms of rationality that are as
successfully public in their scope, as that of instrumental rationality once was.
"If publicness is to be exhaustively defined by instrumental reason, then the
adventures of reason will never again inform an authentically public civil
discourse in the realm of polity - the realm where finally we all must meet."
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Tracy's deep concern that theology should meet the demands of public
rationality makes him suggest that both the Frankfurt school and revisionist
theology share a lot in common,
"The central demand for the continuing refinement of genuinely critical theory
and for its universal applicability to all experience and all symbol systems is
the chief distinguishing characteristic of both the contemporary revisionist
model for fundamental theology and the 'revisionist' model for critical social
theory exemplified in the work of the Frankfurt school."56
Nevertheless Tracy takes issue with Habermas on a number of points,
"That distinct cognitive spheres (science, morality, art) possess distinct validity-
confirming modes of argument is philosophically true",57
"[nevertheless] there is no argument in Habermas that disallows [the validity
claims of the religions],... therefore no good reason, either philosophically or
sociologically, for a modem critical social theorist to so confine his analysis
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to three and only three cognitive spheres as to stop short of even asking the
questions of validity claims of the religions as they have been analyzed by both
philosophers of religion and theologians."58
To insist, as Habermas does, on three cognitive spheres alone is to severe
theology from any links it may have in tradition and society. Furthermore, as
Tracy points out, Habermas's understanding of the cognitive sphere ofmorality
does not show how discussion of the good, can be related to discussion of the
right. Allied to all of these criticisms, Tracy concludes, therefore, that
Habermas's refusal to include religion as a cognitive sphere can only stem from
an entrenched commitment to a fully-fledged theory of social evolution, which
imagines an all too easy and untroubled progression from myth to metaphysics
to communicative rationality.59
In fairness to Habermas it has to be said that, to an extent, he is less concerned
to deliberately exclude religion than Tracy seems to suggest.60 Habermas's
aversion to religion as a cognitive sphere is not on the grounds that religion
offers no validity-confirming modes of argument, for Habermas recognises that
religion can be a source of existential consolation. Habermas's objection to






See Habermas's own account of a theological truth claim in the section entitled "The
Truth Claim of Theological Discourse", in Habermas, Modernity and Public Theology, ed.
Browning/Fiorenza.
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of religion cannot be publicly validated because they are, by virtue of being
religious, totalising truth claims! But where is Habermas's justification for this?
Why must a theological truth claim, by virtue of being religious, be a totalising
truth claim? Revisionist theology's commitment to particularism is not in doubt.
For Tracy, as we shall see shortly, the universal is only accessed through the
particular.
3. Communicative Rationality Without an Eschaton
Habermas's reluctance to accept religion as a significant cognitive sphere
hampers his project fatally and betrays vestiges of a foundationalist conception
of reason that he himself would be at pains to eradicate. The fact that theological
truth claims must maintain a cognitive dimension and that religion, as the
cultural expression of those truth claims must deserve a place in any
postmetaphysical reconstruction of reason, go hand-in-hand.61
Until very recently Habermas has consistently failed to recognise the importance
of the existential and aesthetic in the realm of the individual. In his article
"Private Faith or Public Religion? An Assessment ofHabermas's Changing View
of Religion", William B. Meyer has suggested that Habermas has recently
changed his mind about religion and thus offers hope to theologians wishing to
61
In Chapter Four we shall examine Adina Davidovich's attempt to demarcate the province
of meaning that is constituted by religion. According to her reading of Kant's Critique of
Judgement Kant held to an understanding of religion as that which provides the unity of reason.
See Adina Davidovich, Religion as a Province ofMeaning (Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 1993).
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develop some of Habermas's views in a theological context.62 Nevertheless,
how far Habermas can be taken to be a theological ally is debatable. Agnes
Heller has criticised Habermas for the neglect of any understanding of human
affectivity in his work,
"the lack of the sensuous experiences of hope and despair, of venture and
humiliation, is discernible in the structure of his theory: the creature-like
aspects of human beings are missing."63
Lacking a means of understanding important areas of human experience,
Habermas's theological potential is limited. It is certainly the case that in earlier
works Habermas maintained that the content of Christianity has become
secularised (conformed to instrumental rationality), and that neither posivitism
nor expressivism can offer any real answers in the wake of the conceptual and
ethical vacuum left by religion,
"Neither science nor the arts can claim to be the heir to religion. In this respect
only a discursive ethics and communicative rationality can turn out to
substitute for the holy."64
Consequently, in Habermas's formulation of the theological problem (such that
he would be prepare to admit to there being one), the substitute for the holy is
a "communicative structure" that facilitates human knowing, whereby,
"'God' becomes the name for a communicative structure that forces men, on
62 See for example, William B Meyer, "Private Faith or Public Religion? An Assessment
of Habermas's Changing View of Religion", Theology 75 (1995), pp.371-391.
63
Agnes Heller, "Habermas and Marxism", Habermas: Critical Debates (London,
Macmillan, 1982), ed. John B. Thompson and D. Held, p.21.
64
Jiirgen Habermas, Theory ofCommunicative Action, Vol 2 (Boston, Beacon Press, 1986),
p. 140.
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pain of a loss of their humanity, to go beyond their accidental, empirical
nature, to encounter one another indirectly, that is across an objective
something that they themselves are not".65
While Habermas's critical social theory does strive to include all voices in the
public arena, and shows us a different way of viewing otherness, he nevertheless
excludes the possibility of religion exercising any kind of role in the public
space at all. As Anne Fortin-Melkevik says in summing up the logic of
Habermas's project it,
"necessarily seems to relegate religious experience, religion, religious language
and theological discourse to oblivion or irrationalism".66
Habermas's description of postmetaphysical reason does in the final analysis
provide yet more evidence of instrumental reason's failings.67 Nevertheless, in
Habermas's response to the problem of instrumental rationality he ignores the
fact that faith might still have a role to play in a postmetaphysical context. Faith
might in fact even be more vitally important in disabusing belief of its cognitive
privilege than communicative action. Furthermore, it may be that faith provides
communicative action with a telos that is more adequate to the demands of the
contemporary situation than anything Habermas has to offer. This is ultimately
65
Jiirgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, p. 120.
66 Anne Fortin-Melkevik, "The Reciprocal Exclusiveness ofModernity and Religion among
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attempts to do natural law ethics without the pitfalls and thus can be a bridge between Habermas
and Maclntyre, for whom all goods are particular. For Finnis some goods are universally
acknowledged as goods.
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Charles Davis's criticism of Habermas.68 While Habermas's stress on
communicative rationality can help theologians overcome the distortions of
instrumentalist understandings of reason, it nevertheless does not provide us with
the kind of hope that is necessary to bring about the radical transformation that
Habermas seeks. Insofar as communicative action has a telos it must be thought
of as the future unity of mankind. In Habermas's formulation the achievement
of this goal is dependent upon the viability of an "ideal speech situation". This
is a complex part of Habermas's arguments and, notwithstanding the many
problems associated with it, is an idea that from the outset struggles to escape
metaphysics. Habermas disagrees of course, arguing that the telos in
communicative action is proportionate to "un-coerced intersubjective
understanding",
"To be sure the concept of communicative rationality does contain a Utopian
perspective; in the structures of undamaged intersubjectivity can be found a
necessary condition for individuals reaching an understanding among
themselves without coercion, as well as for the identity of an individual coming
to an understanding with himself or herself without force."69
Nevertheless, though there may be some kind of goal in Habermas's programme
of communicative action, it is Davis's argument that such a telos cannot be
enough to justify us in believing in the actual possibility of transformed and
emancipated society, and this because,
68 See Chapter 11 ,'Communicative Rationality and the Grounding of Religious Hope' in
Charles Davis, Religion and The Making ofSociety, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1994), pp. 188-205.
69
Jiirgen Habermas, "Reply to my Critics", Habermas: Critical Debates (Cambridge, Mass;
MIT Press, 1982), ed. John B. Thompson and D. Held, p.228.
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"the possibilities inherent in human action may be, in fact constantly are,
frustrated by the negative contingencies of human existence, notably sickness
and death and irrational human evil."70
Habermas even seems to admit to this. In describing his theory of
communicative action he says,
"This perspective comprises only formal determinations of the communicative
infrastructure of possible forms of life... it does not extend to the concrete
shape of an exemplary life-form."71
Consequently, if this is the case, Davis is right when he says,
"Secular hope [Habermas's] without religion cannot affirm future fulfilment,
even partial, with certitude, however promising the present, but must be content
with degrees of probability."72
In the final analysis therefore, Habermas cannot provide us with the real
possibility of an authentic or good life. The hope inherent in communicative
action stumbles in the face of suffering and evil. Transformative praxis comes
up against a brick-wall and has no way around it. Consequently, as we shall see
further in Chapter Three, the life of faith and the theological truth claims that
spring from it, must be distinguished from Habermas's project. Firstly, because
merely to differentiate reason into different rationality complexes will not alone,
prevent the return of cognitive privilege and totalisation in some form or another.
What is needed is a more radical transformation altogether. Secondly, because
what faith provides is precisely that transformative principle, that has a real hope
70






that is not frustrated by suffering and evil. This hope is not a new set of theories
or foundational propositions, nor a body of objective knowledge, nor even a
communicative structure whose goal is the future unity of mankind. It is a hope
with an ultimate end, a telos, an eschaton. It is an ultimate end which
furthermore makes all communicative action possess ultimate significance. It
moves beyond the ent/less chatter of modernity, to a life of transformed and
transformative action. What theological truth claims, informed by the hope that
faith offers, can serve to do, is to unsettle and frustrate all those forms of
discourse that are ultimately opposed to transformation.
Conclusion
The conclusion of this Chapter concurs with Alistair McFadyen when he says,
"public meaning is not given by a present and unlimited order of power; it is
a future, eschatological goal which we seek for and anticipate in our
communication and action."73
In this Chapter I have demonstrated how the inadequacies of modernity's model
of reason have made the question of a public rationality a burning issue. I have
discussed Jiirgen Habermas's model of public rationality as an attempt to find
a way around the problems of modernity without recourse to an ultimate goal.
I have highlighted those areas in Habermas that theologians can learn from and
pointed to those areas in theology that Habermas can learn from. The conclusion
to this Chapter is that what Habermas lacks is an adequate telos. The telos of
73
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communicative action is too tied to procedural norms to make possible the
radical transformation of human finitude in the face of suffering and evil.
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CHAPTER THREE
ON THEOLOGICAL TRUTH AND PHRONESIS
"It is a mark of the trained mind never to expect more precision in the
treatment of any subject than the nature of that subject permits" Aristotle1
"Theology in postmodernity must reorient itself to wisdom rather than
knowledge. Wisdom is the means of integrating what modernity and
postmodernity alike have torn asunder, metaphysics and morals, theory and
practice, fact and value."
Kevin Vanhoozer2
Introduction
In Chapter Two we have seen that neither instrumental nor communicative
understandings of reason provide all that is needed for an adequate theological
response to the problems ofmodernity. We have seen that Habermas's model of
reason as communicative action attempts to avoid the foundationalist tendency
to privilege one truth over another and thus facilitate the transformation of the
human situation. My criticism of Habermas has been that without an ultimate
goal, it is difficult to see how he can make the radical transformation of the
human situation a real possibility. If we wish to argue that faith - that which
theological truth claims are expressive of - succeeds in facilitating the radical
transformation that Habermas hopes for, then we need to show what form of
rationality might legitimate such faith. This Chapter sets out to do this by first
1
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics (London, Allen & Unwin, 1953), Book l:3;1094bl3, tr.
J.A.K. Thompson.
2
Kevin Vanhoozer, "The Trials of Truth: Mission, Martyrdom, and the Epistemology of
the Cross", in the forthcoming To Stake A Claim, (Orbis Press).
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examining how faith can facilitate radical transformation without totalisation, i.e.,
the cognitive privilege of one truth over another, then by examining the way that
phronesis models of rationality can legitimate such faith. It is the argument of
this Chapter that the move to praxis understandings of faith is to be welcomed. 3
Nevertheless, if a theological truth claim is to prevent the loss of critical
adjudication as truth, then it can best be done by the adoption of phronesis
models of rationality. The benefit that phronesis brings to theology, is a form of
criticism that is both an epistemological act and a moral act.
1. On the Problem of Totalisation and Praxis Understandings of Faith
The difficulty of arriving at an adequate understanding of a theological truth
claim in a postmodern context cannot be under-estimated. If theological truth is
to satisfy its past and its future it has to avoid all totalising influences,
foundationalisms, and suggestions that theological truth possesses a cognitive
privilege over other truth. At the same time however, it must attempt to maintain
theological truth claims as universal claims. This is no easy matter. For many
thinkers theological truth claims by their very nature depend upon notions like
totalisation and cognitive privilege. They will argue that theological truth claims
Although of Aristotelian origin and of major significance in Marx's thought, in
theological discussions the term praxis is usually most closely associated with theologies of
liberation. A fundamental claim of such theologies concerns a move from the centrality of
orthodoxy to the centrality of orthopraxy, where knowing and doing exist in a dialectically
dependent relationship that issues in virtue as a criterion for truth. See for example; G. Gutierrez,
A Theology of Liberation (Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1974); L. Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator
(Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1980); J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation
(Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1975).
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are entirely dependent upon a model of truth as universal adequacy; that if true
at all, a theological truth must be true in all particular instances of itself or not
at all. Consequently, the idea of a theological truth claim that does not assert a
privilege over all other truths is one that does not make much sense for many
thinkers. Randy Maddox, to take but one example, argues like this and claims
that a theological truth claim is not something that makes any sense once the
notion of cognitive privilege has been ruled out of court.4 If he is right then the
idea of a revisable theological truth claim is indeed a contradiction in terms. This
is therefore the key question. By demanding the disavowal of all totalising
influences, can sense be made of a theological truth claim, especially if, as we
have argued in Chapter Two an eschatological dimension seems to be a
necessary element in theological truth? Once the notion of a total and
foundational privileged truth is removed from theology, is it still dealing in the
world of universals?
Of course one alternative suggestion is that theological truth claims are non-
cognitive, entirely mystical claims. This is an idea that is not without its appeal.
Much postmodern, deconstructionist theology makes this claim and for good
reasons.5 Non-cognitive explanations of theological truth offer an easy escape
from the problem of universals and particulars. With them, we can collapse all
4
Randy L. Maddox, "Contemporary Hermeneutic Philosophy and Theological Studies" in
Religious Studies 21:4 (1985), pp.517-529, p.529.
5 See Part 4 of D Z. Phillips' Faith After Foundationalism (Colarado, Westview Press,
1995), for a postfoundationalist account of concept formation in religion, pp.255ff.
96
uncomfortable distinctions between truth and falsehood, and slip easily into the
"non-logocentric interstices" that lie between modernity's false and alienating
dichotomies.6 Inviting as this might seem as a solution to the problem, once
taken, we find that we have walked straight into the jaws of another trap. To
retain any kind of commitment to publicly accessible truth claims or models of
revisable theological truth, we must defend at the very least, the belief that
theological truth claims have a cognitive dimension. Whether that dimension also
entails a privileged place in a cognitive hierarchy, is the question that is open to
doubt. How then can a theological truth claim occupy a place in a cognitive
framework without of necessity demanding a privileged place in that framework?
One answer to this question is to see faith - that which theological truth is
expressive of - in terms of a praxis which issues in the radical critique of all
cognitive privilege. Conceived in this manner, faith can be capable of facilitating
a radical transformation of the human situation. Consequently, a theological truth
claim is misunderstood if it is thought to demand either cognitive or theoretical
privilege. Faith, in the light of an ultimate end, can in fact be disruptive of
cognitive and theoretical privilege.
It is modernity that has insisted that a truth claim rests upon the idea of
cognitive privilege, and that a theological truth claim, understood as an
orthodoxy, rests upon the idea of theoretical privilege. Consequently, if we
6
See Mark C. Taylor, Erring: A Postmodern A/theology (Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 1984), pp.8-9.
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wished to maintain at all that theological truth claims were cognitive claims, i.e.,
pertaining to matters of fact, then there appeared no way of avoiding the conflict
that inevitably ensued between different theological truth claims arising from
different religious cultures. For modernity, orthodoxies must collide, they cannot
be reconciled with one another or within the public sphere without radically
altering what we mean when we talk of truth.7
Moreover, because of the dominance of positivist and verificationist models of
legitimation within the epistemology ofmodernity, faith has been misunderstood.
Faith has not only been attacked for relying upon notions of cognitive privilege
and cognitive hierarchy, but has been denounced as the major factor contributing
to their maintenance. The extent of the critical power of faith in modernity has
not therefore been recognised and has been immediately curtailed by the extent
to which modernity's own epistemology could exercise a truly critical function.
Consequently, modernity's relegation of faith to the sphere of personal interest
needs to be resisted. The understanding of legitimation that drives modernity's
reluctance to admit that faith might possess a cognitive dimension remains more
committed to a type of certainty foreign to the subject matter faith is concerned
7
Again, revisionist approaches in theology have been prepared to make such alterations and
by being committed to some form of public rationality, have attempted to hold onto a critical
function for theology in the process of that alteration. In discussing the achievements of
revisionist and liberal theology and the challenges facing revisionists and liberals in the future,
James Buckley in The Modern Theologians emphasises the importance of the potential
contribution revisionists can make to this question when he says, "revisionists and liberals ought
to continually to address the issues raised by the debate over 'truth' (e.g., is truth correspondence
to reality, pragmatic effectiveness, disclosure? Do we need a theory of truth and method?" See
James J. Buckley, "Revisionists and Liberals" in The Modern Theologians (Oxford, Basil
Blackwell, 1997), ed. David F. Ford, p.326.
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with, than it is at first apparent. It is the case that modernist criticisms of faith
appear to forget too readily, Aristotle's advice about expecting more precision
in the treatment of a subject than the subject itself permits.8
In moving to a praxis paradigm for understanding faith, we can escape the idea
that theological truth claims necessitate cognitive privilege without rejecting the
idea that faith has a cognitive dimension. For Charles Davis, faith is that which
ensures the radical transformation of the human situation precisely because of
its capacity to disrupt all cognitive privileges. It treads a tightrope between
fideism and foundationalism, objectivism and relativism, nihilism and idolatry,
metaphysics and morals,
"Religious faith may be seen as following a narrow ridge between the two
abysses of nihilism and idolatry.... Religious faith is best viewed not as a set
of beliefs, but as an unrestricted openness to Reality. As such, it is a critical
foundation for the permanent argument that constitutes political society."9
Nevertheless, to successfully defend a cognitive dimension for faith, we must
demonstrate that faith can facilitate an authentic critical moment. This moment
must neither be borne out of a position of cognitive privilege, nor contribute to
the maintenance of cognitive privilege.10 Such a critical moment for Davis, has
g
See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1:3:1094bl3.
9
Charles Davis, Religion and the Making of Society (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1994), p.37.
10
Davis's critique of religious orthodoxy makes clearer the critical authenticity of faith as
the critique of cognitive privilege, because faith is mediated through praxis. The radical
consequences of this for theology are that, "Theology loses its boundaries as an independent
discipline, because the only appropriate context for the conscious articulation of praxis is a
99
to do with the conceptual 'space' it makes available for the individual that,
"widens the horizon within which the person, thinks, judges, decides and
acts".11
For Davis, a revisable theological truth claim is therefore best preserved by
supposing belief to be ideologically-loaded. It is only through a process of
ideology critique that theological truth claims can function as vehicles of human
transformation. This process must furthermore be extended into the tradition that
theological truth claims come from,
"the Christian tradition, like other traditions, is not exclusively a source of truth
and value, but a vehicle of untruth and false values, and thus must be subject
to a critique of ideology and critically appropriated, not simply made one's
own in an assimilative process of interpretation".12
That this move towards a paradigm of action need not end in a slide towards
epistemological relativism is shown towards the end of this Chapter, where a
phronesis model of legitimation is introduced.
Modernity's critique of faith has often suggested that it is inevitable that faith
will assert a privilege over reason. The revisability of theological truth based
upon praxis understandings of faith can also lead to claims for the priority of
faith over reason. But this is not necessarily a bad thing as long as faith is
theory of the development of society in its total reality." See, Religion and the Making of
Society, p.91.
11
Charles Davis, Religion and The Making ofSociety, p.35.
12 Charles Davis, Theology and Political Society (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1978), p.25.
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defined in terms of action. It is not necessarily the case that the priority of faith
must conclude with the conquest of reason. It is possible that the kind of priority
that faith must have over reason can be thought of in terms of the priority of
loving action.13 The priority of faith over reason would be fideistic if conceived
of in terms of a verificationist or positivist paradigm of knowledge, however
faith need not be conceived of in these terms. For Maurice Blondel faith is to be
thought of in terms of the primacy of action.14 For Blondel, faith may precede
reason in matters of action because love is foundational for action, not
knowledge.15 Consequently, when we speak of the totalisation or priority of
faith, we are speaking of the totalisation and priority of love. In L 'action Blondel
develops a phenomenology of human action that attempts to show that the
human will is never equal to itself, that is, it never finds an adequate resolution
in any of its actions. Every action is a self-transcending entity. For Blondel
therefore, the logic of action demands the realm of the spiritual, and ultimately
a revelation which needs dogmatic formulation. Furthermore, the logic of action
alone cannot decide which actions are truly loving and which are not. Only in
13
See Paul Ricoeur, "Love and Justice" in Radical Pluralism and Truth: David Tracy and
the Hermeneutics ofReligion (New York, Crossroad, 1991), ed. W.G. Jeanrond and J.L. Rike,
pp.l87ff, for a fuller understanding of love in this context.
14
In Charles Davis' Religion and the Making of Society, p.93, Davis brings out an
interesting connection here between the work ofBlondel and William James. James cites Blondel
in two of his works and appears to draw considerable inspiration from him. Davis suggests
however that Blondel's work is best not interpreted as pragmatism in the sense of maintaining
an oppositional distinction between thought and action.
15 See Maurice Blondel, L'Action (1893) in Olivia Blanchette, "Introduction to Maurice
Blondel" in Action (1893): Essay on a Critique of Life and the Science of Practice, (Notre
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), pp.xvii-xviii; and commentators James M.
Sommerville, Maurice Blondel 1861-1949" in Thought 36 (1961), pp.371-2.
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allegiance with a series of actions (e.g., a tradition) can such a decision be made.
What Blondel tells us is that the critical moment of faith is not a moment which
either seeks the false certainty or the pivotal foundations of modernity's
epistemology, and can thus be truly transformational. Blondel's emphasis upon
the embodiment of thought, long before postmodernists made the idea
fashionable, coupled with Davis's defence of the power of faith to disrupt all
cognitive privileges, can therefore help to put flesh on the idea of faith as a
transformative principle which is disruptive of all bids to totalise. That there is
a totalising dimension within such an understanding of faith, cannot be denied
fully. However, to understand such a totalising dimension in the manner that
Blondel conceives of action can serve both to reveal the horizons of our thinking
and acting more fully to us. The extent of this revelation is summed up in this
quote from Blondel,
"For it is not from thought that faith passes over into the act, it is from practice
that it draws down a divine light for the spirit. God acts in this action and that
is why the thought that follows it is richer by an infinity than that which
proceeds it. It has entered into a new world where no philosophical speculation
can lead it or follow it."16
If we follow this route, and understand the priority that faith has over reason as
the priority of loving action, we are still nevertheless confronted with the
question of what model of reason may be adequate to such an understanding of
faith. A phronesis understanding of reason is a model which offers a possible
answer to this question, and we shall explore it below.
16
See Maurice Blonde, L'Action (1893), quoted in Charles Davis, Religion and the Making
ofSociety, p.95.
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2. On the Promise of Phronesis
The importance of phronesis for reflections upon theological method is in the
first instance related to a conception of a practice in the realm of the intellect
that reveals something of the nature of the good life. In Thomas Guarino's
article, "Between Foundationalism and Nihilism: Is Phronesis the Via Media for
Theology", Guarino concludes by arguing that in the final analysis phronesis is
not sufficient for the demands of theology.17 Where phronesis fails is in respect
of its inability to deal adequately with the "cognitive status of credal and
doctrinal statements".18 What Guarino implicitly recognises is that phronesis
conceptions of rationality have the potential to upset the cognitive status of
theological truth claims by dissolving the privilege they enjoy over other truth
claims. What Guarino is concerned about is that a phronesis model of rationality
might not do enough to protect the cognitive privilege that theological truth
claims enjoy in a cognitive hierarchy. But to hold these concerns is merely to
return us to the problem ofpublic accessibility. The great strength of a phronesis
model of reason is precisely in that it offers a way of making sense without
privileging one cognitive insight over another. Charles Allen's definition of
phronesis highlights its strengths well,
"phronesis is the historically implicated, communally nurtured ability to make
good sense of relatively singular contexts in ways appropriate to their relative
17
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Using distinctions made by Richard Bernstein, Charles Allen helpfully unpacks
each of the terms in this definition to explore how "phronetic sense making", can
enable us to hold on to more of our theological heritage than previously thought
possible.20 Allen lists five aspects of phronesis models of reason that he
suggests theologians can benefit from; 1. phronesis is employed in making good
sense; 2. it is communally nurtured; 3. it is historically implicated; 4. it makes
good sense of relatively singular contexts; and 5. most importantly, it makes
sense of its subject matter in a manner appropriate to the subject matter.21 The
great value of a phronesis understanding of rationality according to Allen, is
therefore the help it gives us in avoiding the either/or dilemma of objectivism
and foundationalism on the one hand, and relativism and subjectivism, on the
other.22 In the same way that for Allen a phronesis understanding of rationality
can avoid the either/or choice between objectivism and subjectivism, it can
likewise allow theologians to avoid an either/or choice between the universal
scope of a theological truth claim and its particular context. With phronesis
19 Charles W. Allen, "The Primacy of Phronesis: A Proposal for Avoiding Frustrating
Tendencies in Our Conceptions of Rationality", Journal of Religion 69 (1989), pp.359-374,
p.363.
20 See Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1983), pp. 182-206.
21 Charles Allen, "The Primacy of Phronesis', p.363.
22
For Allen 'objectivism' is exemplified in thinkers such as Martin Mollis and P F.
Strawson. See Charles Allen, "The Primacy of Phronesis", p.360.
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theological truth can be both universal and particular, metaphysical and moral.
Aristotle's notion of phronesis as prudence or practical wisdom is of course, at
the heart of the retrieval of phronesis understandings of reason.23 Although too
much can be made of a retrieval of Aristotle's views in today's situation, at the
same time, Aristotle's contribution to non-instrumentalist models of reason in
general cannot be overlooked.24 It is therefore a legitimate question to ask in
the first instance what Aristotle meant by phronesis, and what role it occupied
in his schema. Phronesis is discussed in Book 6 of The Nichomachean Ethics
on "Intellectual Virtues", and is one of the five modes of thought by which truth
is reached. Episteme (scientific knowledge), techne (art or technical skill), nous
(intuition) and sophia (wisdom) are the four other intellectual virtues. In the
Aristotelian schema, the intellectual virtues are described as belonging to that
part of the soul which is rational. They are not intended in the first instance to
be understood as moral virtues.25 Whereas sophia is the highest of the
intellectual virtues because it is knowledge of that which is by nature most
precious, the value of phronesis is that it is concerned with the actual practice
23
See Aristotle The Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI: 1139b18-36.
24 Allen offers useful advice in his article The Primacy of Phronesis', when he says that
respectful consideration of the history of an idea is needed more than a slavish reproduction of
it - a view he finds confirmed in Richard Bernstein, see Beyond Objectivism and Relativism,
pp.47-48.
25
See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book VI:I.
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of intellectual virtue.26 All other intellectual virtues for Aristotle imply
prudence/practical wisdom, and it is in this sense that phronesis has a special
part to play.
"prudence does not exercise authority over wisdom or over the higher part of
the soul, any more than the science ofmedicine exercises authority over health;
for it does not use wisdom, but provides for its realisation; and therefore issues
orders not to it, but for its sake." 27
It has to be remembered that distinctive as the role ofphronesis is in Aristotle,
it is nevertheless subservient to episteme, scientific knowledge.28 Where
contemporary retrievals ofphronesis understandings of rationality part company
with Aristotle, is over the primacy that they wish to accord to phronesis.
Aristotle's ultimate subordination of phronesis under episteme involves and
presupposes, the either/or distinction between universal truth and particular truth
that contemporary defenders of phronesis wish to overcome. We can,
nonetheless, appropriate ourselves of the best of Aristotle's insights to help
tackle the problem of the relationship between universals and particulars. The
idea of a phronesis understanding of reason, stressing that reason is something
we do can be borrowed from Aristotle, and put to work in theology to great
effect.
Gadamer has probably done more to revive phronesis understandings of reason
26
Ibid., Book VI:VII, 1140b33.
27
Ibid., Book VI:XIII, 1142b31.
28 Ibid., Book VI: 1139 b:20-22.
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than anyone else in recent times.29 Gadamer's analysis of understanding in the
human sciences provides not only an explanation of the marginalisation of the
truth claims of the human sciences generally, but also using phronesis models
of rationality, a means by which such marginalisation can be overcome. Pre¬
eminently for Gadamer, the tradition of the human sciences mediates truth in a
way which is in the final analysis not reducible to an external norm. Truth in the
human sciences is participative and essentially disclosive.
"the experience of historical tradition reaches far beyond those aspects of it that
can be objectively investigated. It is true or untrue not only in the same
conceiving which historical criticism decides, but always mediates truth in
which one must try to participate."30
Phronesis can help overcome the marginalisation of truth in the human sciences
because it is,
"concerned with reason and with knowledge, not detached from a being that
is becoming, but determined by it and determinative of it."31
As we shall see in a moment, and further in Chapter Six, it is Gadamer's
rehabilitation of phronesis that promises to provide a revisionary account of
theological truth claims with the powerful resource of a non-foundationalist
ontology.32
29 See Thomas Guarino, "Between Foundationalism and Nihilism", pp.44ff.
30
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method p.xxiii.
31
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York, Crossroad, 1975), tr. Joel
Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, p.278.
32
See Guarino, "Between Foundationalism and Nihilism", p.45.
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Along with Gadamer, Jurgen Habermas of course is also committed to some
form of phronesis understanding of rationality but situates it within a different
model of truth.33 For Habermas, truth in essence involves the authentic
transformation of human subjectivity, while for Gadamer, truth is essentially the
disclosure of possibility. The difference between Habermas and Gadamer
therefore concerns the difference between models of truth as transformation and
models of truth as disclosure. Gadamer is influenced by Heidegger and holds to
the view that the manifestation of truth involves a disclosure-concealment
dialectic.34 The problem that Habermas finds with Gadamer concerns whether
a model of hermeneutical philosophy which is content to believe that the power
of conversation alone is sufficient in the public forum (such as Gadamer's), can
not only provide answers to questions of aesthetic meaning, but can offer truly
critical strategies for societal praxis. Habermas thinks that Gadamer's model
places too much faith in the similarities of context between our present social,
political and cultural situation, and those of the Greek polis. He argues that our
present technologically dominated context is much more systematically distorted




On manifestation of truth as disclosure-concealment see, Martin Heidegger, Being and
Time (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1962), section 44 "Dasein, Disclosedness and Truth"; also Basic
Writings, ed. David F. Krell (London, Harper & Row, 1977), p. 149-87, "The Origin of the Work
of Art". Kevin Vanhoozer furthermore describes Tracy as a "theologian of manifestation" See
Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy ofPaid Ricoeur (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1990), p.168.
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The Habermas/Gadamer debate is of course complex. Nevertheless, in essence
Habermasian criticisms of Gadamer's model of hermeneutics think that Truth
and Method should have been more accurately titled Truth OR Method, with
Gadamer's choice being for truth over against method. Consequently, such
critics disagree with the ontological and contextualist emphasis in Gadamer's
hermeneutic philosophy, and argue that a more moderate position on method and
theory needs to be recovered.35 Gadamerian critics on the other hand have
responded by arguing that Habermas's "ideal speech situation" still appears
transcendentalist in its structure, and may be so divorced from present realities
that it is useless as a means of judging alternatives. As Gadamer himself says,
"What man needs is not just the persistent posing of ultimate questions, but the
sense of what is feasible, what is possible, what is correct, here and now."36
Although generally supportive of Habermas, Seyla Benhabib also criticizes him
for an understanding of the self which is "disembedded and disembodied".37
While William C. Placher also argues that Habermas's appeal to a democratic
consensus may be compelling to those brought up in the West, but can offer
little to those operating with different political ideals.38
35 Paul Ricoeur, "The Task of Hermeneutics" Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences:
Essays on Language, Action, and Interpretation, tr. John B. Thompson (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1981), p.60.
36
Gadamer, Truth and Method, p.xxxviii.
37
Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992), p. 151.
38 See William C. Placher, Unapologetic Theology: A Christian Voice in a Pluralistic
Conversation (Kentucky, Westminster/John Knox, 1989), Chapter 5.
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David Tracy has identified both transformation models of truth and disclosure
models of truth at work in theology. As a revisionist theologian, committed to
the revisability of theological truth claims he can see the value of both
Habermas's and Gadamer's versions of truth39. Tracy suggests that both give
rise to theological analogues in hermeneutical theology and political theology.
Hermeneutical theology, implicitly or explicitly, recalls Gadamer's model of
truth, and political theology, implicitly or explicitly, recalls Habermas's.
Nevertheless, instead of choosing between these two models, theology must pool
them together. Tracy insists that a marriage of both a disclosure model of truth
and a transformation model must admit to the distinctive nature of each model,
yet must work towards preventing their separation.
"all good theory is grounded in the authentic praxis of intellectual integrity and
cognitive self-transcendence., all real knowledge is in some sense participatory.
Yet those realities., can be distinguished without being separated. "Saying the
truth" is distinct from, although never separate from, "doing the truth"."40
Where political and liberation theologies incline towards a transformation model
of truth, Tracy's hope is that they may be a productive corrective to the
emphasis upon disclosure that is in fundamental and systematic theologies.
"insofar as truth is always best understood as basically transformative in
character rather than either metaphysical or disclosive, praxis theology sublates
the claims to truth of all alternative formulations articulated in non-praxis
oriented fundamental and systematic theologies".41
39







For Tracy, therefore, the use of a phronesis model of reason necessitates the
recognition of at least two models of truth. Both truth as disclosure (with its
most explicit manifestation in various paradigms of hermeneutical theology), and
truth as transformation (as expressed in paradigms of political theology), must
be seen as mutually dependent. Consequently, only in-so-far as both models of
truth are held together can theology be successful at making the distinction
between "saying the truth" and "doing the truth" a constructive one.42
However, although Tracy is conscious of the demands of social transformation,
in the final analysis, the transformation model of truth serves to underline the
"foundational reality of praxis as transformed authentic subiectivitv".(emphasis
mine)43 This emphasises a point we will stress later about Tracy's continuing
commitment to the goals of liberal modernity because it is subjectivity that is
authentically transformed by theological truth for Tracy.44
42
To what extent Tracy can be paralleled beside other typical models of praxis-theology
is debated in Dermot A. Lane, "David Tracy and the Debate About Praxis" in Radical Pluralism
and Truth (Crossroads, New York 1991), ed. Werner G. Jeanrond and Jennifer L. Rike.
43
David Tracy, Analogical Imagination, p.71.
44
As we shall see, Tracy will attempt to convince us that this is not a form of subjectivity
conceived of in terms ofmodernity's epistemology. Tracy wants to return to the primacy of truth
as disclosure and to do so he find an ally in postmodern forms of thought. As we shall see
further in Chapter Six, for Tracy, theology in its postmodern context must attempt to move
beyond the subject of modernity, beyond the turn to language, to "difference" and to the "Other",
"Postmodernity begins by trying to think the unthought of modernity. Beyond the early modern
turn to the purely autonomous self-grounding subject, beyond even the more recent turn to
language (the first great contemporary challenge to modem subjectivism) lies the quintessential
turn of postmodemity itself - the turn to the other." See David Tracy, "Theology and the Many
Faces ofPostmodemity" in Readings in Modern Theology: Britain and Ameiica (London, SPCK,
1988), ed. R. Gill, p.229.
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3. On Legitimation in Zagzebski's Model
The central problem with theological uses of phronesis models of rationality
concerns the way in which theological truth claims can be judged/legitimated,
yet it is also here that phronesis holds out the most promise to theology. As we
have already said, when the problem of legitimation is raised it involves a notion
of what constitutes epistemological justification, that is out of place in a post-
positivistic context.45
Linda Zagzebski is one who has taken up the opportunities and challenge that
phronesis models of rationality present for the problem of legitimation and
theological truth.46 Zagzebski proposes a model of rationality that suggests that
what is rational is embedded in moral behaviour. This model of rationality is one
that offers much promise when applied to religious belief, because,
"The model of what a good person does when she acts is a model of rationality
which .. can illuminate what a good thinking person does when she forms
45 See the section by Zagzebski "Problems in the notion of Justification" in Virtues of the
Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.29ff, where she uses William Alston and
Alvin Plantinga to show that there are not only different notions of what constitutes justification
in epistemology, but that, "the conceptual confusion over justification has led to the present
impasse between internalists and externalists", p.31.
46 See Linda Zagzebski Virtues of the Mind; An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the
Ethical Foundations of Knowledge-, also "The Place of Phronesis in the Methodology of




For Zagzebski, epistemological theories always involve concepts that are
directly ethical, e.g., epistemic duty, responsibility, and so on. However, these
concepts are linked to different moral theories which influence the outcome of
their application in epistemology. The situation we are in, wherein we are forced
to choose between internalist and externalist models of reason is largely a result
of the application within epistemology, of concepts derived from "act-based"
moral theories. Following a train of thought established by Ernest Sosa, Lorraine
Code and J. Montmarquet, Zagzebski has therefore attempted to articulate an
alternative model which centralises the concept of virtue in epistemology.48
Zagzebski's model suggests that the notion ofphronesis is something which can
govern both believing and acting and is a quality which allows a person to see
how they should act. In the same way that virtue cannot be reduced to the mere
performance of right acts, Zagzebski believes that epistemology cannot be
reduced to the question of legitimation,
"virtue theorists claim that it is a mistake to begin an investigation in moral
philosophy with the question of when an act is right or wrong. I accept this
position and think that similarly it is a mistake to begin an investigation in
epistemology with the question of when a belief is justified or unjustified."49
47
Ibid., p.206.




For Zagzebski, knowledge is wrongly thought of as true justified belief, with
justification as something that converts true belief into knowledge. This
understanding has not enabled us to understand religious belief adequately and
has led to the crises of pluralism. The model Zagzebski proposes is therefore one
which promises a more adequate understanding of religious belief by seeing
knowledge as "true belief arising out of acts of intellectual virtue".50 In the
same way that moral virtues and vices are within our control in the sphere of
behaviour, so too are intellectual virtues and vices within our control in the
sphere of cognition. Like moral virtues, intellectual virtues, (e.g., carefulness,
thoroughness, courage, perseverance etc..) are not mere instruments or tools to
achieve happiness with, but necessitate a proper balance between the different
aspects of the human condition. The real question we should be asking of
theological truth claims according to Zagzebski, is not can they be justified, but
is the person holding them, holding them in a way which is intellectually
virtuous? For Zagzebski, what this means is that a person's beliefs are rational
if they conform to two basic criteria. First, are they the result of reliable belief-
producing processes - Zagzebski uses the example of the guess as a true belief
produced through unreliable belief-producing processes.51 Secondly, are they
50
Ibid., p.207. Zagzebski finds parallels for her claims in the work of John Henry Newman.
In Newman's Essay in aid of a Grammar ofAssent (1870), (Notre Dame, University of Notre
Dame Press, 1979). "Assent" is described in terms of an act of will towards a truth that we grasp
with an "illative" or instinctive sense, rather than a truth that grasps us. Bernard Lonergan and




motivated by a desire for truth.52
What Zagzebski argues, is that in the same way that phronesis is a form of
moral judgement which is not strictly rule-governed, so too, with respect to
beliefs, is it a form of epistemological judgement that is not strictly rule-
governed. Consequently, she holds that in theological matters, the rationality of
any belief can be tested against criteria determining whether or not such a belief
would be acceptable to a person possessing phronesis,
"A test for whether or not a belief is rational (justified, acceptable) is whether
it would be accepted by a person with phronesis in the relevant
circumstances."53
This is, she argues, a "strictly analogous" application of Aristotle's own
phronesis test for moral action, except now applied to the realm of knowledge.
The problem with this test, as Zagzebski herself points out, is that it involves the
identification of persons with phronesis. This of course is both a highly
individualistic project and entails a certain circularity in that, since we need to
have a pre-understanding ofphronesis in order to identify persons possessing it,
we cannot then use the same behaviour as criteria.54 However, in response to
the allegation that application of the notion ofphronesis leads to this circularity,






See Nancey Murphy, "The Role of Virtue in Epistemology" in Stephen T. Davis, ed.
Philosophy and Theological Discourse.
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for having phronesis"55 - a point which is furthermore endorsed by Murphy,
when she says that the test of the rationality of religious belief ought to be in the
hands not of a virtuous individual, but a "community of virtuous truth-
seekers".56
The problem of which community of truth-seekers ought to be the definitive one,
has of course been identified by a number of key thinkers.57 One way around
the problem is to suggest with Charles Taylor and John Finnis that certain
common human values shape our practical reasoning.
If Zagzebski's model of legitimation is successful then the problem of how to
judge between rival theological truth claims obviously appears far less daunting
than previously thought. Legitimating theological truth claims may in the final
analysis not be about deciding for or against them in the light of only one
understanding of rationality. Rather, we can invert the values of the equation
which normally suggests that a true belief is legitimate when it is a rational
belief, to suggest that our understanding of what is rational is legitimated by the
virtuous exercise of true beliefs held with integrity. Consequently, whether a
55 Linda Zagzebski, "The Place of Phronesis in the Methodology of Theology", p.218.
56
See Nancey Murphy, "The Role of Phronesis in Epistemology", in Stephen T. Davis, ed.
Philosophy and Theological Discourse, p.225. Note that Murphy thinks that ultimately
Zagzebski's use of "reliability" as criteria for the belief-producing processes of rationality,
necessitates more traditional epistemological inquiry.
57
See, Alastair Maclntrye, After Virtue.
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belief is rational or not need not be determined by a process whereby rationality
is the criteria for virtuous action, but can be determined by a process whereby
virtuous action is the criteria for rationality.
A phronesis test could, consequently, be incorporated into the methodology of
theology as a basic guide to the relative adequacy and rationality of any
theological truth claim, and could ask; "Is this belief produced through reliable
belief-producing processes?", and; "Is this belief motivated by the desire for
truth?"58
Zagzebski's argument for the inclusion of phronesis in the methodology of
theology concludes with some implications which we would do well to learn
from when we consider the question of legitimation. First of all, the rationality
of a person's religious belief, is not something that can be determined apart from
the effect it has in the person's life.59 Secondly, knowledge of God is not an
insight obtained through the procedures of rule-governed argumentation, but is
an insight gained through procedures more like the ones people use in resolving
moral dilemmas. These non-rule-governed procedures reflect the Aristotelian
Doctrine of the Golden Mean, which calls for tact, wisdom and above all
58 For more on the potential of virtue epistemology as a theological interlocutor, see the
Chapter, "The Trials of Truth: Mission, Martyrdom and The Epistemology of the Cross", in the
forthcoming, To Stake a Claim: Christian Mission in Epistemological Crisis, ed. Kevin J.
Vanhoozer (Orbis).
59 Linda Zagzebski, "The Place of Phronesis in the Methodology of Theology", p.215.
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patience.
The importance of phronesis for theological truth claims will be stressed again
in the conclusion to this thesis, where we will see that wisdom may be the
necessary element in judging between different imagined possibilities of
goodness. Nevertheless, in this Chapter we have seen something of the potential
of an alternative conception of reason that can integrate elements of truth that
modernity has previously ignored.
Conclusion
In this Chapter we have seen that the totalisation of theological truth claims only
becomes a problem under an epistemological rubric that insists that truth
involves cognitive privilege and hierarchy. We have seen how faith suffers under
this formula, and yet also how an alternative reading of the situation can see
faith as the primary destabilising force behind the dismantling of cognitive
privilege. I have therefore suggested that a certain praxis understanding of faith
is of the essence of a theological truth claim, and need not be sacrificed to those
critics -theological or otherwise - that see totalisation lurking under every bed.
The conclusion of this Chapter is that phronesis models of rationality offer
theological truth claims significant opportunities. A phronesis model of
rationality affords us an understanding of truth as both universal and particular,
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without risk of paradox. Following Zagzebski, we can argue that the rationality
of any belief is not something that can be determined apart from the impact it
has in the sphere of morality. Consequently, faith, understood as praxis, can be
a meaningful, even necessary dimension, of an intellectually virtuous life. Using
phronesis models of reason and praxis models of faith, theological truth claims
can avoid many of the problems they find themselves confronted with in
modernity. The benefits that a phronesis model of reason can bring to theology
are evident. As a form of rationality, that is at the same time a virtue, phronesis





"Our generation celebrates its freedom from the constricting yoke of the
imperial age of grand systems. It joyfully rebels against abstract thinking and
disavows preoccupation with systematicity, which none epitomized better than
Immanuel Kant, according to whose daily routine the women of Konigsberg
allegedly set their clocks. Contemporary liberal theology claims that we can no
longer believe in a universal disembodied reason that is free from the
constraints of particular circumstances. Our thinking, it alleges, reflects
interests and desires. Theories serve our will to power and are to be interpreted




The argument in Chapters One to Three has been to suggest that what might
help the making of public theological truth claims, is a praxis model of faith and
a phronesis understanding of rationality. However, such a suggestion does not
necessarily need religion for its fulfilment, and runs the risk of making the
theological dimension redundant altogether. If theological truth claims are to be
hereafter understood in the light of models of rationality as virtuous action and
faith as praxis, then why do we need to retain the epithet theological at all? This
question, evidently faced head-on by Kant, as well as other key figures, may
have a number of possible answers. It may be that religion adds nothing to
1 Adina Davidovich, "Kant's Theological Constructivism", in Harvard Theological Review
86:3 (1993), pp.323-351, p.323.
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ethics; that we should simply give up talk of theological truth claims, and accept
that one or other of the postmodernist's versions of modernity is actually in the
final analysis the best account that we can come up with. We have already
looked at one version of this option in Chapter Two and concluded that, so far,
the postmodernists we have considered do not seem to offer sufficient resources
upon which to base theological truth claims.
On the other hand therefore, it may be as Kant suggests that religion adds to
ethics a categorical moral imperative, Duty. It may be that theological truth
claims are forms of teleological judgement which act as regulative principles of
human thought and action.2 Although this model still may not allow us to
accord religion the full autonomy as an independent sphere of meaning that
some would like, it nonetheless remains a possible construal of the relationship
between religion and ethics. The problem with Kant's answer to the question has
long been that, once the postulate of God has served its purpose making the
categorical imperative a possibility, then the meaningfulness of religion seems
to be exhausted by ethics. However, another reading of Kant on this question
suggests that far from being a provisional postulate of reason, the contemplative
thought of God as the moral designer of the universe, is actually an essential
2 See Kant, Religion within the Limits ofReason Alone, (Harper, New York 1960). Tr. T
M Green and H H. Hudson, p.54. "The idea (of the good principle) itself, which reason presents
to us for our zealous emulation can give us power."
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component in the maintenance of the unity of reason.3
It is one of the premises of this thesis that while the meaningfulness and truth
of religion can never be divorced from the ethical, nonetheless, ethics does not
need to exhaust religion. In this Chapter, we will therefore consider an argument
which does not seek to move outside the scope of Kantian philosophy generally,
and yet challenges the normal understanding of Kant on the question of what
religion adds to ethics. In Adina Davidovich's Religion as a Province of
Meaning, it is shown that for Kant, religion is the essential bridge between the
spheres of practical reason and pure reason, nature and freedom.4 In
demonstrating this, Davidovich makes it possible that,
"theology need not be torn between unbounded subjectivity and unattainable
objectivity."5
3
As we shall see further in Chapters Five and Six, a third option is that what religion adds
to ethics is possibility. Ricoeur and Tracy's construal of this idea suggests that there is little that
distinguishes religion from art, and that understanding the possibilities that religion extends to
us in aesthetic terms is much more constructive than trying to define what religion might offer
beyond art. Under this last option, religion can at least be viewed philosophically as a
hermeneutical act of resistance against the reduction of form to content, and can be viewed
phenomenologically as the cultural manifestation of such an act of resistance. With Tracy, we
can understand religion as a paradigmatically hermeneutical phenomenon, a much messier thing
than the tidy distinction between religion and culture usually suggests, and like Nicholas Lash,
can argue that the kind of oppositional distinction made between religion and culture is a false
one, "the view that religion is the name of one particular district which we may inhabit if we
feel so inclined, a region of diminishing plausibility and significance, a territory quite distinct
from those we know as "politics" and 'art', as 'science' and 'law' and 'economics'; this view
of things, peculiar to modern Western culture, had a beginning, in the seventeenth century and
is now coming to an end." Nicholas Lash, The Beginning and the End of 'Religion' (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.ix.
4 See Adina Davidovich, Religion as a Province ofMeaning: The Kantian Foundations of




Consequently, even given the transcendental status of theological truth claims
under a broad Kantian rubric, it remains possible to configure the relationship
between religion and ethics in such a way as to preserve the autonomy of
religion as a province of meaning. Whilst on its own, Davidovich's argument
stands as an encouragement to theologians searching for ways in which
theological truth claims can be public without being reduced to ethics, it can also
be more strategically employed to help any theological approach charged with
"experiential foundationalism" (like Tracy's), provide a robust defence. For, if
valid, Davidovich's argument can help bolster approaches that seek to ground
theological truth in human experience, without fear of sinking into subjectivity
or relativism. It is Davidovich's claim that,
"theology need not detach itself from its foundations in human experience to
serve a general audience."6
We will examine how this can be possible in this Chapter.
1. On the Relationship between Religion and Ethics in Kant
Nowhere is the problem of the relationship between religion and ethics dealt
with more thoroughly than in the work of Immanuel Kant. Kant's oft-quoted
lines from the Critique of Practical Reason, aptly express his lifelong
preoccupation with these twin themes.7
6
Adina Davidovich, "Kant's Theological Constructivism", in Harvard Theological Review,
86:3 (1993), pp.323-351, p.351.
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Justice cannot be expected to be done to such a massive and complex thinker as Kant in
a few pages. My purpose is not to enter into too much detail on the numerous debates
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"Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing wonder and awe, the
oftener and the more steadily I reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me
and the moral law within me. I do not merely conjecture them and seek them
as if they were obscured in darkness, or in the transcendent region beyond my
horizon: I see them before me, and I connect them directly with the
consciousness of my own existence".8
Kant is of course a pivotal figure in the history of Western philosophy. Indeed,
it would be true to say that many of the key features of modernity are derived
from a synthesis first expressed by Kant at the end of the Enlightenment. The
extent to which religion has profited or lost in the light of Kant's thought, is an
open question, with thinkers on both sides arguing the case. Was Kant the
"founding father of symbolic theology" as Phillip Rossi suggests?9 Or did he
hammer the last nail in the coffin of religion and replace God with the
Categorical Imperative? This is the issue facing interpretations of Kant and a lot
hangs on it. If we can answer yes to the first question, then theological
constructivism, i.e., the conscious effort to build theological truth claims, has a
future.
concerning interpretations of Kant's epistemology (debates for example over realism or non-
realism), but to set the parameters of the question of religion more explicitly. Kant after all has
been seen by many as the father of many modern disciplines including that of the philosophy
of religion - see for example James Collins, The Emergence of Philosophy ofReligion, (New
Haven, Yale University Press, 1967), pp.89-212.
8
Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, in Kant Selections (London, Macmillan, 1988), ed.
Lewis White Beck, p.325.
9
See for example Phillip Rossi's "Kant as the Father of Symbolic Theology: Hope and the
Symbols of Christian Faith" in Philosophy Today 25 (1981), pp.24-33, Kant is described as the
father of symbolic theology whose three critiques are intended to facilitate a way of thinking
about nature that sees it as purposive and meaningful. As we shall see this also parallels Stewart
Sutherland's claim that the universe is such, that it makes sense to be holy.
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Kant's 'Copernican Revolution' attempted to reverse the relationship between
the knower (as subject) and the knower (as object), and change the priority that
the objective had over the subjective. Kant's 'revolution' was to make the mind
into an entity which imposed upon nature certain categories, without which it
was unable to make sense of its own stimuli. Thus, Kant's 'Copernican
Revolution' can be accurately described as a turn to the subject, where
subjectivity is no longer thought of as a second-rate form of knowledge. After
Kant, subjectivity characterises all knowledge. As Tracy points out, this aspect
of Kant's thought leads directly to the blossoming of Romanticism and the
freedom to delight in symbol.10
The 'Copernican Revolution' was considered to be a significant development in
belief about human knowledge. Through it, Kant was believed to have
demonstrated that while knowledge does initially come from empirical sense
experience, it does not come without the additional processing of the categories
of the mind. However, Kant's philosophy was also intended to be a critical
philosophy, and attempted to expose the limits of reason in a way that did not
induce total scepticism. It was an attack upon the confidence of metaphysical
and theological dogmatics yet with the intention of enabling a new rational
faith.11 The question that theologians have been forced to deal with following
10 David Tracy, "Literary Theory and the Return of the Forms for Naming and Thinking
God in Theology" in Journal of Religion 74:3 (1994), pp.302-319, p.309.
11 Kant believed that prior to him all philosophy had been dogmatic, the need therefore was
for a new approach in philosophy which was critical without being absurdly sceptical.
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Kant is, what kind of truth does theology stand for in this new rational faith?
Kant refused to accord any credibility to the idea of a speculative metaphysics.
Any attempt to describe in definitive terms the nature of a meta-physical reality
would, in his opinion, fail. Theology, as speculative metaphysics was likewise
instantly invalidated by Kant. Consequently, the only thing that saved theology
from being a pointless exercise according to Kant's schema was connected to the
operations of the practical reason which exhibit a moral consciousness.
Kant's epistemology holds that we cannot look at anything without assuming it
to have a purpose or end. We possess a capacity for teleological judgement, and
theology deals with, and is derived from, this capacity. Theology is related to the
question "What can I hope will be?". In Kant, therefore, there is a sense in
which religion is clearly thought to be subordinate to ethics,
"So far as morality is based upon the conception of man as a free agent.... it
stands in need neither of the idea of another Being over him, for him to
apprehend his duty, nor of an incentive other than the law itself, for him to do
his duty."12
But this thought is quickly followed by another. Even though for its own sake
morality is not dependent upon religious ideas of what constitutes the end
towards which moral actions strive, nevertheless,
"it is quite possible that it is necessarily related to such an end, taken not as the
ground but as the sum of inevitable consequences of maxims adopted as
12
Kant, Religion Within the Limits ofReason Alone (New York, Harper & Row, 1960). Tr.
Theodore M. Green and Hoyt H. Hudson, p.3.
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conformable to that end".13
For Kant, therefore, though in one sense religion is subordinate to ethics, at the
same time, "morality thus leads ineluctably to religion".14 It is the intriguing
marriage of these two thoughts that have occupied generations of thinkers
attempting to establish exactly what kind of truth claim Kant held a theological
truth claim to be! One influential school has forged a complete identification of
God with Kant's categorical imperative, and reduced religion to ethics.
Nevertheless, as we shall see in a moment, there are strong grounds to suggest
that this understanding of Kant, that God is Duty writ large, will not suffice. The
ordinary reading of Kant can offer a means of justifying the distinctiveness of
the religious over the ethical, in terms of a hierarchical structuring of the
noumenal and the phenomenal. This of course allows us to claim that theological
truth claims are transcendental truth claims that function as regulative principles,
disclosing the necessary conditions for future possibilities. However, we need to
be careful of using the language of regulative principles too concretely.
Theological truth claims function like regulative principles in that they represent
a possible reality. A strictly Kantian understanding of a regulative principle
leaves us with the problem of ensuring that the noumenal does not exercise
privilege over the phenomenal, resulting in the kind of understanding of ethics






exactly what happens under Kant's epistemological structure,
"Kant privileges the transcendental over the empirical and thus detaches moral
reflection from the actual contexts in which human beings seek to make
decisions about what to do next."15
A more fruitful Kantian insight concerns the way that the Third Critique
succeeds in establishing the viability of theological truth claims as teleological
judgements.16 Adina Davidovich has explored the importance of Kant's Third
Critique and we will examine it next.
2. On Davidovich's Re-reading of Kant
Inspired by a similar understanding of Kant she finds in Rudolph Otto and Paul
Tillich, Adina Davidovich thinks that the normal understanding of Kant's views
on religion places too much emphasis on Religion Within the Limits ofReason
Alone. This work expresses Kant's fears that fanaticism could become embodied
in historical religion, but it does not develop the main idea found in the Third
Critique that, contemplative thought about the moral designer of the universe
establishes the unity of reason in a marriage of theory and praxis.11 According
to Davidovich, it is this last idea about religion that should govern our
15 Joanna Hodge, "Genealogy for a Postmodern Ethics; reflections on Hegel and
Heidegger",in Shadows ofSpirit: Postmodernism and Religion (London, Routledge, 1992), ed.
Phillipa Berry and Andrew Wemick, p. 137.
16
See Kant's Critique ofJudgement in Kant Selections, Lewis White Beck, pp.341-410.
17
Davidovich, Religion as a Province ofMeaning, p.xv.
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understanding of Kant's final position, and not the idea found in Religion Within
the Limits of Reason Alone whereby religion is more or less subsumed by
morality in being limited in its validity to the practical sphere.
"Kant considered religion an essential bridge between the worlds of theory and
praxis and elevated its status as such to that of a necessary principle through
which alone the unity of reason is established"18 (emphasis mine)
Phillip Rossi agrees with Davidovich's fundamental point that Kant's concern
was with the unity of reason, and the role that contemplative thought of a moral
designer could have in its maintenance. Although he nevertheless takes issue
with Davidovich over whether Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone is
merely intended to be a response to fanaticism as Davidovich claims,19 Rossi
nevertheless agrees that Kant considered religion (defined as contemplative belief
in God as moral architect), a necessary principle through which both the
theoretical and practical dimensions of reason could be harmonised. Davidovich
argues that the self-declared culmination of Kant's critical philosophy, the Third
Critique, is meant to make us realise the necessity of a contemplative thought
of a moral designer of the universe in achieving the unity of reason,
"[Kant's] central argument that reflective judgement bridges the gap between
nature and freedom led [him] to a contemplative conception of religion that
differs significantly from the conception of religion of the first two
critiques."20
| o
Ibid., p.xv. Note, central to Davidovich's argument is the claim that Kant's most
constructive engagement with the question of religion came not in Religion Within the Limits
of Reason Alone, but in the Critique ofJudgement.
19
See Phillip Rossi, Book Review of Religion as a Province of Meaning in Theological
Studies 55 (1994), pp.551-553.
20
Davidovich, Religion as a Province ofMeaning, pp.xi-xii.
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Thus, the new rational faith which Kant sought, could be deemed valid beyond
the practical sphere of the postulates of reason. According to Davidovich the
necessity of belief in the realisation of the summum bonum for Kant depends in
turn on a reflective judgement where contemplative ideas make the unity of
reason a possibility.21
The contemplative hope that the universe has a purpose, is then the basis of the
unity of reason. Davidovich argues that the principle of purposiveness that Kant
develops, is intended to show how understanding and reason can stand together
without either reducing one to the other. This idea is further linked to the
summum bonum which involves the notion of a moral designer, not in order to
prove the existence of such a being, but as a "possible principle of creation".
It is at this point in her argument, that Davidovich identifies Kant's summum
bonum with a contemplative idea, and admits that she might be moving slightly
beyond Kant's express wishes.
"We must deduce from these considerations something Kant himself never
explicitly claimed., the Highest Good of the Third Critique functions as the
principle of the transcendental unity of Reason and Understanding, as the
unifying principle of the domains of nature and freedom."22






make it himself. Eventually, however, it became the central building blocks of
the theological work of Otto and Tillich.
A detailed examination of Davidovich's reading of Kant cannot be undertaken
here. My purpose in this Chapter is merely to suggest possible ways that religion
may survive being reduced to ethics. Nevertheless, it is necessary to point out
that there is considerable disagreement amongst Kant scholars that Davidovich
could be correct. Central to Davidovich's argument is the belief that for Kant,
the unity of reason is not achieved through the exercise of the Practical
Reason.23 This suggestion, held by Edward Caird, Yirmiaha Yovel and Richard
Kroner, leads to the belief that it is in moral action that the human agent knows
him or herself as a free noumenal being.24 But for Davidovich, the limitations
of the Practical Reason in knowing what the end of moral action is, makes this
belief impossible. Thus,
"Our conscience, informed by the Categorical Imperative, is a judge that can
only condemn but never justify. It is impossible therefore for Practical Reason
to find the meaning of human existence in the moral act and its place in moral
history."25
Furthermore,




See for example, Edward Caird The Critical Philosophy ofEmmanuel Kant 2 vols.; (New
York, Kraus, 1968); Yirmiaha Yovel Kant and the Philosophy ofHistory (Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1980); and Richard Kroner Kant's Weltanschauung (Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1956), tr. John E.Smith.
25
Davidovich, Religion as a Province ofMeaning, pp. 132-3.
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of Reason are satisfied".26
Although all Kant would allow was a contemplative thought about an intuitive
reason, nevertheless, Davidovich believes that,
"it was Kant's intention to show that contemplation of the reflective ideas
which are generated in the exercise of our faculty of judgement, provides the
final answer to the three great questions of philosophy: What can I know?
What ought I to do? and, What may I hope for?"27
One of the problems faced by Davidovich's reading of Kant comes to the fore
in her interpretation of Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics ofMorals.2* It
is in this work that Kant deals most specifically with the question that
Davidovich is concerned with, and explores whether the supreme principle of
morality can indeed be religious. The arguments in the Groundwork are of
course complex and involve Kant's presupposition that a radical dichotomy must
exist between autonomous morality and heteronomous morality. Davidovich
deals with these arguments and argues that though the Groundwork suggests that
the supreme principle of morality is found in the Categorical Imperative, this





28 To an extent the existence of a piece of work explicitly dedicated to the refutation of the
claim Davidovich is trying to make seems to militate against her efforts. In the Groundwork of
the Metaphysics of Morals (published 1797) Kant refutes the possibility of something
Davidovich believes to be implied in the earlier Critique ofJudgement (published 1790). We are
therefore left wondering why, if Kant's thought were actually as Davidovich suggests, he did
not make his commitments more explicit at the time of writing the Groundwork. This confusion
is further deepened in the light of the unambiguous standpoint Kant takes on religion in Religion
Within the Limits of Reason Alone (published 1793).
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right or wrong is purely a matter of reason.29 What the Categorical Imperative
does, argues Davidovich, is to help the moral agent negotiate a route through
which the establishment of the summum bonum, the final end of morality, can
be achieved.30 Consequently, it is not by virtue of the Categorical Imperative
itself, that something is added to the conception of the good held by the moral
agent, for the Categorical Imperative is only a formal principle. It is the goal of
the moral command itself - the Good - which is morally motivating.31
How then does the goal, or end of morality, relate to Kant's views on religion
and contemplative reflection according to Davidovich? Davidovich believes that
in the discussion of the nature of reflective judgement found in the Third
Critique there is strong evidence that, for Kant, contemplative belief in God
allows for a new understanding of the summum bonum. Rather than the normal
suggestion that Kant's intention in the Third Critique was merely to demonstrate
the existence of God as the necessary postulate of practical reason, Davidovich
claims that Kant's principal aim was to lead us towards the contemplation of an
intuitive reason that could have created both theoretical and practical reason,
that,
"the interests of Reason then lead us to contemplate the world as a divine
29






creation embodying a moral purpose".32
Nevertheless, such intentions still do not allow for the claim that we have
knowledge of God. In no sense does Davidovich suggest that Kant reneges on
the epistemological commitments made in the First Critique. Consequently, a
contemplative thought about intuitive reason, is not to be thought of as a "God's-
eye-point-of-view", but merely as a point of view from the perspective of
reflective judgement. As such, it is a point of view which can be of real value
to us in enabling us to live differently. This is an extremely important point and
links with views held by Stewart Sutherland. As we shall see in Chapter Seven,
Sutherland's suggestion that the role of theology is to articulate the possibility
of a perspective sub specie aeternitatis has a close parallel here. Such a
perspective is, for Sutherland, "regulative in nature", and is, "approached only
indirectly through the light which it throws on our world", (thus clearly Kantian)
but is a perspective which opens up the possibility of a holy life,33
In Part Two of her study, Davidovich's argument is further developed in a more
concrete application to the question of theological truth in the work of Otto and
Tillich. Otto's theory of numinous experience is, according to Davidovich,
directly indebted to Kant's understanding of religion set out in the Critique of
Judgement and expands upon ideas left latent in Kant's own writings concerning
32
Ibid., p.135.
33 Stewart Sutherland, God, Jesus and Belief (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1984), p. 111.
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the cognitivity of religious experience. Similarly, Tillich's theory of religion as
a "theonomous consciousness" is seen as an extension of Kant's contemplative
understanding of religion and shows that, using Kant's own terminology,
religious consciousness can be different to both heteronomous consciousness
(i.e., consciousness regulated by things other than itself), and autonomous
consciousness (i.e., consciousness regulated only by itself). For Tillich, religious
consciousness is theonomous, a third alternative between autonomy and
heteronomy, and as such can establish the fact that religion recognises the
practical and theoretical functions of reason, yet at the same time adds to them
a dimension which, "they themselves must recognise as essential".34 The
respective differences between Otto and Tillich for Davidovich, lies in the fact
that one believed that religion had some kind of foundation in reason
independent of morality and science, while the other believed religion was the
depth dimension of all other aspects of culture.
In the light of Davidovich's reading of Kant, we are licensed to understand
theological truth claims as forms of teleological judgement that go beyond the
practical sphere; that they are objects of contemplative reflection, and that
consequently, "religion as a province of meaning" can play "an essential role in
the economy of reason".35 It therefore appears possible, even under the Kantian
34
Davidovich, Religion within the Province ofMeaning, p.228. This dimension is of course
the depth dimension of existence that religion stands for.
35 Ibid., p.305.
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rubric of critical transcendentalism, to escape the modernist compulsion to
sacrifice theological truth claims on the altar of the fact/value dichotomy.
Theological truth claims as claims about the nature of human experience can be
meaningful without necessitating the reduction of the province of meaning of
religion, to that of the private individual's subjective taste.
If accurate and reliable, Davidovich's re-reading of Kant's Third Critique does
offer significant resources for the development of an understanding of religion
and the role of theological truth claims which allows religion some kind of
distinctiveness from ethics. Davidovich follows Tillich in believing that religion
represents a depth dimension of human experience which cannot be reduced to
ethics, but yet is not completely unrelated to ethics.36
"Religion is not a special function ofman's spiritual life, but is the dimension
of depth in all of its functions."37
Tillich names that which religion represents as ultimate concern. Finding itself
without a natural home in any of the three spiritual functions of the human life,
religion accepts that it is a vagrant force whose character is as the ultimate
concern of all aspects of living. In the moral sphere it is the "unconditional
36 It is interesting to note the way that both Tillich and Tracy choose more or less spatial
metaphors that are in some way representative of the idea of an eschaton - a not-yet-but-already-
lived reality. See for example Kevin Vanhoozer's review of On Naming the Present, in Reviews
in Religion and Theology 1 (1997), pp.44-47. "Tracy's God is ultimately eschatological - not
only the God of the future and of hope, but the other-than-worldly God who dismpts concepts
and confidence."
37 Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1959), p.5.
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seriousness of the moral demand".38 In the cognitive sphere it is the "passionate
longing for ultimate reality", and in the aesthetic sphere it is the "infinite desire
to express ultimate meaning".39 Consequently, religion cannot be rejected with
ultimate seriousness because ultimate seriousness is an expression of an ultimate
concern. Davidovich's model of religion as a province of meaning makes much
sense of this understanding of religion. Religion has generally provided a
unifying perspective that has married the diverse and sometimes conflicting
interests found within different cultures, but it has also a perspective with an
ultimate concern. It may therefore be possible to tie in here with theological
programmes like Tracy's, that see religion as a paradigmatically hermeneutical
phenomenon, for which an analogical imagination is an essential tool.
Nevertheless, if Davidovich's project is to succeed, care must be taken to avoid
the cognitive privilege of theological truth claims. Davidovich shows recognition
of this problem when she discusses whether a Kantian defence of the rationality
of religion must also lead to the stronger claim that all rational agents must be
religious.40
"Even if we agree that proponents of the Kantian school offer an intriguing
defence of the rationality of religion, we may still want to ask if they succeed
in arguing for the stronger case that all human beings must be religious. The
two claims tend to merge in their work. They defend religion by showing its






Ibid., p.309. Davidovich herself expresses reservations about this latter claim.
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order to be fully rational we must all be religious and still to accept their
defence of the rationality of religion"41
But herein lies a problem. How can an understanding of religion that focuses on
contemplative belief in, "the world as a divine creation embodying a moral
purpose", do enough to escape cognitive privilege?
In Davidovich's essay, "Kant's Theological Constructivism", she discusses three
distinct models of theological constructivism that, she claims, Kant employed.42
The first two "ethical postulation" (found primarily in the Critique ofPractical
Reason but developed in the Critique of Judgement and Religion Within the
Limits of Reason Alone), and "imaginative projection" (found primarily in
Metaphysics ofMorals, but also in the Third Critique, and Religion Within the
Limits of Reason Alone), subjugate religion to morality. However, the third
model of theological constructivism "contemplative construction", makes religion
as an independent province of meaning a possibility. This model is found most
explicitly in the Third Critique where, Davidovich claims, Kant,
"outlines a program of theological constructivism for which faith is rooted in
the subjectivity of feelings and can nevertheless, claim for its vision universal
communicability.1,43
Furthermore,
"The contemplative idea of God that this model suggests is the necessary
41
Davidovich, Religion as a Province ofMeaning, p.309.
42




correlate of both moral decision and the scientific quest for truth."44
What Davidovich argues for, is the idea that an essential part of all quests for
truth, in whatever sphere, is the contemplative idea of God. In describing the
third of Kant's models of theological constructivism, Davidovich says she is
following Kant's use of the word contemplative, as "a thought that is indifferent
to the existence of its object", which,
"considers the character of the object only as an object of thought, regardless
of its existence or in-existence."45 (emphasis mine)
Nevertheless, there is a problem here, if a contemplative idea is as Davidovich
describes, how can it function in any meaningful way as the necessary correlate
ofmorality and science whilst being indifferent to the existence or otherwise of
its object? What kind of province ofmeaning does a contemplative idea of God
that is 'indifferent' to its object, represent?46 This of course raises the spectre
of the realism versus anti-realism debate which we will discuss more fully in
Chapter Seven, in the context of a debate between Stewart Sutherland and Don
Cupitt. In the light of our present subject under discussion it is unclear whether
Davidovich would agree more with Cupitt for whom the possibility of morality
is real irrespective of whether or not such a possibility corresponds with the way





46 See Davidovich, Religion as a Province ofMeaning, p.79, where Davidovich quotes Kant
in the Third Critique describing a judgement of taste as "merely contemplative"!
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is dependent upon its correspondence with the way the universe is. On the one
hand Davidovich is committed to a Kantian picture which suggests that morality
is a possibility because it is written into reason as a universal phenomenon,
while on the other hand that which secures the unity of universal reason is a
contemplative idea which is indifferent to the existence or otherwise of its
object. Whether this means Davidovich is a realist or not is open to question.
A further problem that may arise is with Davidovich's understanding of a
province of meaning. Despite Davidovich's claim that the rationality of religion
does not necessarily lead to the further claim that all rational beings are
religious, it may be inevitable that her understanding of the kind of province that
religion represents, will come to be regarded as the sole province of meaning.
As the sole province of meaning, it would necessarily have privileged access to
truth. The worry that the province that religion occupies in Davidovich's account
will come to be regarded as a no-man's land province, where a contemplative
idea of God is incapable of functioning as a truly critical principle with which
to judge between rival theological truth claims, is however, less serious than it
might seem. Where Davidovich may offer a plausible way around both of these
potential difficulties lies in the relationship that she might suggest exists between
the three models of theological constructivism in Kant. In a similar way, to the
way that David Tracy suggests that theology is structured into three related
disciplines and correlated with three related publics, Davidovich could argue that
the shortcomings of one of Kant's models of theological constructivism, are
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made up by the strengths of one of the others.
Caution needs to be exercised to prevent the exaltation of the religious province
of meaning as the sole province of meaning. We must be reminded that religion
secures for us a coherent worldview and does not therefore seek to compete for
the epistemological high ground. In the same way that the distinction between
religion and culture is at best only heuristic and allows only for the use of
provisional and normative judgements, the distinction between a religious
province of meaning and any other, must, at all times be kept open to revision
to prevent truth becoming a privileged possession. Even religion will corrupt
truth when it is allowed to become the sole province of meaning. Davidovich's
defence of religion as a province of meaning, should be thought of as one
necessitated by the state of the philosophy of religion in modernity. It is not a
claim for the privilege of religion, but is an apologetic for its existence.
Conclusion
The conclusion to Part One of this thesis is to claim validity for the making of
theological truth claims in the contemporary situation. We have seen that
theological truth claims need not compete with other truth claims for the
epistemological high ground, that they do not necessitate cognitive privilege over
other truth claims. We have also seen that theological truth claims do not
necessarily need to supersede moral imperatives, or be superseded by moral
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imperatives. In this Chapter, we have seen that religion can make a truth claim
about the world, without either colliding with science or being reduced to ethics.
By centralising Otto's idea that we possess a religious consciousness, Davidovich
allows us to claim that the type of truth that theological truth represents concerns
meaning. Thus, while being a claim about the way the world is, it is however not
(in the first instance anyway), a claim about correspondence with the way things
are, but about coherence. It is therefore possible to incorporate an idea that we
will come on to discuss in Chapter Six, in the context of David Tracy's
theological paradigm. If I am right in saying Davidovich moves more towards
a coherence model of truth than a correspondence model, then her
epistemological claims locate the province that religion represents in the human
imagination. Her suggestions could therefore tie in neatly with David Tracy's
description of the role in theology of an analogical imagination, and his
suggestion that religion is a paradigmatically hermeneutical phenomenon; a
sphere which facilitates a non-totalising meaningfulness, through all the flux and
uncertainty of the moral, aesthetic and epistemological quests.
The problem I have tried to highlight with Davidovich is that the unity that is
secured for reason through the contemplative idea of God could easily lead to
religion becoming the sole province of meaning, if not properly regulated with
some critical principle. This could lead to the problem of totalisation all over
again and risk debilitating the public scope of theological truth claims. However,
I have suggested that Davidovich might employ the other two of Kant's models
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of theological constructivism to alleviate this potential difficulty. What is evident
is that Davidovich offers considerable opportunity to further the work of
revisionist theologians in striving to justify the publicness of theological truth
claims premised upon notions of human experience.
Tracy can take great comfort from projects like Davidovich's in his war of
attrition against Lindbeck's charge that the notion of experience at the heart of
his theology is "logically and empirically vacuous".47 For Davidovich, the
distinctively theological dimension that a theological truth claim represents that
is more than that offered by morality, has to do with the provision of the
possible conditions of meaningfulness. Thus, theological truths claim can be
pregnant with possibility in Davidovich's schema. In Part Two of this thesis we
will examine what it is about a theological truth claim that can induce the birth
of such possibility? In Chapters Five to Seven we will approach this question
head-on, for the answer that Tracy's revisionist theology offers, following
Ricoeur, is that it is art that is the midwife of possibility. Whether she is as
proficient as she needs to be will be the key question that will emerge by the
end of Chapter Six. Nevertheless, for the meantime my conclusion to Part One
of the thesis is to validate the making of theological truth. Theological truth
claims are meaningful, and need not be paralysed between metaphysics and
morals.
47
George Lindbeck, The Nature ofDoctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age,
(Philadelphia, Westminster, 1984), p.32.
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PART TWO
THEOLOGY AND IMAGINED POSSIBILITY
Introduction
The argument of Part One has been to suggest that theological truth claims may
survive being reduced to ethics when understood as claims about the possible
conditions of meaningfulness. Nevertheless, the province of meaning that
religion is concerned with is therefore not a province that is external to the
human knower, but is one that is immanent within the processes of knowing. In
locating the province of meaning of religion in this manner we can therefore
claim legitimacy for theological truth claims. Consequently, it is the conclusion
of Part One of this thesis that theological truth claims are valid. Following in the
spirit of Kant's Third Critique theological truth claims are valid as claims about
the imagination.
By itself, the conclusion of the First Part of the thesis does not serve to advance
the making of theological truth claims very far. In Part Two of the thesis I
therefore attempt an exercise in theological constructivism. The question is no
longer whether we are justified in talking of theological truth claims, but what
exactly do we mean when we do so. In Part Two I explore the implications of
focusing upon imagined possibility as that which is most distinctive of a
theological truth claim. In Chapter Five, after an introduction to the notion of
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possibility itself, we explore Paul Ricoeur's idea of the imagined possibility of
self-authenticity. Here, I argue that Ricoeur fails to distinguish between different
types of imagined possibility, and consequently invests a great deal in believing
that the imagined possibility of self-authenticity is sufficient for the
transformation of the human situation from self-centredness to other-centredness.
With this criticism made, we move on in Chapter Six to examine an explicitly
theological appropriation of Ricoeur in David Tracy. Here I argue that Tracy
makes certain presuppositions about art that leaves his theological model unable
to distinguish holiness from fanaticism. In Chapter Seven and the Conclusion to
the thesis I begin to offer a constructive suggestion for a renewed understanding
of the imagined possibilities that theology might offer. In Chapter Seven I draw
from Stewart Sutherland the idea that theological truth claims represent the
possibility of a life of holiness lived sub specie aeternitatis, and suggest that the
type of imagined possibility that theological truth claims represent is better
thought of as the imagined possibility of goodness, rather than the imagined
possibility of self-authenticity. In the Conclusion, I follow Iris Murdoch, in
defending the primacy of the concept of the Good, over other concepts. Here,
I argue that the concept of goodness is not vulnerable to the vicissitudes of art,





"It is from language as a medium that our whole experience of the world, and
especially hermeneutical experience, unfolds." Hans-Georg Gadamer1
"In imagining his possibilities man acts as a prophet of his own existence... By
changing his imagination man alters his existence." Paul Ricoeur2
Introduction
In Chapter Three, I argued for the primacy ofpraxis understandings of faith and
phronesis understandings of reason. Chapter Five advances the argument of
Chapter Three by exploring the role that language plays in the acquisition of
phronetic sense-making skills. Following Ricoeur, I argue that theological
language succeeds where ordinary language fails in opening up previously
unattainable possibilities, and that theological truth claims are indeed claims
about imagined possibilities. Against Ricoeur, I argue that the imagined
possibility of self-authenticity is not sufficient for the transformation of the
human condition from self-centredness to other-centredness. In this Chapter, I
1
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, (New York, Crossroad, 1989), 2nd Revised
Edition, tr. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, p.457.
2 Paul Ricoeur, History and Truth (Evanston, Northwest University Press, 1965), p. 127.
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begin by exploring how the notion of possibility itself might relate to a
theological truth claim. We start by exploring and defending the distinction
between a possibility-in-principle and a possibility-in-fact. Next, we describe the
pitfalls involved in the notion of possibility when linked too closely with
Heideggerian ideas of being, and follow a theological appropriation of this link
in deconstructionism. We then examine more of the promise that the notion of
possibility holds out for theologians in the connection Ricoeur makes between
possibility and language. Here, we show what Ricoeur believes he has done to
advance on Bultmann's failure to distinguish between a possibility-in-principle
and a possibility-in-fact. Following Bultmann and Ricoeur, I conclude that
theological language does differ from ordinary language in that it opens the door
to possibility, and thereby makes possible the acquisition of phronesis.
Nevertheless, I argue that Ricoeur's construal of the goal of possibility as
authentic subjectivity and its realisation through the creative imagination, fails
to distinguish adequately enough between imagined possibilities that are
conducive to the transformation of the human situation and those that are not.3
1. On Possibility
The notion of possibility has long been of interest to philosophers and
theologians. Book IX of Aristotle's Metaphysics provides the seminal
3
Kevin Vanhoozer raises this question of Ricoeur in Chapter 6 of Biblical Narrative in the
Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, and asks, "Can Ricoeur's attention to narrative... save him from
reducing salvation to an event not of history, but of human subjectivity..?". See, p.136.
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philosophical account of the idea. In the Metaphysics Aristotle contrasts
possibility with actuality but insists on the temporal, logical and ontological
priority of actuality.4
"For from the potential the actual is always produced by an actual thing ...
there is always some first mover and the mover already exists actually".5
The belief that the distinctiveness of a theological truth claim lies in the notion
ofpossibility offers significant resources for the project of a revisable theological
truth claim. It is my claim that faith - that which was argued in Chapters Two
and Three to facilitate the transformation of the human situation through the
positing of an ultimate goal - is a unique vehicle of possibility. At the outset,
therefore, there is an intimate link between theological truth claims, through
which faith finds expression, and possibility. The clearest statement of this link
is of course Bultmann's New Testament and Mythology where
"demythologisation" is a process which interprets religious mythology in the
light of the radical contingency of human existence.6 The 'new life' or
'salvation' that religion offers represents the possibility of a state of transformed
and authentic being. To understand theological truth claims as expressions of
such possibilities, is then, to represent something which has long been specific
4 Pointed out by Kevin Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur,
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.33 n.8.
5
Aristotle, Metaphysics Book IX (Berlin, 1831), tr. Immanuel Becker 1049b, pp.24-26.
6
See Rudolph Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology" (1941), New Testament and
Mythology and other basic writings, (London, SCM Press Ltd, 1985), tr. Schubert M. Ogden,
pp. 1-43.
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to religion. However, the key question is to what extent the theological
appropriation of the notion of possibility, can itself facilitate a meaningful and
constructive way of moving from possibilities-/n-/?rmcz/?/e, to possibilities-m-
fact. As all readers of Rudolph Bultmann know, this problem has a well-worn
history and, as we shall see at the end of this Chapter, appears to be
circumvented only through the creation of another problematic.7 Ricoeur has,
of course, offered one route out of the impasse Bultmann was faced with, and
is, as we shall see, a route adopted by David Tracy. Ricoeur argues that it is the
creative imagination that is the "power of the possible", and hence that which
ultimately distinguishes between possibilities-in-principle and possibilities-in-
fact.8 In offering this solution, however, Ricoeur leaves us facing the question
of how to distinguish between a real imagined possibility and a false imagined
possibility.
Some might argue that this is a false distinction and ought to be rejected. They
would suggest that all imagined possibilities have equal status and that
consequently a means of judging between imagined possibilities is unnecessary.
n
As already mentioned in the Introduction, for Bultmann possibility was the key
distinguishing feature between philosophy and theology. "Philosophy thus takes a possibility in
principle to be already a possibility in fact. But in the opinion of the New Testament, human
beings generally have lost the possibility in fact; indeed, their knowledge of their authenticity
is falsified by being tied up with the opinion that they have control over it." See Rudolph
Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology" (1941) in New Testament andMythology and Other
Basic Writings, tr. & ed. Schubert M. Ogden, p.27.
8 See Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics (Evanston,
Northwest University Press, 1974), ed. Don Ihde, p.408.
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How then can we justify the distinction between real imagined possibilities (i.e.,
possibilities-in-fact), and false imagined possibilities (i.e., possibilities-in-
principle)? An example of a false imagined possibility could be taken as the
possibility of a unicorn existing. Unicorn existence is a possibility-in-principle,
but it is not a possibility-in-fact. This is a harder claim to justify than appears
the case at first. The temptation is therefore to dissolve the distinction between
possibilities-in-principle and possibilities-in-fact, and claim that the possibility
of unicorn existence in principle, must also mean the possibility of unicorn
existence in fact. As Bultmann rightly observed, this is what philosophy that is
independent of theology tends to do. It assumes that a possibility-in-principle is
a possibility-in-fact. However to hold this assumption would seem to necessitate
the belief that all imagined possibilities have equal status. This is clearly
unsatisfactory. Are we to believe that the possibility of unicorns, elves, fairies
and dragons, is of the same order as the possibility of goodness? In my analysis
of possibility, a real imagined possibility must be distinguished from a false
imagined possibility, and the heart of that distinction hinges upon the difference
that an imagined possibility can make in the transformation of the human
situation. Unicorns, fairies and elves undoubtedly enhance the human situation.
Who among us has not benefited from recreational, imaginative flights of
fantasy? Nonetheless, imagined possibilities such as these do not have the same
power as the imagined possibility of goodness. As we shall see in Chapter Seven
and the Conclusion, the imagined possibility of goodness possesses something
that other imagined possibilities do not. Consequently, it is the case that the
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imagined possibility of goodness has the capacity to be genuinely transformative
of the human condition. The distinction between possibilities-in-principle and
possibilities-in-fact therefore has to be maintained, and the heart of the
distinction has to be between possibilities that can be seen to contibute directly
to the transformation of the human situation and those that cannot. It is the
argument of Part Two of this thesis that an understanding of theological truth as
the articulation of possibility does indeed offer us significant promise, but that
the confidence that Ricoeur and Tracy have in the creative imagination as the
"power of the possible", is misplaced unless effort is made to adequately
distinguish between different types of imagined possibility.9
a: The Pitfalls of Possibility
The idea that possibility is at the heart of the human quest has its modern roots
in Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Kant. As we have seen in Chapter Four, Kant's
most significant contribution to theology lies in his endorsement of the power
of human creativity and the idea that theological truths are symbolic truths.
Heidegger's contribution, is however concerned with the link between
possibility, being and human temporality.10 The idea that theological truth is
about being, naturally places questions of legitimation in an altogether different
context. Being is not a category that the epistemological resources ofmodernity
9
See Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics, ed. Don Ihde,
p.408.
10 See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1962) Tr. J. Macquarrie
and E. Robinson.
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can cope with very easily for it does not render itself as an item of knowledge
in the manner preferred by modernity. Nevertheless, although being, as a
philosophical category, may challenge and stimulate modern epistemological
paradigms of legitimation, we are nonetheless still charged with the
responsibility of judging between alternative accounts of being, and are therefore
forced back into the arena of public theological truth and the question of
revisability. What is an adequate account of being? A created, imagined account?
Or something more? The idea that theological truth claims are accounts of
possible ways of being, places us under an even greater responsibility to ensure
that the conversation does not drift off into some vaporous 'fog' of obscurity.
To do so would negate any attempt at legitimation, and would yield no
discernible critical principle. As I argued in Chapter One, theology has to leave
the ghetto it has been placed in and stand by its commitment to the idea that it
makes publicly accessible truth claims. Too much talk of the wrong sort of
possibility, may in the end militate against this commitment, and lead us into a
new ghetto of our own making.
b: Possibility in the Fabric Of Finitude?
Any discussion of the theological appropriation of possibility must take account
of Heidegger. Heidegger turned Aristotle's account of possibility on its head,
arguing that instead of actuality having precedence over possibility, possibility
was indeed the distinguishing aspect of actuality. It is therefore with Heidegger
that we must begin. Heidegger's contribution to the question of possibility
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concerns the distinction between authentic and inauthentic ways of being.11 For
Heidegger, authentic existence is a way of living face to face with human
fmitude and temporality. He does not balk at the prospect of ultimate mortality,
but finds possibility in the very fabric of finitude. Heidegger thinks humans are
faced with two choices. One of accepting the flux of human finitude without
seizing hold of possibility, and simply living life 'da', there but without being.
The other, to create possibilities out of the flux, and thereby realise being 'sein'.
To accomplish the marriage of 'da', that which is, and 'sein', that which might
be, is then the human challenge. To live 'dasein' is to make real the promise of
possibility in the fabric of finitude. However, the problem with Heidegger
situating possibility in an analysis of being, concerns the move beyond all
epistemology. In the manner that contemporary postmodern interpretations of
Heidegger have alighted upon the critique of presence and logocentricity, we
witness a move beyond all talk of truth, and enter a realm where endless
negations seem to be the only stable factor in a constantly shifting world of
symbol.
Deconstruction is, in a large measure, a response to the problems initiated by
Heidegger but interprets them in the light of Saussurian linguistics.12 Derrida
11
Useful readers on Heidegger include Stephen Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time
(London, Routledge, 1996); H. Dreyfuss, Being-In-The-World (Cambridge, Mass; MIT Press,
1991); George Steiner, Heidegger (London, Fontana, 1978).
12
De Saussure saw language as a self-enclosed, self-referential system of signs, no longer
dependent upon some transcendent signifier. For De Saussure, language is composed of symbols,
a complex inter-network of factors "beyond" the words we use. But for him, a symbol has no
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is of course the grand-master of deconstruction, and argues that it is the
differences between symbols that symbols represent not what they refer to.
Language is not referential but deferential. Words defer meaning endlessly. For
Derrida, the referential idea of language is too closely tied to an idea of being
as a stable presence (ontotheology). Derrida's reading of Heidegger makes him
believe that such a notion cannot approximate to authentic existence, and
consequently strategies need to be devised to overcome the perennial temptation
of humankind to objectify being.
Nowhere more, is such objectification exemplified for Derrida, than in
metaphysics. Metaphysics, for Derrida, is under the wrong impression that what
it refers to is somehow more than rhetorical. That is, that it deals with more than
just the imaginary and abstract constructs of literature. Derrida thus wants to
undo the privilege of metaphysics. Metaphysics does not, and cannot,
acknowledge its own rhetorical nature. The great strength of literature, and the
reason why writing is therefore privileged over speech in Derrida, is that texts
by their very nature do acknowledge their own rhetorical character. For Derrida,
texts constantly expose the contradictions inherent in themselves. Thus,
Christopher Norris can correctly describe Derrida's concept of writing as,
".. the free-play within every system of communication (whose) operations are
meaning outside its position in the network. A symbol is dependent upon its position in relation
to other symbols for meaning. A symbol gains its meaning however, not by virtue of any
similarities between the other symbols, but by virtue of the differences between it and others.
See, Ferdinand de Saussure, Courses in General Linguistics (London, Peter Owen, 1960), tr.
Wade Baskin.
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precisely those which escape the self-consciousness of speech and its deluded
sense of the mastery of concept over language."13
Derrida's analysis of language does not, therefore, permit us to make the kind
ofmoves that we shall shortly see Ricoeur making. Literature does not give birth
to a language which can transcend the contradictions that it generates. Derrida's
logic will not rest content with a 'poetics', as if the logical contradictions
inherent in language can be transcended by some form of rhetorical language.
(This idea is implicit in Ricoeur's belief that the truths of literature are accessed
in an indirect way, that literature and its world of narrative and metaphor
indirectly reflect a world of meaning). For Derrida, such an approach is merely
another example of the privilege of metaphysics, and the desire to relegate
writing to a secondary place after speech.
Kevin Hart has been keen to take Derrida's reading of Heidegger and employ
it in theology.14 According to Hart, both deconstruction and theology have at
the centre of their concerns the world of signs. Indeed Hart claims, theology is
a discourse which creates the distinction between sign and signified.15
Theology also, according to Hart, has made use of the notion of a fall in relation
13
Christopher Norris, Deconstruction Theory and Practice (London, Methuen, 1982), p.28.
14
See Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1989).
15 Hart argues along the lines of the fact that God has always taken to be more than the sum
total of discourse about him.
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to language. This notion Hart finds explicitly in Derrida, where, contrary to the
understanding Western thought has generally held to, Derrida employs the notion
of a fall within the sign. Signs are themselves a sign of the fall. What Hart finds
encouraging in Derrida, is his preparedness to fully exploit the reality of the
sign, and on that basis suggests deconstruction to be a potential ally in the quest
for a non-metaphysical theology. Far from being an attack upon theology,
deconstruction is an answer to the theological demand for a non-metaphysical
theology. Together, both deconstruction and theology recognise that the sign is
the originator of metaphysics, and consequently both seek to put it into
question.16
According to Hart, the real centre of Derrida's concern lies in his belief that
ontotheology - the belief in being as a stable presence - is a manipulation, thus
any attempt to halt the free-play of meaning by either a concept or an action
which grounds any text with a determinate centre is to comply with
ontotheology, and to privilege metaphysics above literature, speech above
writing, book above text, the spiritual above the material. There are therefore
only two clearly defined ways to frame the question of meaning, the ontological
theory of signification, and the grammatological theory of signification. The first
postulates the existence of a transcendent signified which all signification is
grounded in, and where signs are fallen from pure presence to representation (re-
16 Kevin Hart, Trespass of the Sign, p.21.
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presence).17 The second way (Derrida's), refuses to acknowledge the downward
fall of the sign, and argues that the sign conveys meaning not through a fall
from full presence, but through the random interaction of other signs. The
consequences of Derrida's theory of signs are most evident as a critique of any
theology presupposing the idea that God is the transcendent signified, a sign
which is entirely independent of language, and self-fulfilling. It is also evidently
a critique of any theory of interpretation which assumes that the concept of a
self-fulfilling sign as an ultimate ground of meaning, is necessary for
interpretation. But furthermore, it is a critique of any practice which functions
on such an assumption. Hart argues that deconstruction has close ties to various
mystical traditions. These are similar to deconstructionism in that they too
display a critical antipathy to philosophy, on the grounds that it is naively
metaphysical. Negative theology is such a tradition and Hart distinguishes
between metaphysical theologies (which include Western philosophy) and non-
metaphysical theologies, and argues that the Christian tradition of negative
theology is a form of non-metaphysical theology.
At the end of The Trespass of the Sign, Hart urges us to once again read the
Christian mystics with the approval of Heidegger as a possible revived negative
theology.18 But can metaphysics be eschewed quite so lightly? As an attempt
17
See G R. Evans, Philosophy and Theology in the Middle Ages (London, Routledge,
1993), for a good account of the origins of this view.
18 Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign, pp.237-269.
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to define the apophatic moment that is present in all theology, Hart's
observations have some use, but is theology an entirely apophatic venture?19 As
Peter Hodgson rightly suggests,
"an apophatic moment is necessary in theology since negation is a necessary
element of the divine life, but it should not control the logic of theological
discourse." 20
Furthermore, others might well argue that the extreme existential trajectory that
Heidegger sets off on, is of little use when it comes to identifying the difference
between authentic being and inauthentic being.21 Consequently, the flaw that
is at the heart of the Heidegger-Derrida-Hart trajectory is the absence of an
awareness of the need for public criteria. Deconstruction is not without a
concern for truth, however, that concern is governed by a commitment to an
inverted metaphysics which ultimately gives us no hope of distinguishing
between an edifying paradox and a destructive and false contradiction. The Zen
Koan demonstrates the problem precisely. An alternative trajectory from
Heidegger, which we witness in revisionist approaches must therefore avoid this
problem by being committed to the old metaphysics of presence and
consequently to the need for public criteria. Although the problem revisionists
face concerns the development of criteria of publicness, they at least are clear
19
Apophaticism refers to the stream in Christian spirituality that suggests that God/reality
is encountered through the negation of all images.
20
Peter Hodgson, Winds of the Spirit (London, SCM Press Ltd., 1994), p.357 n4.
21
See Ricoeur's critique of what he describes as Heidegger's "short route". Paul Ricoeur,
"Existence and Hermeneutics", The Conflict ofInterpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics, ed. Don
Ihde, pp.3-24.
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that theology has to make publicly adjudicated truth claims. The deconstructive
theologians abrogation of theology to the sphere of personal mysticism will not
suffice. Evidently a more constructive route for theology must be advanced. As
Simone Weil says, "the need of truth is more sacred than any other need."22
In this section I have so far concentrated on the pitfalls of understanding the
relationship between possibility and being. If the deconstructionist reading of
Heidegger's link between possibility and being fails the criteria for a theological
truth claim that we have so far described, what then is an alternative reading of
possibility? Wherein lies the promise of possibility? In the next section we will
answer this question by looking at Paul Ricoeur's link between possibility and
creative language.
2. On Language and the Promise of Possibility
In recent times, Brueghel's painting The Tower ofBabel has been widely used
to illustrate the problem of language. In the painting itself, Brueghel depicts a
massive tower rising out of a flat plain, dwarfing the medieval town that lies at
its feet and casting a shadow that extends far into the countryside. The detail in
the painting is part of its allure, with tiny construction workers beavering around
the walls of the tower, bolstering the buttresses and hoisting masonry further up
to the workers at the top. At the very top of the structure, obscured by cloud, we
22
Simone Weil, The Needfor Roots: Prelude to a Declaration ofDuties towards Mankind
(New York, G P. Putnam, 1952). Tr. Arthur Willis, p.35.
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can see human specks perched precariously on top of scaffolding, wrestling with
huge blocks and pushing the tower, stone by stone, ever heavenwards. At first
glance the painting is a symbol of human achievement and progress. The
harbour, filled with boats bringing materials for this vast stone project, speaks
of industry and organisation. However, when looked at closely the painting
seems more like a symbol of human pride than achievement. The tower is shown
clinging precariously to the rock that is its foundation, and what looks like the
lower buttresses are shown requiring urgent repair. In the foreground of the
painting the encounter between the King and his cowering masons adds tension
to the scene, suggesting that all is far from well.
Brueghel's Tower of Babel is of course based on the story found in the Old
Testament (Genesis 11). In it, a people of one language, living in one place,
build a city, and a tower to reach up to the sky. But the LORD, comes down to
mock their tower, for he sees in it a threat to his own sovereignty.
"Behold they are one people, and they have all one language; and this is only
the beginning of what they will do; and nothing that they propose to do will
now be impossible to them." (Gen 11:7 RSV)
In revenge, the LORD confuses their language, "so that they may not understand
one another's speech", and scatters them abroad over the face of the earth. The
story concludes with the statement that the place that commemorates this event
is hitherto to be called Babel, "because there the LORD confused the language
of the earth." (Genesis 11:9)
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The question the painting poses, as all art forms do, is the question of
interpretation. How should we 'read' Breughel's text? Painted in the Sixteenth
Century somewhere in Italy, it is itself an interpretation of another much earlier
text about human desire.23 To understand the latter text therefore involves an
understanding of the former one. So where do we find the true meaning of the
painting? Does it lie in the accuracy with which Breughel has matched his
intentions with the original author's intentions? Or is the true meaning that
which fits the needs of the current interpreter? Can we follow our sceptical
modern sensibilities and ignore the presence of a deity in the earlier biblical text,
and simply ask whether the true meaning of Breughel's Tower of Babel is a
moral lesson about greed, or an icon of prosperity? Or, must we inevitably judge
Breughel's faithfulness to the original text, in the light of it being a story about
the relationship between humanity and God? Or do we simply give up on both
truth and meaning, and confess that art pushes us outside them both? Such then
is the problem of interpretation, and of language.
At one level, the story of the Tower of Babel is of course a mythological story
designed originally to explain a place name, Babel. Negatively, it has become
an enduring symbol of the incommensurability of language, the idea that real
communication between the different symbol systems that humans exist within,
21 r
Art historians differ over the precise dating of The Tower ofBabel. The original is known
to be the work of Pieter Breughel the Elder (1525/30-1569). The fact that Breughel's son
continued copying and interpreting his father's work is reason enough to suggest that the
paintings of the Breughels are a good example of the hermeneutical phenomenon.
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is an illusion. As already touched upon, this idea is not without appeal for the
question of interpretive practice. With it we can simply allow that the theist and
the atheist actually do live in different worlds of language, and that the need for
conversation or dialogue between them can be surpassed by the need for
tolerance of the other's (literally) incomprehensible position. But to accept such
an approach is to abandon any model of theology which includes the drive
towards publicness as part of the adjudication of its truth claims. There must
therefore be another way through the problem of interpretation, a way which
accepts both the conditioning that interpretation effects upon truth claims and the
substantive reality that truth claims represent. More positively therefore, the
image of a babel of tongues can conjure up the idea that language creates
previously unknown possibilities. For many, including pre-eminently Tracy
amongst revisionist theologians, this way is to be found in the hermeneutics of
Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur takes seriously the possibilities that language offers us
beyond the empty rhetoric of the deconstructionists, and acknowledges that the
human quest involves the desire to move, "beyond the desert of criticism."24
a: The Promise of Possibility in Paul Ricoeur
For Ricoeur, possibility is intimately connected with language. Like Heidegger,
Ricoeur thinks that human existence must be more than simply 'das', what there
is. To exist at all for Ricoeur is to have an excess of being, which makes what
24 Paul Ricoeur, Symbolism ofEvil (Boston, Beacon Press, 1969), p.349
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might be, as real if not more real, than what is. Thus, to be human at all is to
have possibilities; it is to have future possibilities that are in every way as
concrete as present actualities. To be human is to have a forward-orientation. It
is this understanding of the nature of human existence that forges the connection
between possibility and language in Ricoeur, because it is in the creative flights
of the imagination as they are expressed in metaphor and narrative, that
possibility becomes real. For Ricoeur, authentic existence is therefore mediated
through human linguistic creativity, and most importantly, through metaphor and
narrative. Consequently, the creative imagination makes future possibilities
present actualities. Taking up the opportunity Kant has afforded us in
understanding symbol as a constructive power, Ricoeur has shown how symbol
functions in preceding and gives rise to thought, and how symbolic language
therefore contributes to the actualization of possibility.25 In The Rule of
Metaphor, he argues for the cognitive value of metaphor, against the idea that
metaphor is a mere trope, or figure of speech.26 For Ricoeur, metaphor is not
reducible to a univocal understanding of language (see Appendix A:), where
there is a one-to-one correspondence between sense and reference, but conveys
meaning through an encounter between frameworks. This encounter reveals a
Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, p.348, in which Ricoeur identifies the first stage
of a hermeneutical arc in the context of a phenomenological study of the symbolism of evil in
Hebrew and Greek culture, and suggested that in understanding religion at all, the first thing we
encounter is the symbol. Any philosophical unpacking of religion has therefore to be
fundamentally open to the demands of the nature of symbol. Even before we meet myth, we
meet symbol.
26 See Paul Ricoeur, Rule ofMetaphor (London, Routledge Kegan & Paul, 1978), p.5. See
also the work of I.A Richards and Max Black on the cognitive value of metaphor.
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similarity-in-difference between sense and reference, which gives us a semantic
shock and allows for the redescription of reality. Metaphors thus retain a
cognitive dimension, and a powerful link with possibility. Consequently,
narrative expressions of the creative imagination are for Ricoeur,
"the form of creative language par excellence which deals with human time and
the historicity of the human condition",27
Narrative expressions are "the substance of things hoped for", and as such
represent the "long route" to authenticity that distinguishes Ricoeur from
Heidegger.28 It is furthermore, Ricoeur's theory of narrative interpretation that
makes a bridge possible between Heidegger's extreme existentialism and
epistemology, between being itself and accounts of being.29 Kevin Vanhoozer
shows that for Heidegger, to be resolute in the face of death is the most
authentic form of possibility. But this is a view which limits authentic existence
to a "quasi-Stoical resignation". He argues that for Ricoeur, death is only "an
interruption of our ability-to-be rather than its most authentic possibility".30
Narrative is therefore intimately connected to possibility for Ricoeur, because
narrative is the pre-eminent expression of human existence conditioned as it is
27
Kevin Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: A Study in
Hermeneutics and Theology, p.29.
28
George Steiner points out that Heidegger himself was possibly aware of the fact that his
understanding of temporality and possibility lacked a sufficiently critical method of analysis, cf.,
George Steiner, Heidegger (London, Fontana, 1978), p.78.
29
Kevin Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative, p.30, for more on the "narrative hope" that
distinguishes Ricoeur from Heidegger.
30
See Paul Ricouer, Time and Narrative 3 Vols. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
1984-88), p.65; Kevin Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy ofPaul Ricoeur, p.30.
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by time.31
The hope expressed in narrative in Ricoeur's work, is clearly an avenue of
optimism in contrast to the radical negativism of deconstruction, and advances
on the understanding of the hermeneutical task in Gadamer.32 Again following
insights derived from Heidegger, Gadamer's monumental Truth and Method is
a sustained analysis of the question of understanding, and spells out in more
detail the idea that to prevent truth from being subverted by method
understanding needs to be likened to the kind of participation found in the
interpretation of a text or work of art.33 To an extent Ricoeur agrees that all
understanding has a hermeneutical shape, and is in agreement with Gadamer that,
"In contrast to the tradition of the cogito and to the pretension of the subject
to know itself by immediate intuition, it must be said that we understand
ourselves only by the long detour of the signs of humanity deposited in cultural
works"34
Nevertheless, Ricoeur advances the work of Gadamer, in showing how
explanation might add anything to understanding. For Ricoeur, a hermeneutical
arc governs all knowledge and involves a move from understanding to
-11
As Vanhoozer say, "narrative may well be viewed as the culmination of Ricoeur's
intellectual journey. .. (it is) the place where three of Ricoeur's central themes converge, namely,
possibility, temporality and creative imagination." See Kevin Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative,
p.86.
12
For Gadamer's use of Heidegger see Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp.254-
264.
33
Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 101.
34
Paul Ricoeur Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and
Interpretation (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.143.
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explanation and finally to a post-critical second naivete. Ricoeur's work can
therefore accept the strengths of structuralism as part of the hermeneutical arc,
but develop beyond its weaknesses, moving from sense to reference. For
Ricoeur, structure itself is an oriented activity that is only completed in the
reader. To believe that the meaning of a text resides in its structure is all very
well, so long as it is remembered that the structure of a text does not come about
independent of our creativity. Because of this, Ricoeur holds that any adequate
philosophy of language must do justice to the intentionality of the texts. He
wants interpretation to include the fact that texts are invested with the hope of
meaning. Texts do refer, in the sense that they intend to speak of reality.
It is evident that Ricoeurian hermeneutics offers real promise by understanding
the link between language and possibility. Modernity's dominant paradigm for
language has been positivist, stressing the univocal reference of language to
reality and tended to interpret metaphor and narrative as disposable vehicles with
no cognitive value. However this understanding of language is contested by
Ricoeur. Metaphor and narrative have cognitive value and therefore make future
possibilities become present possibilities. In Ricoeur we can find a
methodological basis upon which to describe the possibility that the symbols of
human culture, expressed in religious texts and religious language hold out to us.
Following Ricoeur, we can consequently resolve many of the differences
between different religions and cultures simply by adopting a fuller
understanding of the pervasiveness of metaphorical language and narrative. The
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figures of Christ, Krishna and Confucius can be draped with metaphorical
imagery without risk of contradiction, or the necessity of univocal justification.
The 'after-life' can be spoken of without risk of ridicule, and the 'soul' can at
last have substance without corporeal evidence. Nevertheless, attractive as these
possibilities appear, we are left with a problem with Ricoeur. How are we to
judge between metaphors? How are we to determine which metaphors create the
possibility of authenticity and which do not? What is to prevent ordinary work-a-
day metaphors like the "arm of the chair", from being confused with more
significant metaphorical language like the "arm of the law"? Worse still, how are
we to judge between rival conceptions of what constitutes a good metaphor? Are
we to believe that we are left with absolutely no criteria that will justify our
preference for "child of God" over "human machine" as a metaphor for the
human subject?
Janet Soskice has attempted an answer to this question by suggesting that the
most successful metaphors are ones which permit limitless extensions beyond
themselves.35 Central to Soskice's understanding of metaphor, is the idea of a
model ofmetaphor which allows for further extension. For Soskice, behind even
the most literal language there lies background metaphors whose dynamic and
inexhaustible capacity for extension ensure that language doesn't dry up. The all-
pervasiveness of metaphor in human language, means that for Soskice,
35 See Janet Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985).
Soskice claims that David Tracy does not adhere to the same understanding of metaphor as
herself, and categorises his work as non-realist.
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inferences can be legitimately made about the nature of God from the metaphors
used about Him.
"It is our hope that a defence of metaphor and of its use as a conceptual
vehicle will support the Christian in his seemingly paradoxical conviction that,
despite his utter inability to comprehend God, he is justified in speaking of
God and that metaphor is the principle means by which he does so."36
For Soskice, religious metaphors do not only tell us a great deal about the
religious person's life. They also tell us about the religious object, i.e., God. The
justification for this in Soskice's view, lies in the way that metaphors work.
Metaphor relies upon a surplus of new meaning flowing from one metaphorical
usage to another. Theistic talk about God is consequently bound within a "wheel
of images". However, because the use of language presupposes certain innate
understandings, Soskice argues that we can accept both that religious language
is metaphorical and yet that it depicts reality.
"the theist can reasonably take his talk of God, bound as it is within a wheel
of images, as being reality depicting, while at the same time acknowledging its
inadequacy as description."37
But Soskice's answer does not necessarily save us. If the most successful kind
ofmetaphor is one that permits limitless extensions, do we have anything which
can arrest meaning in such a way as to allow for a determinable outcome?
Following Soskice, the best metaphors seem to lead directly towards a Derridean






It will become evident that this problem does not go away and in fact is
magnified in theological appropriations of Ricoeurian hermeneutics, when we
look at the way Ricoeur's most ardent disciple, David Tracy, applies them.
Nevertheless, the next question we must consider is the distinctive role Ricoeur
believes theological language can play in relation to possibility, and in particular
how we can successfully distinguish between a possibility-in-principle and a
possibility-in-fact. We shall go on to see in Chapter Six, how Ricoeur's answer
to this question bears upon the central claim of this thesis, that there is a
fundamental flaw in the way that some revisionist theological attempts ground
theological truth in the creative imagination.
3. On Theological Language and Possibility
With the apparent failure of instrumentalist models of reason as a foundation for
public theological truth claims, the turn to language has been suggested as an
alternative. The contemporary 'linguistic turn', has consequently led to the
development of hermeneutical theology. 'Conversation' and 'dialogue', are the
primary theological analogues of truth for this approach in theology. The great
strength of this approach lies in the world of possibility that is opened to us
through language. Theological language can have an essential role to play in
enabling us to acquire phronetic sense-making skill and thus generate new
possibilities. For Ricoeur, the critical principle of possibility itself, is the
imagination,
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"[The imagination] is, par excellance, the instituting and the constituting of
what is humanly possible.. By changing his imagination, man alters his
existence"38
The imagination is that which makes the possibility of authenticity, and thus of
the transformation of the human situation real. And for Ricoeur, it is religious
language that is of great importance in the quest for authenticity, religious
language is consequently the primary language of possibility because, for
Ricoeur, religious language has a revelatory power. As the primary language of
possibility religious language therefore takes precedence over poetic language,
which also is disclosive of possibility. Ricoeur follows Bultmann in believing in
two realms of being, the first the being of objects, the second the being of
humans. Ordinary language relates to the being of objects in nature, while
religious and poetic language relate to the being of humans in freedom. Like
poetic language, the revelatory power of religious language, lies in its capacity
to create a new way of life, and to open our eyes to "new aspects of reality, new
possibilities".39
"I believe that the fundamental theme of Revelation is this awakening and this
call, into the heart of existence, of the imagination of the possible .... The
revealed as such is an opening to existence, a possibility of existence."40
The distinction between religious language and poetic language for Ricoeur, is
38 Paul Ricoeur, History and Truth, pp. 126-7.
39 Paul Ricoeur, "Poetry and Possibility: An Interview with Paul Ricoeur Conducted by
Phillip Ried" in The Manhattan Review 2;2 (1982), 6-21, p.13.
40 The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of his Work (Boston, Beacon Press,
1978), ed. Charles E. Reagan and David Stewart, p.237.
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therefore a significant one. Poetic language is revelatory only in the sense of an
aesthetic revelation that demands no commitment. Religious language on the
other hand demands decision, and is related to a community of use. Furthermore,
religious language reveals possibilities that are characterised by limit, what
Tillich would call a depth dimension of ultimate concern, and is therefore a
language which stretches normal expectations of linguistic meaningfulness.
Ricoeur (and as we shall see Tracy also), holds that theological truth claims
remain in the first instance about possibility in the face of limit. The notion of
limit therefore has an intimate connection with possibility in Ricoeur, because
it is directly reflective of the future, still-more, as-yet-unrealised possibility of
authenticity.41 Consequently, Ricoeur's hope is that the idea of possibility borne
out of limit will escape the structural inconsistency of Bultmann's attempt to
distinguish between a possibility-in-principle and a possibility-in-fact.
The inconsistency of Bultmann's answer to the problem, lay in the fact that the
universal dimension of possibility was conditional upon the historical
particularity of the Christian story. Authenticity was, in principle, available to
all, but in fact only realisable through the gospel. Bultmann therefore ended up
with two kinds of possibility, for which he posited a relationship between
theology and philosophy that attempted to bring them both together. Ricoeur
relocates Bultmann's problematic by centralising hope for the possibility of
41
Kevin Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative, p. 122.
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freedom as gift, as combined philosophical and theological categories. What
makes hope for the possibility of freedom as gift real, is the power of the
imagination. Through narrative, imagined possibilities become realised
possibilities, and possibilities-in-principle become possibilities-in-fact. Ricoeur's
solution therefore makes the critical leverage that makes possibilities-in-principle,
possibilities-in-fact, a thing of the imagination. Furthermore, Ricoeur believes
that the imagination can yield the public criteria necessary to distinguish between
a possibility-in-principle and a possibility-in-fact. Gary Comstock agrees with
Ricoeur on this point. In an article defending Ricoeur's biblical hermeneutics
over against Hans Frei's, he suggests that whereas Frei sacrifices truth for
meaning, Ricoeur,
"not only thinks the [biblical] stories make truth claims, but he believes that
they challenge the way modern philosophers think about truth. In being willing
to say what he means by 'true' here, he lends credence to the idea that the
biblical narratives make genuine, public, perhaps even revolutionary claims
about what is the case."42
However, in focusing upon the imagined possibility of self-authenticity as he
does, has Ricouer really chosen a concept that can effect a genuine
transformation of the human situation? For Ricouer, the transformation of the
human situation is synonymous with self-authenticity,
"In the same way that a project opens up possibilities in the world, it opens up
possibilities in myself and reveals me to myself.."43
42
See Gary Comstock, "Truth or Meaning: Ricoeur versus Frei on Biblical Narrative" in
Journal ofReligion 66 (1986), pp.139-140.
43 Paul Ricoeur, The Philosophy ofPaul Ricoeur: An Anthology ofhis Work ed. Charles E.
Reagan and David Stewart, p.69. The notion of a "project" in Ricoeur, has to do with that which
is the "object" of consciousness.
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Also,
"Interpretation is the process by which disclosures of new modes of being ..
give to the subject a new capacity for knowing himself."44
There is little doubt that understanding theological truth in the light of possibility
is a good thing. There is also little doubt that understanding theological truth in
the light of imagined possibility, can help make theological truth claims have
transformative potential. With Ricoeur, theological truth claims can extend to us
previously ttmmagined possibilities and make them real. The eschatological and
future-oriented, dimension of religious language can not only reflect a still-to-be-
realised possibility, but can facilitate its realisation in the present. Furthermore,
because they deal in possibility, theological truth claims can be capable of
revision and need not totalise. Theological truth claims as articulations of the
possible can avoid both being reduced to ethics and reified to metaphysics.
Consequently, because they are revisable, theological truth claims can be public
and accessible to, and facilitate the making of phronesis, a practical wisdom
oriented towards the good life. These are the clear promises of imagined
possibility for the revisability of theological truth claims. Nevertheless, we must
return to the original point made about imagined possibility at the start of this
Chapter. Is it right to accord all imagined possibilities equal status? The answer
must clearly be no. The imagined possibility of the existence of mythical
creatures is clearly of a different order to the imagined possibility of justice.
44 Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus ofMeaning (Fort Worth,
Texas, Christian University Press, 1976), p.94.
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Even more, is the imagined possibility of goodness, of a different order to the
imagined possibility of evil! Consequently, in focussing upon the imagined
possibility of self-authenticity has Ricoeur chosen the best of all imagined
possibilities? I would argue not.
How can .^//-authenticity avoid the traps we discussed in Chapter Two, where
we saw modernity's notion of selfhood fail to accord adequate status to the other
as other. Ricoeur's answer is that postmodern selfhood is to be achieved through
textuality and narrative.45 But where is the evidence that selfhood is the most
significant imagined possibility for the human situation? Is self-authenticity, even
a postmodern textual self-authenticity, more likely to be a more genuinely
transformative concept than, for example, goodness or justicel My claim is that
it is not. Whereas goodness and justice are concepts that can ultimately escape
the play of images that art forces upon all means of representation, self-
authenticity cannot. Self-authenticity is, in the final analysis, merely a
kaleidoscope of reflected notions of the self in relation to the other.46 A concept
like goodness, on the other hand, has the power to stop the play of images and
thereby effect genuine transformation. This I would argue is a fundamental
45
Ricoeur attempts to deal with this question in Oneself as Another (Chicago, Chicago
University Press, 1992), where he puts forward the idea of a self as a "narrative text", that only
finds fulfilment in publicness.
46 Ricouer does of course have a social imaginary dimension to his argument - see for
example Hermeneutics and Human Sciences - and would therefore disagree with my criticisms
of his position. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that in order to overcome the criticisms I am
making of his position, Ricoeur has to stretch the concept of ,s<?//-authenticity far beyond its
normal usage
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distinction and one which Ricoeur does not take adequate cognizance of.
Conclusion
In this Chapter we have explored two alternative trajectories stemming from an
understanding of possibility as authentic existence. We have seen the dangers of
a total rejection of universalist rationality in the Heidegger-Derrida move beyond
ontotheology and the idea of being as stable presence, into the constant free-
play of signification in language. Furthermore, we have seen how the more
moderate Heidegger-Ricoeur trajectory can allow us to permit language a degree
of free-play while still holding onto some form of universalist rationality. My
argument is that the problem that still remains with the Heidegger-Ricoeur
trajectory concerns the fact that the goal of possibility in Ricoeur is self-
understanding, and therefore returns us to the problem of the subject-centred self
we explored in Chapter Two, i.e., how can self-authenticity be configured so as
to avoid seeing the other as external and hostile to itself? While the promises of
Ricoeurian hermeneutics may be manifold - and Tracy certainly thinks they are -
there are nevertheless clearly significant pitfalls. To make a theological truth
claim an imagined possibility of authentic subjectivity at the very best risks the
claim that there can be no distinction between the truth claims of religion and
the truth claims of art, and at the very worst risks sacrificing the primacy of the
moral over the metaphysical for some individual, fictional ideal. My claim in this
Chapter is that in focusing upon the imagined possibility of self-authenticity,
Ricoeur risks privileging a type of imagined possibility that does not do enough
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to transform the human situation. He risks being accused of failing to sufficiently
distinguish between different imagined possibilities. That these criticisms also
apply to explicitly theological outworkings of the Heidegger-Ricoeur trajectory
will be further seen in the next Chapter in the context of David Tracy's
development of Ricoeurian imagined possibility as theology.
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CHAPTER SIX
ON THEOLOGICAL TRUTH AS THE
IMAGINED POSSIBILITY OF SELF-AUTHENTICITY
"The truth claims of art and religion stand or fall together". David Tracy1
Introduction
In the last Chapter we saw how theological truth claims could be construed as
imagined possibility and highlighted the weaknesses in Ricoeur's notion of the
imagined possibility of self-authenticity. My criticisms of Ricouer were argued
on the basis that some imagined possibilities must be given more status than
others. I suggested that there are at least two types of imagined possibility. The
first type, such as the imagined possibility of goodness, were those that can be
seen to directly contribute to the transformation of the human situation. The
second type, such as the imagined possibility of the existence of mythical
creatures, were those that might enhance the human situation, but could not be
proved to be directly conducive towards the transformation of it.2 Consequently,
I argued that since the imagined possibility of goodness was more likely to
1
David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of
Pluralism (London, SCM Press Ltd, 1981), p. 185 n.37.
2
A third type of imagined possibility might of course be those imagined possibilities that
are directly obstructive of the transformation of the human situation, or that suggest a negative
and damaging type of transformation. Media images of violence are perhaps the most pointed
example of this third type.
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transform the human situation than the imagined possibility of, for example,
unicorns existing, it should be accorded a different status of imagined possibility.
In this Chapter I shall push this point further in the context of David Tracy's
understanding of theological truth as imagined possibility. The strengths of
Tracy's approach are many and the Chapter will not shrink from highlighting
them. Nevertheless, the same question that I confronted Ricoeur with, will re¬
appear with Tracy. Consequently, two problems emerge at the end of this
Chapter. First of all, if it is the case that Tracy's approach collapses religion
into art, as I suggest it does, then he also, like Ricoeur must struggle to
distinguish between imagined possibilities that directly contribute to the
transformation of the human situation, and those that merely enhance it.
Secondly, in being unable to distinguish between different imagined possibilities,
Tracy leaves his theological model incapable of distinguishing between holiness
and fanaticism. By the end of this Chapter an important claim about art therefore
becomes apparent, that is, that art is guilty of privileging metaphysics over
morals due to the distance that is created between an image and that which an
image is representative of.
In this Chapter we will first explore Tracy's understanding of theological truth,
then look at the motivation behind his centralisation of art as the most public of
human realms, before examining the place theological truth as imagined
possibility occupies in Tracy's schema. We will conclude with an assessment of
the extent to which Tracy's theological model offers us an adequate via media
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between metaphysics and morals.
1. On Theological Truth in David Tracy
At the beginning of Theology of Culture Tillich paints an allegorical portrait of
religion as an itinerant discipline, wandering from door to door in search of its
natural home.3 It tries the house of morality in the hope that it might find what
it is seeking there, after all, "is not the ethical the nearest relative of the
religious?" and is taken in but made to feel a poor relation, and forced to serve
morality and deny its own independence. Next, it tries the house of knowledge
and is again admitted but only for a short while before it is forcibly rejected.
The third house religion tries is that of art, and here it is met with a warm
welcome. But once inside religion itself hesitates, "Is the hospitality art offers
to religion given unconditionally or not?" Tillich's answer, significantly, is no!
David Tracy's, it appears, is yes!
Tracy is an eclectic thinker whose interests range widely, and attract attention
from a variety of sources. A role call of his influences would at the very least
have to include Bernard Lonergan, Paul Tillich, Mircea Eliade, Langdon Gilkey,
Paul Ricoeur and Hans-George Gadamer, all of whose work, Tracy can be said
to have assimilated into his own. As T. Howland Shanks says,
"(Tracy) listens to a wide variety of voices, always on the lookout for elements
of truth. Tracy is a truth-seeker who does not flee complexity, and seeks to
include as many voices as possible in the conversation that is contemporary
•3
Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture (London, Oxford University Press, 1959), p.6.
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theology."4
It is because of both the influences Tracy assimilates within his theology and his
proposal that theology should be a hermeneutic venture, that qualifies him as a
good example of how an approach to revisable theological truth claims can work
internally within a religious tradition.5 At the outset Tracy speaks from an
intellectually pluralist position and to a pluralist situation. In particular he is
committed to the ideal of public theology, to the priority of dialogue, and to the
development of a theological method that makes room for the Christian world-
view without privileging it. As a Roman Catholic priest and Professor of
Theology, David Tracy has dual commitments to both the Church and the
Academy. Nevertheless, the driving force behind Tracy's theology is a
commitment to the ideal of the aesthetic as a paradigmatically public sphere, and
is in that sense deeply committed to Kant's Third Critique as the paradigm
magnum opus on symbolic theology.6 How religion relates to this sphere, is in
terms of religion as a representative phenomenon, and theological truth claims
as expressive of the imagined possibility of self-authenticity.
4
See T. Howland Shanks, "David Tracy's Theological Project: An Overview and some
Implications", in Theological Studies 54 (1993), pp.698-727, p.699.
5 See Charles W. Allen, "The Primacy of Phronesis: A Proposal for Avoiding frustrating
Tendencies in Our Conceptions of Rationality", in The Journal ofReligion, 69 (1989), pp.359-
374, p.371, n.39 for a parallel between his own work and that of David Tracy's in arguing that
conversations with classics cannot be replaced by arguments about them.
6
See Phillip Rossi, "Kant as the Father of Symbolic Theology: Hope and the Symbols of
Christian Faith", Philosophy Today 25 (1981), pp.24-33.
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A brief overview of Tracy's interests shows that his concern about theological
truth claims has long been focused upon the question ofmethod in theology. His
dissertation for the Doctorate in Sacred Theology at the Gregorian University of
Rome was on the subject of Bernard Lonergan, and gave an early indication of
his interests.7 His first published work The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan
(1970) focused upon the question of method in theology with a detailed
exposition of Lonergan's own views. Although clearly indebted to Lonergan's
own concern with the question of method (especially as expressed in Method in
Theology), Tracy was not uncritical of him, and in a paper delivered at the
Lonergan Congress 1970 said that Lonergan's understanding of the task of
theology did not provide sufficiently critical grounds for the,
"truth-value of the claims to ultimacy of religious and explicitly theological
language."8
Rooting Lonergan's failure in his tendency to minimise the consequences of
historical-consciousness, Tracy suggests that Lonergan's blind acceptance of the
authority of the dogmatic tradition did not suffice for a contemporary
foundational theology.9 Tracy summed up his work on Lonergan with a
7 David Tracy, "Lonergan's Interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas: The Intellectualist Nature
of Speculative Theology", (diss. Gregorian University, Rome, 1969).
8 David Tracy, "Lonergan's Foundational Theology: An Interpretation and a Critique", in
Foundations of Theology: Papers from the International Lonergan Congress 1970, (ed.) Phillip
McShane (Dublin, Gill & MacMillan, 1971) p.214.
9
It should be noted that the term foundational theology is used in Tracy's earlier work. In
later work he replaces it with the term fundamental theology. This is not to be confused with
fundamentalism, since Tracy's fundamental theology operates within the scope of a
transcendental philosophy i.e. a philosophy committed to the identification of the a priori
conditions of knowledge itself. For a good description of fundamental theology from a Protestant
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challenge to the theological community and a description of the task ahead of
it. He claimed that historical consciousness had so undermined the previously
secure assumptions that lay behind theological truth claims that the contemporary
theologian must face head-on the question as to what the prior conditions are,
that make religious and theological truth claims possible. In this explicitly
transcendentalist mode, Tracy therefore embarked upon his next major work
Blessed Rage for Order (1975), which attempted to address this very question.
In this work, Tracy advanced a particular method, termed revisionist, by which
the truth-conditions of the claims of the Christian tradition may be identified and
evaluated. This method drew heavily upon the work of Paul Tillich, and
involved the correlation of the meanings present in common human experience
and language, with the meanings present in the Christian fact.10 The five
principle arguments of Blessed Rage for Order are helpfully laid out in summary
theses. These include:-
Thesis 1: "The Two Principal Sources for Theology Are Christian Texts and
Common Human Experience".
Thesis 2: "The Theological Task Will Involve a Critical Correlation of the
Results of the Investigations of the Two Sources of Theology."
Thesis 3: The Principle Method of Investigation of the Source "Common
Human Experience and Language" Can Be Described as a Phenomenology of
the "Religious Dimension" Present in Everyday and Scientific Experience and
perspective see Gerhard Ebeling, The Study of Theology (Fortress Press, 1980), Chapter 12.
10 Where Tracy departs from Tillich's method of correlation is over his claim that Tillich's
method suggests that a critical correlation need only be made between the questions of the
"situation" and the answers provided by the Christian "message". This however does not go far
enough because for Tracy, both the questions and the answers given in the "situation" must be
included in the process. See David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in
Theology (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1975), p.46.
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Language".
Thesis 4: "The Principle Method of Investigation of the Source "the Christian
Tradition" Can be Described as an Historical and Hermeneutical Investigation
of Classic Christian Texts".
Thesis 5: "To Determine the Truth-Status of the Results of One's Investigations
into the Meaning of Both Common Human Experience and Christian Texts the
Theologian Should Employ an Explicitly Transcendental orMetaphysical Mode
of Reflection".11
In Blessed. Rage for Order Tracy suggests that there are two sources for
theology: (1): common human experience and language, and (2): the Christian
tradition. The first source is to be understood as disclosing a religious dimension,
defined primarily using Ricoeur's notion of limit, and is to be investigated using
Ricoeurian hermeneutics. The second source, defined primarily using Tracy's
notion of the classic, is to be investigated using historical and hermeneutical
analyses. The results of these investigations are to be correlated to establish
points of contact, and the resultant truth-status of these findings determined by
an explicitly metaphysical mode of analysis.12 The task of interpreting such
findings is a transcendental one in the sense that it aims at revealing the
conditions of the very possibility of experience itself.13 Classics (texts, images,
rituals and symbols), are the vehicles which disclose these possibilities.
11
David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, pp.52-56.
12
Tracy's own treatment of this question is neatly summarised in the section titled
"Religion and Morality: Identical or Distinct?" in Blessed Rage for Order, pp.lOOf.
13 Tracy is happy to attribute the symbolic model of theological truth claims to Kant, saying
that, "an explosion of symbolic forms was championed first by Kant's argument in the Third
Critique that the symbol possesses the ability to think more than the concept can conceive". See
"Literary Theory and return of the Forms for Naming and Thinking God" in Journal ofReligion,
74:3 (1994), pp.302-319, p.309.
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Feeling that enough had not been said on the question of the historical and
hermeneutical analysis of the Christian text, Tracy's next project was to devise
a comprehensive theory of the Christian text which allowed for both, the
particular claims of the Christian faith-community and the interests of the wider
public. Tracy expressed this concern in an article in Christian Century in 1975,
"What systematic model, informed by the criteria determined for fundamental
theological discourse, will allow a specific historical community of faith to
articulate its particular vision of reality in a manner that makes it available for
the wider community without being wrenched from its own historical
experience?"14
His answer to this question was comprehensively delivered in The Analogical
Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (1981), and
culminates in his theory of the classic.15 In this work, Tracy's twin concerns
about method and publicness in theology are given explicit treatment in the
context of the nature of the truth claims of systematic theology. The strategy by
which the truth claims of systematic theology are to be appropriated is governed
by the demand of publicness, and Part One of the book is a theoretical
justification of this claim. All that purports to be authentic theology, is public
discourse, discourse available in principle to all persons. It is therefore with the
14
David Tracy, "Theology as Public Discourse" in Christian Century 92:10 (1975), p.280.
15
For Tracy, all major religious traditions produce classics, defined as, "those events texts,
images, rituals, or symbols which disclose permanent possibilities or meaning and truth",
nevertheless, what defines a religious classic is that, "explicitly religious classic expressions will
involve a claim to truth as the event of a disclosure-concealment of the whole of reality by the
power of the whole - as in some sense a radical and finally gracious mystery." See The
Analogical Imagination, p.68.
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question of publicness uppermost in Tracy's mind that The Analogical
Imagination forges a close link between art and religion, arguing that the
privatisation of religion in modernity is intimately connected to the privatisation
and the subjectivisation of the aesthetic. Consequently, art for Tracy is a
"realised experience of an event of truth".16 What art does for us, is offer us
new possibilities of self-understanding, wherein, we,
"lose our usual self-consciousness and finally encounter a rooted self - a self
transformed into both new possibility and the actuality of rootedness." 17
Tracy's stress on the publicness of art is an important one for the coherence of
his approach, and a point which we shall return to later. In Kierkegaard, the
aesthetic, moral and religious trinity has the moral in the realm of public
experience, and the aesthetic and the religious in the realm of the individual.
(See Appendix B:)
"Ethics and the ethical, as constituting the essential anchorage for all individual
existence, have an indefeasible claim upon every existing individual."18
For Tracy, art is public, and as we shall see by the end of this Chapter, it would
appear morality is in danger of being privatel To an extent then, where Tracy's
project begins to go wrong is in the link he makes between art and religion,






Seiren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 1941), tr. D F. Swenson and W Lowrie, p. 119.
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identification of the aesthetic with the spiritual. While art is disclosive of
possibilities of self-authenticity, it is nevertheless that realm of authentic
publicness where "only the paradigmatic is real".19 In forging a link between
art and religion Tracy intends to re-establish the basis upon which theological
truth claims can have truth status.20 His claim is that hermeneutical
interpretation is a fundamental characteristic of theology, and that there is
consequently a correlation between the way that truth is arrived at through
interpretation in the realm of art, and the way truth is arrived at in the realm of
religion.
"By understanding systematic theology as fundamentally a hermeneutic
enterprise, the issue of both the meaning and truth of religion is related to the
analogous issue of the meaning and truth of art."2'
Consequently,
"The claims to truth in both art and religion., stand or fall together."22
Integral to the task of the systematic theology is therefore the idea that,
"systematic theologians, by definition, will understand themselves as radically
finite and historical thinkers who have risked a trust in a particular religious
tradition. They seek therefore, to retrieve, interpret, translate, mediate the
resources - the questions and answers, form and content, the subject matter -
of the classic events of understanding of those fundamental religious questions
embedded in the classic events, images, persons, rituals, texts and symbols of
19
David Tracy, Analogical Imagination, p. 112.
20
Tracy's commitment to the priority of art is further evidenced in the way that he has most
recently been defending the christomorphic character of theology. He states his position quite
bluntly, "Theology is not christocentric but theocentric, although it is so only by means of its
christomorphism". See, David Tracy, "Theology and the Many Faces of Postmodernity",
Readings in Modern Theology: Britain and America (SPCK, London, 1995), ed. R. Gill, p.232.
21
David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, p.x.
22
Ibid., p. 185 n.37.
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a tradition."23
In describing theology as a hermeneutical enterprise, Tracy is taking full
cognizance of the problem of interpretation we discussed in Chapter One. His
approach to theological truth is therefore one which attempts to implement the
insight that "all interpretation is a mediation of past and present".24 That,
following Gadamer, to understand is to converse well, and that furthermore,
"real conversation occurs only when the participants allow the question to
assume primacy."25
Where the meaning and truth of religion and the meaning and truth of art meet
for Tracy, is in the notion of the classic. Following Ricoeur, Tracy knows that,
"the experience of understanding occurs in linguistic form", consequently, the
excess of meaning that any text carries, demands constant interpretation. Thus
the classic is deemed so, because in it,
"an event of understanding proper to finite human beings has here found
disclosure"26.
What such an "event of understanding" discloses to us is a new way of
understanding ourselves,
"the reader overcomes the strangeness of another horizon not by empathizing
with the psychic state or cultural situation of the author but rather by
understanding the basic vision of the author implied by the text and the mode-












Thus, the classic is a foil for the disclosure of an authentic self-understanding.
If genuine, the classic will confront the horizons that govern our present
experience with the possibility that "something else might be the case".28 The
truth that classics disclose, is in the final analysis, "an experience that upsets
conventional opinions and expands the sense of the possible".29 The possibility
that is expanded in the experience of the classic, is fundamentally the possibility
of a new self-understanding,
"who is this T that finds itself needing interpretation rather than contemplative
reconstruction? The T is none other than the human being who knows the self
as, in fact, what Heidegger called a 'thrown projection'."30
Tracy's flirtation with overtly postmodern works is an attempt to further assert
the priority of the aesthetic as a public sphere,
"Postmodern theology at its best is not a rival set of propositions to modem
theology. It is something else: a search for entirely new forms."31
The emphasis Tracy places upon form is significant in this respect.32 Tracy







31 David Tracy, On Naming the Present: God, Hermeneutics and Church (London, SCM
Press Ltd., 1994), p.45.
32 See David Tracy, "Literary Theory and the Return of the Forms for Naming and Thinking
God in Theology". According to Tracy, Hegel alone of all the modem philosophers saw the
history of form as a central task, and raised its significance beyond the polarities of an
understanding which posits content as the opposite of form.
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This has led to the various 'isms' that are fundamentally divisive. What is
needed is an "ethics of resistance" to the destructive powers of the 'ism'. This
is what postmodernity provides. For Tracy, the distinctiveness of a religious
classic is ultimately not in terms of its conceptual content, which is contextual
and relative, but in terms of its form. It is only therefore with attention to form
that the question of what religion adds to ethics can take on any real meaning.
But the insight that a theological return to form affords us brings more than just
a postmodern imperative towards conversation and dialogue,
"The history of theology is the history of the ever-shifting relationship between
the reality of God and that divine reality as experienced and understood from
within a logos".33
Theology, even conceived hermeneutically, is therefore a theocentric enterprise
for Tracy; one which correlates the "awesome, frightening, interruptive reality
of God" with the horizons of understanding such a divine reality is conceived
within.34 The unambiguous theocentricity and implicit theological realism of
Tracy's later theological model is therefore clear,
"at its best postmodern theology is an honest if sometimes desperate attempt
to let God as God be heard again; disrupting modern historical consciousness,
unmasking the pretensions of modem rationality, demanding that attention be
paid to all those others forgotten and marginalised by the modem project.
Theos has returned to unsettle the dominance of the modem logos... God is
once again the dominant partner in the theological correlation."35
Furthermore,





"This God reveals God-self in hiddenness, in cross and negativity, above all in
the suffering of all those others whom the grand narrative of modernity has set
aside as non-peoples, non-events, non-memories, non-history."36
This new revelation of God therefore takes place most radically in the
"interruptive experience and memory of suffering itself', in the light of which,
"the modern 'isms' for God suddenly seem inconsequential."37 Consequently,
in an effort to escape the logocentricity that the 'ism' generates,
"the other and the different come forward now as central intellectual categories
across all the major disciplines including theology."38
These categories are, however, not merely ideas that will repeat the logocentric
commitment of modernity. They bear all the hallmarks of the radically
transgressive otherness of revolution.
"The other and the different - both those from other cultures and those not
accounted for by the grand-narrative of the dominant culture - return with full
force to unmask the social-evolutionary narrative of modernity as ultimately an
alibi-story - not a plausible reading of our human history together."39
Although modernity has had positive effects (Tracy says the turn to the subject
can be seen as emancipatory and entrapping), it has now become clear that the





38 David Tracy, "Theology and the Many Faces of Postmodernity', Readings in Modern
Theology: Britian and America, p.229.
39 Ibid., p.229.
190
has increased marginalisation and conflict, not the reverse.40 Not only other
cultures, but history itself, "the last outpost of the other and different", has in
modernity become a tabula rasa for the perpetuation of all that has been before.
The time has therefore come, for a move beyond modernity. Modernity's
crowning barbarism has been to suggest that modernity itself is the glorious
climax of history, that,
"soon all other traditions, all other cultures will quietly fade away as the grand
social evolutionary schema ofmodern liberalism lulls all to rest with the secret
promise of making everything (and everyone) just one more expression of the
same good liberal worldview."41
However, for Tracy, modernity itself has developed and maintained a
commitment to its own specialised form for evaluating theological truth claims.
"What modernity provides is a series of seemingly endless debates on the
correct 'ism'., the correct set of abstract propositions for naming and thinking
God."42
This has consequently prevented the development of a pluralism of forms for
naming God. The various 'isms' that modernity threw up as absolutes,
necessitated the triumph of one over the subjugation of the others, hence, there
could be no real pluralism in modernity. Never before has it become so obvious
that modernity has failed to adequately represent the deepest most enduring





42 David Tracy, "Literary Theory and the Return of the Forms for Naming and Thinking
God in Theology", p.307.
191
"there is no set of abstract propositions, no rational clear and distinct ideas, no
sublating concept, no rational propositional doctrine - in a word no -ism - that
is ever adequate for naming and thinking God."43
Furthermore, modernity's chosen form of "decontextualised abstract propositions
articulated in accordance with the demands of modern rational argument"
excludes other forms, and does not permit of a plurality of voices in the
conversation.44 Ultimately therefore, the conflict of 'isms' in modernity, fails
not only to incorporate religion as a dialogue partner, but fails also to provide
a secure basis for dialogue itself.
For Tracy, the sheer theological diversity of our own time, can thus be directly
attributed to the identification of modernity's over-reliance upon this one form,
and was prefigured in Kant's critical transcendentalism.45 What the return to
form means, distinctively for Christian theology, is a move beyond modernity's
insistence that God's existence is a prior question to God's identity, expressed
biblically as the question of the name of God. The dominant question for
contemporary Christian theology is therefore not does God exist, but,






Ibid., p.309. For Tracy, the impact of attention to form can be found not just in the
"high" Romantics but in Schelling's philosophy of myth; Kierkegaard's understanding of genre;
Nietzche on style; Tillich on symbol; Eliade on the morphology of the sacred; Hegel on the
modem concept of the Absolute; and finally Ricoeur's reversal of Hegel in a "hermeneutics of
the polymorphic forms of the absolute".
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biblical name."46
Gone at least then, is any notion that Tracy believes in an easy resolution to the
problems of pluralism. Gone then is the picture of Tracy as a frustrated liberal
foundationalist intent on securing a stable centre from which to construct yet
another grand-narrative. Tracy suggests that there is no such centre to be found
and rejects this view of his work. Even postmodern readings ofmodernity cannot
assume impartiality, they also are culpable in the barbarisms ofmodernity. What
postmodernity can do, at its best, is demonstrate an "ethics of resistance" to,
"the same unquestioned sameness of the modem turn to the subject, the modem
over-belief in the search for the perfect method, the modem social-evolutionary
narrative whereby all is finally and endlessly more of the same."47
There are, for Tracy, a multitude of forms of the turn to the other in
postmodernity, however the ethical resistance of every form is an interruption
of the role of more of the same. Tracy thinks that what theology needs to do is
take a new look at the relationship between forms of thinking God and naming
God. This involves an examination of the relationship between form and context,
and becomes a dialectical and transgressive form of thought, which participates
in an "event-gift-revelation of the Other".48
46
Ibid., p.309. Tracy pays tribute to Barth's work in drawing attention to the question of
the forms for naming God in the biblical literature, as well as his work in particular on the forms
for naming God in the passion narratives.
47 David Tracy, "Theology and the Many Faces of Postmodernity", Readings in Modern




What distinguishes this understanding of theology from earlier dialectical
theology (e.g., Karl Barth's), which also centralised categories of event language
and revelation language, is the completeness with which it seeks to transgress
modern thought forms.49 The return of event language and revelation language
in theology, is an attempt to,
"disrupt or intercept the continuities and similarities masking the increasing
deadening sameness of the modern world-view."50
Many forms of contemporary philosophy also demonstrate such
transgressiveness, some even negating the distinction between philosophy and
theology (e.g. Mark.C.Taylor). Tracy consequently finds allies in thinkers who
also attempt to centralise notions of otherness and difference and thus contribute
to the project of transgressing the apparently immoveable logos of modernity.
Like a true theological magpie, Tracy is happy to feed off a variety of sources
and claim that theology has finally become a,
"transgressive postmodern option that dismpts all totalisations. [It will] never
again be tameable by a system - any system - modern or premodern or
postmodern. For theology does not bespeak a totality."51
49
For many, Barth's theology is a complete transgression ofmodern thought forms. See for
example, Robert Jenson, Alpha & Omega: A Study in the Theology ofKarl Barth (Edinburgh,
Nelson, 1963), "To put it somewhat crudely, Barth has solved the problem of the disappearance
of the timeless by retaining the general structure of classical theology but putting the historical
event of Jesus' existence in the place formerly occupied by changeless 'Being'.", p. 140.
50
David Tracy, "Theology and the Many Faces of Postmodernity", Readings in Modern
Theology: Britain and America, p.230.
51
Ibid., p.235. The following sentence reads "Christian theology at its best is the voice of
the other through all those others who have tasted prophetically and meditatively, the Infinity
disclosed in the kenotic reality of Jesus Christ". Though it has not been a concern of this thesis,
the extent to which there is anything specifically Christian in Tracy's theological model, is a
vital point that others have challenged him on. See for example Gareth Jones, Critical Theology
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995) p!25.
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What postmodernity offers us is an attempt to, "think the unthought of
modernity"52. Postmodernity is consequently a "form of formlessness which is
neither modern or premodern."53 The acts of resistance that postmodernity
invites us to join in on, are consequently acts of,
"resistance to the temptations of a complacent, humanist, self-image; resistance
to an alinguistic and ahistorical consciousness; [and] resistance to the onto-
theo-logical complacency of all the modem -isms."54
The heart of Tracy's interest in postmodern forms of thought comes out in his
attempt to answer the question concerning the role of the image in the spiritual
life. Identifying deconstruction with strands within Buddhism, Tracy says,
"My own belief is that the nearest affinity to Buddhist thought is to be found
in certain contemporary strands of postmodern thought like that of Gilles
Deleuze and Jacques Derrida."55
In doing this it is evident that Tracy has increasingly employed the language of
'otherness' and 'difference' for no apparent reason other than to keep
understandings of spirituality tied to understandings of art. In traditional models
of Christian spirituality an apophatic approach has stressed that the 'ascent' to
God is through the gradual shedding of images used in the pursuit of holiness.
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995) pl25.
52






55 David Tracy, Dialogue With The Other: The Inter-Religious Dialogue (Louvain, Peeters
Press, 1990), p.70.
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By contrast a kataphatic approach emphasises the necessity of images and the
dependency of the holy life upon something more than the endless negation of
images by which knowledge of God is attained. The apophatic and negative
character of much of Tracy's later work is indeed striking. The twin engines of
'otherness' and 'difference' combine their power in theology as 'transgressive';
never offering consoling 'isms', but revealing God in hiddenness, negativity and
suffering.
"Derrida and Deleuze with their distinct but related notions of difference and
their critique of all dialectics as dis-allowing difference by rendering
differences as dialectical opposites joined to the indecidability of all meaning
through our need to use langauge, bear some remarkable family resemblances
to Nagarjuna's anti-dialectical, yet dialectical insistence on the indecidability
of all thought in language." 56
In a discussion concerning the Christian-Buddhist inter-religious dialogue in
Dialogue With the Other, Tracy explores the thinking of Meister Eckhart.
According to Tracy, Eckhart's spirituality parallels much Buddhist spirituality
with its emphasis on intellectualism and detachment.57 An intense
intellectualism (characteristic of the Dominican Order), leading to radical
detachment, is the cornerstone of both Eckhartian and Buddhist spirituality.
Although in the final analysis Tracy suggests Eckhart cannot be seen to be as
radically apophatic as the Buddhist parallels suggest, nevertheless, both




Rudolph Otto thinks Eckhart is most closely paralleled with Shankara, see for example,
Rudolph Otto, Mysticism East and West 1932 (New York, Meridian Books, 1957). Tr. Bertha
L. Bracey and Richenda C. Payne, while D T. Suzuki thinks a better parallel is with Nagarjuna,
cf., D T. Suzuki Mysticism; Christian and Buddhist (New York, Harper, 1957).
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contemplation above all forms of imaged contemplation. Eckhart's "Godhead-
beyond-God", encountered in the negation of all language about God is
ultimately a non-dialectical entity free from all images.
Nevertheless, Tracy is quick to balance this apophaticism with a kataphatic
corollary. The Flemish thinker Jan Van Ruysbroek, in the same Chapter of
Dialogue With the Other, is shown to be a better model of the spiritual life. Van
Ruysbroek illustrates the fundamental inadequacy of all language naming God,
but keeps alive the idea that God's essence is always dialectically self-
manifesting, and therefore shows a way beyond the endless negation of a fully
apophatic theology to a return to imaged contemplation. Therefore while Tracy
insists on the place apophaticism must have in theology, he is careful to show
that theology cannot remain wholly apophatic.
"We cannot finally stay with the Buddhist..nor even with Meister Eckhart."58
2: On the Publicness of the Aesthetic, and the Imagined possibility of Self-
Authenticity.
Even given the postmodern ambiguities that Tracy seems to delight in, he would
not contest the claim that theological truths represent imagined possibilities.59
CO
David Tracy, Dialogue with the Other, p.94.
59 Both Gary Comstock and Hans Frei criticise Tracy for adopting terminology which is
"insufficiently pragmatic" (Comstock), and "complex, esoteric and obscurantist" (Hans Frei), thus
complicating, rather than clarifying the issues at stake. See G L. Comstock, "Everything Depends
upon the Type of the Concepts that the Interpretation is Made to Convey: Max Kadushin among
the Narrative Theologians" in Modern Theology 5:3 (1989), pp.215-237, p.22. Also, Hans Frei,
"The 'Literal Reading' of Biblical Narrative in the Christian Tradition: Does it Stretch or Will
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Tracy's postmodern theology is an attempt to move beyond all forms of
cognitive absolutism and the institutional realities they engender.60 It is an
attempt to move beyond cultural imperialism, and the hollow trumpetings of the
ecclesia; beyond even the liberal models of modernity, that end in ever more-of-
the-same, and thus conflict. At the same time, it is an attempt to remain faithful
to God, by appropriating 'otherness' and 'difference' critically and yet
constructively.61 Nevertheless, in the final analysis it is fair to conclude that
Tracy's half-hearted postmodernism is not an attempt like that of Mark C.
Taylor's or Kevin Hart's to articulate a postmodern apophatic theology.62 It is
more of an attempt to establish the viability of the aesthetic as that public sphere
of human experience where finally all differences are levelled; where truth may
find a soil it can take root in and prosper. For Tracy, the arcane devices of
postmodern interpretation are not designed to take us higher or deeper into truth,
but are designed to throw us back upon symbol, metaphor, narrative and image,
as our only allies in the quest for truth.
it Break?" in The Bible and the Narrative Tradition (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986),
ed. F. McConnell, pp.36-7.
60
Gareth Jones, Critical Theology, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995), p. 115.
61
David Tracy, On Naming the Present, p.139. The question we have not dealt with in this
Chapter, which is of course a pressing one, is to what extent Tracy's schema necessitate's a
realist God. If God, is that which in the final analysis preserves faith's critical moment, then
should not Tracy be prepared to admit that religious language is much more than analogical?
62 See for example Mark C. Taylor, Erring: A Postmodern A/theology, (Chicago, University
of Chicago Press, 1984); and Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction, Theology
and Philosophy, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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With regards to Tracy's model of theological truth as an imagined possibility of
self-authenticity we can therefore state two points very clearly. Firstly, the
possibility of authenticity that theological truth offers is - like Ricoeur - in the
first instance imagined. For Tracy, this is so because the aesthetic is the most
public of human spheres; only through the publicness of the aesthetic can
knowledge and understanding be meaningful. Secondly, the possibility of
authenticity that theological truth offers is of ^//-authenticity. Classics are
repositories of the power of the creative imagination to generate new possibilities
of self-authenticity in the face of limit. Nevertheless, the net impact of Tracy's
model of theological truth forces the collapse of the distinction between religion
and art, where a classic of art is indistinguishable from a classic of religion. This
of course is entirely Tracy's intention, and responds to a number of issues he is
concerned with. However, in collapsing the truth claims of art and religion,
Tracy is in danger of two errors. Firstly, of reducing that which religion is
representative of, to the capacity for aesthetic experience.63 Secondly, of forcing
morality out of the public sphere and into the realm of the individual.
Whether this latter point is the necessary result of the centralisation of art is not
apparent. As already stated Kierkegaard held the moral sphere to be public, and
the aesthetic and spiritual to be private. This served the dual function of
accounting for the confusion that can exist between art and religion, and made
63 For Ricouer this would be being, but as we shall see in Chapter Seven for Stewart
Sutherland and Iris Murdoch, it would be the Good.
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sure that the spiritual realm was one that was capable of providing resources for
dealing with the kind of suffering that is encountered only at the level of the
individual. Tracy's theology clearly lacks this capacity, relying as it does on the
power of art to soothe away our fears. Nevertheless, whether the centrality of art
also of necessity means the privatisation of morals, as Kierkegaard's model
implies, is not certain.
Authentic self-understanding undoubtedly issues in morality in Tracy's schema.
Nevertheless, what such morality is generated by is art. In holding to this view
Tracy does therefore appear to renege on the commitment to praxis that was
discussed in Chapter Three. If, as was argued in Chapter Three, praxis is vital
in the realm of theological truth and can be seen to facilitate the realisation of
possibility (as Ernest Bloch suggests), then is art, really the realm where praxis
is best discovered?64 55
More evidence of the fact that Tracy's model of theological truth may well force
morality into the sphere of the individual, comes from Neo-Marxist sources. The
64
Ernst Bloch, The Principle ofHope, 3 vols (Cambridge; Mass:, MIT Press, 1986) (trs.)
Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice and Paul Knight, p.242.
65
Some philosophies of art answer yes to this question. Arising from a disillusionment with
the triviality of 'bourgeois' art, Dadaism tries to create a critical art form that believes that,
"the highest art will be that which in its conscious content presents the thousandfold problems
of the day, the art which has been visibly shattered by the explosions of last week, which is
forever trying to collect its limbs after yesterday's crash." As we shall see in the Conclusion, this
view of art is probably one that Iris Murdoch would be happy to agree with. See the "Dadaist
Manifesto", Berlin, 1918, quoted in Tristan Tzara, Seven Dada Manifestos and Lampisteries
(London, Cable, 1992), tr. Barbara Wright.
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issue of the power of theological truth to realise the possibility of a transformed
society is taken up, though for different reasons, by Charles Davis in Religion
and the Making of Society. Here, Davis explores the constraints any form of
theology experiences when it tries to perform a substantial societal critique in
such a way as to effect transformation.66 Davis argues that access to truth can
only be through activity directed towards transforming society. Using Marx's
condemnation of religion as mere theory divorced from practice, i.e., ideology,
Davis says,
"to suppose a once-for-all revelation to anticipate that faith will remain
identical with itself, is for Marx, to fall into ideology because it is in effect a
denial of concrete history and an escape into abstraction,"67
Consequently,
"faith, together with theology, cannot be genuinely a protest against the social
order unless it acknowledges that it itself and its own past history as the
product of alienated society must be submitted to criticism and revolutionary
transformation"68
What Davis therefore suggests for theology is that it must render the tradition
it stems from completely open to a radical re-evaluation. In apparent conflict
with Tracy's revisionist model for a fundamental theology, Davis says,
"To remain on the hermeneutic level - in other words to engage in a process
of re-interpretation - is to acknowledge the tradition as essentially meaningful.
But existing social traditions have to be explained and transcended not
66
See Charles Davis, Religion and the Making of Society: Essays in Social Theology,







For Davis, theology must be radically self-critical of the tradition it stems from,
"it must renounce an a priori claim to self-identity and universality (because)
not to do so is to continue with the idealists to seek salvation in a theoretical
reconciliation of the contradictions of human history".70
So how does Tracy's approach square with Davis's claims? Is Tracy successful
in defending theology as capable of the critical thrust Davis thinks it needs? Can
Tracy's model facilitate the transformation of a possibility-in-principle into a
possibility-in-fact? Like Davis, Werner Jeanrond thinks not and has criticised
Tracy along the same lines. Jeanrond suggests that Tracy's model does not have
real transformative power, and consequently needs to be linked,
"dialectically to the development of principles and strategies of Christian action
in the world."71
Tracy would of course argue that his work can only be understood in the context
of the distinction he makes between fundamental theology (also termed






Werner G. Jeanrond, "Biblical Criticism and Theology: Toward a New Biblical
Theology", in Radical Pluralism and Truth: David Tracy and the Hermeneutics of Religion,
(New York, Crossroad, 1991), pp.45-47.
72
Tracy's three-fold theological schema sees each of three theological disciplines, referring
to three distinct publics; fundamental theology has its locus in the academic public, systematic
theology in the ecclesial public and practical theology in the social public. These distinctions
bears similarities to Marcus Varro's distinctions between natural/philosophical theology
(represented in the academy), mythical theology (represented in the poets and theatre) and civil
theology (represented in political publics), which Augustine analysed but ultimately dismissed.
See City ofGod, Book VI, Chapters 5-12, (tr.) H. Bettenson (New York, Penguin Books, 1972).
202
of a contemporary fundamental theology is best understood as,
"philosophical reflection upon both the meanings disclosed in our common
human experience and the meanings disclosed in the primary texts of the
Christian tradition."73
Consequently, the place experience occupies in a model for fundamental
theology is not necessarily the same for a practical theology. Tracy would
therefore argue that by forging disciplinary distinctions between the various tasks
that theology attempts to involve itself in, he escapes any interpretation of his
work beyond the context he believes it is applicable to.74 He would suggest that
it is unfair to criticise his fundamental theology as if it were meant to be
practical theology. But can Tracy's defence stand? Notwithstanding the fact that
his long-awaited third volume has not yet arrived for scrutiny, many political and
liberation theologians would argue that their practical theologies are fundamental
and systematic and address all three of Tracy's publics. The question therefore
has to be asked, as Matthew Lamb does, whether Tracy's distinctions are an,
"unintentional way of immunising the disciplines of foundations and
systematics against the claims of liberation and political theologies?"75
If Lamb's criticism of Tracy is pertinent, then it seems that Tracy's
73 David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, p.237.
74 Matthew Lamb suggests that Tracy's distinctions between fundamental, systematic and
practical theology, are not so much disciplines as "attempts to articulate, within what Lonergan
would term "the foundational speciality" of theology, the general and special categories relative
to intellectual, religious and moral conversion processes". See Lamb, "Communicative Praxis and
Theology: Beyond Modem Nihilism and Dogmatism", Habermas, Modernity and Public





understanding of the transformational role the imagined possibility of self-
authenticity can have in the social sphere must inevitably privilege individual
transformation over social transformation. If this is correct then Tracy is guilty
ofmaintaining the frustrated dynamic of liberal social criticism which he himself
tries to escape.
This point is made again when we see that, for Tracy, theological truth claims
ultimately cannot be freed from the level of hermeneutics as aesthetics. Tracy
admits this much when he says that a critical social theory must be completed
by a,
"hermeneutical aspect [which] would need the reinterpretation of the societal
and projective [future] limit-possibilities disclosed by the Christian
symbols."76
Why this is so for Tracy can perhaps be explained with reference to the
weaknesses we pointed out in Chapter Two, when we looked at the potential of
communicative rationality as a paradigm of reason for revisable theological truth.
We saw then that Habermas lacked the ability to identify the ultimate end of
communicative action, and our suggestion was therefore, that it was perhaps an
eschatological dimension that distinguished theological truth claims. If this is the
case then Tracy may well be doing us a service in insisting upon a return to
76 David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, p.247. Note that in the footnote for this quotation
Tracy says, "It should be noted that the same methodological rule on the need for a
hermeneutical collaboration of the limit-situations of the religious dimension of our common
human experience and the limit-language of the Christian religious tradition ...would be
applicable to theological discussions of praxis.", p.257 n.47.
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symbol, to hermeneutics and to art, in order for us to realise the eschaton
towards which morality is pointed. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, with
Tracy's model of theological truth, it is difficult to see how any attempt to mark
out the distinctive contribution religion can make to ethics can succeed if the
critical principle of a theological truth claim is thought of as the imagined
possibility of self-authenticity. In following Tracy, do we not inevitably end up
subscribing to a self/social dichotomy and perpetuate the ghettoisation of
theological truth claims even more? Tracy warns us at the outset that the validity
of the truth claims of art and religion stand or fall together, but is there not a
way of preserving both, that does not involve the surrender of religion to art and
the relegation of theology to the sphere of the individual?
Tracy wishes to suggest that religion offers something distinctive to our
conceptions of art and form, but before he can argue that religion offers us
something distinctive he needs to be sure that the contribution religion makes is
an advance on the contribution culture generally makes. For no-one can ignore
the phenomenal impact that art, expressed as culture has upon our awareness of
the power of form. The growth of the media has no doubt been the most
important source of this evidence. That modernity has also become acutely aware
of the power of media is also the case, and leads therefore to the claim that art,
expressed as culture, is as equally conscious of form as religion is claimed to be.
Consequently, the real question seems to be as Tillich asked at the beginning of
this chapter "What does religion have that art doesn't?" In the final analysis I am
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not clear that Tracy has an answer to this question.
It is my claim that religion does offer something to ethics that art does not, and
that what it offers should be understood as a depth of commitment that few
artists can aspire to, and that the moral life cannot function without. Anna
Pavlova was said to have suffered for her art, and Van Gogh became insane and
killed himself, but these are really poor parallels beside the New Testament
picture of "one who gave his life that we might live" ; the Mahayanan Buddhist
picture of the bodhisattva, as one who deliberately delays his own salvation,
thinking, "I shall become the saviour of all beings, and set them free from their
sufferings."77 Even the Hindu understanding of Krisna, and the doctrine of the
avatara is illustrative of a depth of commitment that goes beyond what is
normally associated with art.78
My criticism of Ricoeur at the end of Chapter Four was to question whether an
understanding of theological truth, as the imagined possibility of self-authentic,
risked the importance of morality for some individual, fictional ideal. The
language used there was deliberately strong to emphasise what was at stake. Has
Tracy confirmed my fears or not? In many ways, yes. Davis's criticisms do
77
See Astasahasrika Prajnaparamita 22:402-3 quoted in The Buddhist Tradition in India,
China and Japan (New York, Vintage Books, 1972), ed. William Theodore de Bary pp.81-82.
The doctrine of salvation that is found in the way of the boddhisatva is a challenge to the usual
understanding of Buddhism as a way of personal and individualistic enlightenment.
78 r
See Mircea Eliade, A History of Religious Ideas, Volume 2, (Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982), p.239.
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expose a weakness in revisionist approaches like Tracy's. I would suggest that
the central problem with Tracy's model, is the role the aesthetic occupies as a
public sphere. We have seen how useful the publicness of art is for Tracy's
aims. Pluralism, truth, integrity and conversation can all be held under one roof
because art is public. What is wrong with this according to my thesis are two
things. First, as we have seen with Davis's criticisms, there is strong reason to
suggest that in defending the publicness of the aesthetic sphere, Tracy reneges
on a commitment to the publicness of the moral sphere. This is, of course, an
inversion of Kierkegaard's story of authenticity where the moral sphere operates
at a public level, but the aesthetic and spiritual operate at the level of the
individual.79 Thus, the second flaw with Tracy's paradigm for theological truth
and possibly the real criticism of it, is that in his model spirituality becomes
reduced to the capacity for aestheticism. Consequently, with such a reduction
how can an imagined possibility of self-authenticity offer us resources to cope
with those moments of suffering that transcend the comforting powers of the
image. How can Tracy make sense of despair? In the Conclusion to this thesis
I will expand upon this criticism of Tracy's theological model.
Conclusion
In this Chapter we have explored the strengths and weaknesses of Tracy's model
79 See Spren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, tr. D F. Swenson and W
Lowrie, p. 119.
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of a theological truth claim in some detail. We have seen how the publicness that
Tracy seeks for an adequate resolution to the problems of pluralism and
theological method are resolved for him in the centrality of art. This is both the
great source of hope in Tracy's approach, and its most significant Achilles heel
because we have seen that the imagined possibility of self-authenticity that
theological truth offers, may in the end fail to deliver the kind of transformation
of the human situation that is needed. Is art therefore the most public of human
spheres as Tracy claims? Furthermore, in following Ricoeur in suggesting that
theological truth claims are representative of the imagined possibility of self-
authenticity, is Tracy capable of distinguishing between theological truth claims
that are expressions of faith, and are thereby legitimate, and those that are
expressions of fear or superstition, and are thereby illegitimate? If not, then the
net result of this failing would be that Tracy's model leaves us unable to
distinguish between holiness and fanaticism! With such a crucial weakness, I
believe that Tracy's understanding of theological truth errs uncomfortably on the
side ofmetaphysics to the detriment of morals. Ifwe were to suppose a present-
day scenario involving a religious believer sacrificing a child, would Tracy be
able to offer a distinctively theological reason, for calling such behaviour
fanatical instead of holy? I would argue not.
That this is a serious weakness in Tracy's type of revisionist theology will be
stressed further in the final Chapter, where we explore an alternative revisionist
model of theological truth in which imagined possibility is less dependent upon
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art as an adequate bridge between metaphysics and morals. I shall argue that
with this alternative model the imagined possibility of goodness promises a




ON THEOLOGICAL TRUTH AS THE
IMAGINED POSSIBILITY OF GOODNESS
"Whatever is great in the sphere of the universally human must therefore not
be communicated as a subject for admiration but as an ethical requirement. In
the form of a possibility it becomes a requirement.... the good should be
presented in the form of a possibility." Soren Kierkegaard'
Introduction
In the previous two Chapters I have explored in some detail the strengths and
weaknesses of attempts to understand theological truth as the imagined
possibility of self-authenticity. My conclusions, though not wholly negative, are
critical. There is a real risk that in understanding theological truth claims in this
way, the capacity to judge between imagined possibilities is lost. I have claimed
that it is necessary to distinguish between different types of imagined possibility.
To fail to do so, as I claim Ricoeur and Tracy do, is to dissolve the distinction
between the truth claims of religion and the truth claims of art. To maintain the
distinctiveness of a theological truth claim, a way must therefore be found that
can distinguish between imagined possibilities that merely enhance the human
situation, and imagined possibilities that directly influence the transformation of
the human situation. In this final Chapter, I propose that the beginnings of such
a way can be found in the centralisation of the imagined possibility of goodness
' Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 1941), tr. D F. Swenson and W Lowrie, pp.320-1.
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in theological criteria. By focusing upon the imagined possibility of goodness,
we are at least making sure that a critical theological principle exists to judge
between legitimate and illegitimate theological truth claims. We are ensuring that
a distinction can be made between holiness and fanaticism.
In order that this thesis does not simply conclude with a negative critique of the
failings of one type of revisionist theology, this final Chapter therefore intends
to offer an alternative revisionist model of theological truth. To an extent it
presents Stewart Sutherland's understanding of a theological truth claim as the
solution we have been working towards. In contrast to Tracy, for Sutherland a
theological truth claim represents the possibility of an alternative way of life,
lived in the light of eternity. Whereas Tracy's approach flounders upon the
failure to sufficiently distinguish between types of imagined possibility,
Sutherland's in contrast, by focusing the critical principle of a theological truth
claim on moral criteria, i.e., a good life, may escape the criticisms made of
Tracy's approach.
We open the Chapter by examining Sutherland's brand of revisionism and
explore how his views on both Christology and theism reflect the criteriological
primacy of the possibility of goodness.2 Next, we discuss Iris Murdoch and Don
"
In this chapter I shall be concentrating upon Sutherland's theological contribution as found
in God, Jesus and Belief {Oxford, Blackwell, 1984). Sutherland's other works include Atheism
and the Rejection of God: Contemporary Philosophy and the Brothers Karamazov (Oxford,
Blackwell, 1977) in which he carries out an extended analysis of Dostoyevsky to show how
philosophy and literature relate to each other; and Faith and Ambiguity (London, SCM Press
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Cupitt as foils for understanding what is specific about Sutherland's own views.
Finally, I reiterate my suggestion that Sutherland's model of a theological truth
claim might accord better than Tracy's with phronesis understandings of reason,
praxis models of truth and virtue epistemology.
1. On Sutherland as a Revisionist Theologian
Stewart Sutherland's revisionist ideas are most clearly presented in God, Jesus
and Belief and argue that what religion might still add to ethics is the possibility
of a life lived sub specie aeternitatis in the light of eternity.3 For Sutherland this
life is a life of holiness. Sutherland's claim is that theological talk about God is
not in the first instance talk about the reality or otherwise of the object, source
or foundation of theological truth, but is first of all talk about a possible way of
life. It is his suggestion that this, in the final analysis is what religion offers us -
a disclosure of the possibility of a way of life that is truly moral. What theology
does is articulate the possibility of such a life. Sutherland's suggestion that the
role of theology is to articulate such a possibility has a close parallel with
Davidovich and Kant. The perspective sub specie aeternitatis which makes the
holy life possible is, for Sutherland, a perspective which is "regulative in nature",
and "approached only indirectly through the light which it throws on our
Ltd., 1984), in which five thinkers who all attempt to inhabit the middle-ground between belief
and unbelief are discussed.
3 See Stewart R. Sutherland, God, Jesus and Belief {Oxford, Blackwell, 1984).
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world".4 At the outset, therefore, Sutherland's suggestions would seem to tie in
with the claims made about theological truth in Chapter Four. Nevertheless, as
we shall see, there are significant aspects of Sutherland's revisionism that relate
him more closely to an Aristotelian moral philosophy than to a Kantian moral
philosophy, for Sutherland considers the ultimate criterion of theological truth
to be virtue.5 Sutherland's understanding of a theological truth claim therefore
promises to accord more with the phronesis understandings of rationality and
praxis understandings of truth which we explored in Chapter Three, than Tracy's
does.6
Like Tracy, Sutherland follows a revisionist route for the reinterpretation of
Christianity and the development of theological truth claims in today's world.
Although there are differences between how the two define revisionist there are
also broad similarities. The criteria shown below, by which Sutherland suggests
any proposed system of belief can be judged, presents for us a good picture of




See Stewart Sutherland, Faith and Ambiguity, pp. 1-27, on Dostoevsky's treatment of the
problem of the representation of perfect goodness in literature.
6
In an interview with Stewart Sutherland (13/3/98) to discuss his theological model, when
asked what prevented theological truth claims being reduced to a Kantian conception of Duty,
he responded by suggesting that the primacy of the moral need not been seen as a 'reduction'
of anything; and that secondly, 'Duty' could be conceived of in a much richer fashion. When
asked what the critical theological principle ought to be, he rejected both the imagination and
history as candidates and suggested it be actions conducive towards human flourishing.
7 Stewart Sutherland, God, Jesus and Belief, pp. 15-18.
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1. Any successful revision of the content of religious beliefmust be undertaken
in the context of European culture as a whole.
2. A religious belief which runs counter to our moral beliefs is to that extent
unacceptable.
3. The acceptability of a form of religious belief is related to its
comprehensiveness in the sense which it makes of our experience of the world
in which we find ourselves.
4. A revisionary account of religious belief both commends itself and avoids
the dangers of reductionism to the extent to which it gives or preserves insights
which are not available elsewhere, into the human condition, or into the world
in which we live.
5. A revisionary account of religious belief is acceptable to the extent to which
it makes and defends a claim to be tine.
The importance of theological truth claims, is seen in the last of Sutherland's
criteria. Although the differences between Tracy and Sutherland can be pushed
too far, with Tracy perhaps agreeing to most of Sutherland's criteria, where
Sutherland differs from Tracy is in the importance of the second of his criteria.
For Sutherland, the truth of religion (and hence a theological truth claim), is
directly proportionate to its moral efficacy.
"A religious belief which runs counter to our moral beliefs is to that extent
unacceptable."8
It is not the case that Sutherland's ideas can be reduced to moral philosophy. His
position is rightly thought of as a theological one because God still has a place
in it as that which prevents us believing that goodness is a possession. For
Sutherland, the possibility of goodness comes from outside us, as a graced gift.
Nevertheless, it is my claim that in the final analysis the Good is a more




ultimately characteristic of theological truth. This is evidenced in Sutherland's
Christology, where the way that he deals with the figure of Jesus reflects the
priority of virtue.
Sutherland's revisionist account of the figure of Jesus corresponds with the broad
criteria for revisionist theology given by Buckley and outlined in the
Introduction to this thesis.9 His doctrine of Christ is particularly influenced by
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, for whom the historical figure of Jesus Christ was of
central importance,
"In Christology one looks at the whole historical man Jesus and says of him
'He is God'. One does not first look at a human nature and then beyond to a
divine nature. One meets the man Jesus Christ, who is fully God".10
At the risk of minimising the importance of the historical Jesus (a criticism he
takes seriously and deals with extensively over several Chapters in God, Jesus
and Belief), Sutherland presents the historical Jesus as being less important than
the ideal of goodness that he points us towards. What Jesus offers us in
Sutherland's revisionist schema, is a "demand from without", that gives, "an
eternal perspective to all that we in our human way might think morally
appropriate."11 Jesus does not however give us a Platonic transcendent standard
by which we can evaluate our own moral values, for as we shall see, this is
'
See the Introduction to this thesis.
10




precisely what Sutherland rejects in Iris Murdoch. For Sutherland, Jesus reveals
something of the manner of the manifestation of perfect goodness as
particularity. What Jesus reveals is that,
"the form of goodness is particular rather than general and that it is to be found
embedded in a human being."12
The possibility of such incarnate goodness, is then, what Christianity stands for,
and as we shall see, the emphasis upon the manifestation of goodness in
particular form rather than in general form inclines Sutherland towards an
Aristotelian conception of goodness.
Sutherland's commitment to the primacy of virtue is seen again in the light of
his revisionary account of theism. Sutherland wants to hold onto theism as the
central legacy of Western religion without necessitating a commitment to the
premises of theism itself.13 In Chapter Two of God, Jesus and Belief Sutherland
explicitly gives a central place to moral considerations in the construction of a
theology, asserting the priority of the moral attributes of God over all others.14
Here, the reasons for the rejection of traditional theism are explored in the light
of the problem of theodicy. If we choose the problem of suffering and evil, as
Sutherland believes we must, as a starting point for theology then - argues
12
Ibid., p.191.
13 Sutherland is influenced by R W. Hepburn in arguing that by abandoning all talk of God
we also abandon the things which the concept helps us make sense of. See R.W Hepburn's,
Christianity and Paradox, (London, Watts, 1958), p.21.
14
See Stewart Sutherland, God, Jesus and Belief, pp. 18-35.
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Sutherland - a considerable degree of agnosticism about God's existence must
be the result.1"1 Consequently, the lasting value of theism and theistic talk about
God, can only be seen in terms of statements about the possibility of an
alternative life, lived sub specie aeternitatis, in the light of eternity. Theological
truth claims are therefore not to be thought of as claims about an existing object,
source or foundation, that act as a metaphysical guarantor, but as claims about
a possible way of life, a life of goodness.
Sutherland believes that the fundamental problem facing us today is the question
of how to formulate a way of thinking which is adequate to, and correlates with,
that way of life.16 Distinctively theological language, which for him means
theistic language, adds to moral language,
"a possible way of understanding oneself and one's place in the world in which
one lives", and "a correlated way of living in that world"17
Theological language therefore presents a possible way of life which
incorporates a way of thinking that is not at odds with itself. For Sutherland, it
offers something distinctive, notably a view of oneself and the world (an
15
See articles by Isobel Woollaston, "Starting All Over Again: The Criteria for a Christian
Response to the Holocaust", Theology 93: (1990), pp.456-462; Beverley Clack, "Stewart
Sutherland and Belief in God", Theology 99: (1996), pp.290-295; Richard Harries, "Stewart
Sutherland on Suffering" and "A Reply to Richard Harries by Stewart Sutherland", Theology 91:
(1986), pp.308-317; and A. Phillips-Griffiths, "Certain Hope" Religious Studies 26: (1990),
pp.453-461.
16




epistemology), but also a view of a way of living in the world (a praxis). Such
a view can be described as sub specie aeternitatis, and extends (mere) possibility
into the realm of actual or realised possibility. Theological language, in particular
the language of theism, extends to us the possibility of such a life lived sub
specie aeternitatis, and therefore a way of thinking adequate to the task of living.
What this means for Sutherland is that the kind of truth theological truth deals
with must be of a type that cannot be separated from the life in which it is
experienced. The view sub specie aeternitatis is a whole way of looking at the
whole, and is in that sense a regulative notion. Admitting to the frustration that
such an understanding can lead to, Sutherland says,
"We are at best pilgrims who are aware of the possibility of a view sub specie
aeternitatis, but for whom this is a regulative or formal notion which informs
all our thinking without itself being an idea whose content can be separately
elaborated."18
This possible way life is, for Sutherland, intricately tied to the "plain fact of
suffering". The problem of innocent suffering dominates Sutherland's work and
is, in his view, the stumbling block for most modern theology,19
"most modern theologies bring with them a measure of light; What they fail




19 Woollaston shows how the problem of innocent suffering relates in Sutherland's work
to the thoughts on the Holocaust held by Elie Wiesel and concludes that for both of them, the
impossibility of an appeal to theodicy is paramount. See, Isobel Woollaston, "Starting All Over
Again: The Criteria for a Christian Response to the Holocaust" in Theology 93: (1990), pp.456-
462, pp.460f.
20 Stewart Sutherland, "A Reply to Richard Harries" in Theology 91: p.318.
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Consequently, the only kind of theological statements that are compatible with
a theological foundation in the plain fact of suffering are highly provisional,
"a theology which starts from the realities of suffering and evil in the world
cannot avoid a high degree of agnosticism in its affirmations about God"21
While Sutherland admits that such a starting point for theology can seem
"unduly negative", in a reply to an article by Richard Harries criticising him on
this issue, Sutherland points out that ifwe accept that any religious beliefs which
run counter to our moral beliefs are unacceptable then we are immediately faced
with the problem of innocent suffering.22 Nevertheless, in the risky task of
establishing the foundation which enables religion to add anything to ethics at
all the primacy of the moral must always be paramount,
"sometimes theological speculation or special pleading would tempt us to
engage in such perilous activity. My point is that we should refuse to allow
moral convictions to be overruled by appeals to "higher ways" which are, we
are sometimes told, God's ways"23
2. On What Religion Adds to Ethics for Sutherland
To illustrate his central claim in God, Jesus and Belief, Sutherland uses a line
from Robert Bolt's play, A Man for All Seasons, in which Thomas More offers
guidance to Rich, an unconvinced courtier, that in becoming a teacher and








The key question that Sutherland asks is,
"What is the difference between the man who adds, and means it, 'and God
will know it' and a man who intentionally restricts himself to 'You will know
it and your pupils will know it'? 24
Sutherland's answer to the question is to suggest that what we would lose, if we
abandoned theology and all talk of God, is a perspective upon human affairs
which extends our horizons beyond both the particularism of our own narrow
vision and even the particularism of all human perspectives.
"There are two jewels which lie at the heart of the possibility of a view sub
specie aeternitatis. The first defines the hope and indeed the belief, that there
is an understanding of the affairs of men which is not relative to the outlook
of any individual community or age. The second, which crowns that, is the
implication that such a view is not even relative to the outlook of mankind."25
According to Sutherland, if all talk of God were abandoned we would begin to
believe that the life lived sub specie aeternitatis was something that was a
human construction. But this can never be the case. For Sutherland, the
possibility of such a life is only real because the universe is such that it makes
sense to live a life of holiness. What this amounts to, is the belief that goodness
comes from outside us as a graced gift.
Iris Murdoch has of course argued that "the most evident bridge between religion






Sutherland is basically saying the same thing or not.26 What does the
vocabulary of religion add to the concept of virtue that makes an alternative and
holy way of life possible? Would the same not be achieved by replacing the
word 'God' with the word 'Good'? What after all does the difference of one 'o'
make? "Is God a pretence for seeing certain moral fruits"?, asks Beverley Clack,
even suggesting that there might be something disingenuous in Sutherland's
thought.27
For Sutherland God is clearly not a pretence, belief in God is a much more
serious affair, and is expressive of the fact that a holy/moral life is neither a
pointless exercise nor an impossibility. If the possibility of living a life of
holiness was not real and if the structure of the universe was not such that it
made sense to live morally, then the life of holiness would not be possible. But
for Sutherland the possibility is real. The universe is such that it does make
sense to live a holy life. What then distinguishes Sutherland's view from that of
Iris Murdoch's?28 After all Murdoch appears to share many of Sutherland's
26 Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (London, Chatto & Windus, 1992),
p.481.
27
See Beverley Clack, "Stewart Sutherland and Belief in God" in Theology 99 (1996),
pp.290-295, p.292.
28
On a different track altogether but nonetheless interesting Stanley Hauerwas asks in a
recent article, "Murdochian Muddles: Can We Get Through Them if God Does Not Exist?" See,
Maria Antonaccio and William Schweiker, ed. Iris Murdoch and the Search for Goodness
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 190-208.
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concerns, and has even been described as a revisionist theologian!29
Central to Murdoch's work also is her belief in the sovereignty of the Good, and
like Sutherland she holds to a basic correlation between theism and the
representation of the possibility of virtue (albeit as a historical phenomenon).
"Neo-Platonic thinkers made the identification of the Good with God possible;
and the Judeo-Christian tradition has made it easy and natural for us to gather
together the aesthetic and consoling impression of Good as a person."30
Furthermore like Sutherland, for Murdoch,
"God was (or is) a single perfect transcendent non-representable and necessary
real object of attention".31
Consequently, central to Murdoch's concerns is the belief that,
"moral philosophy should attempt to retain a concept which has all these
characteristics".32
Such a description of God, and of a moral philosophy, therefore exposes
significant parallels between Murdoch and Sutherland. Sutherland admits that
there is much in Iris Murdoch that he agrees with, nevertheless he distinguishes
his own position from Murdoch's. What Murdoch does (wrongly according to
29
See Caroline Guerin's article, "Iris Murdoch - A Revisionist Theology? A Comparative
Study of Iris Murdoch's Nuns and Soldiers and Sara Maitland's Virgin Territory" in Journal of
Literature and Theology 6:2 (1992), pp.153-170. Also, see Mario Antonaccio's "Imagining the
Good: Iris Murdoch's Godless Theology", Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics (1996),
pp.223-242, pp.225ff, in which Antonaccio argues for Murdoch's continuing significance in the
field of religious ethics.
30





Sutherland), in her identification of the Good with Platonic Forms, is connect the
ideas of transcendence and particularity together, and to do this is to militate
against all that Sutherland holds to be most problematic with traditional
theism.33 According to Sutherland, Murdoch wants to make the Good an object
of attention, and by so doing commits the exact error that she criticises the
Judeo-Christian tradition for making with respect to God, thus making the Good,
in some sense also, too much like a possession.34 Thus Sutherland's rejection
is emphatic,
"The reasons for rejecting this view are parallel to my reasons for rejecting the
view of God as an individual."35
What is at the heart of Sutherland's criticism of Murdoch seems to be a fear of
an overly pragmatic account of a transcendent Good,
"the justification for retaining the idea of a transcendent Good must lie not in
what it does, but in the vision to which it gives rise. If the relationship between
transcendent Good and vision is contingent, then why retain the idea as more
or less than the occasion of insight?"36
However, in relating his criticisms of Murdoch back to the account of Thomas
More and Rich, and how Rich might profit from his life, Sutherland says,
"what is required is not to attend to such a transcendent object as the "Good",
but to attend to the needs of others and the character of his own ambition".37
33
See Stewart Sutherland, God, Jesus and Belief, Chapter 4.
34 Sutherland says Murdoch is too influenced by Simone Weil, who he devotes a Chapter
to in Faith and Ambiguity (London, SCM Press Ltd, 1984), pp.76ff.
35






How can this apparent discrepancy be explained?38 What seems most distinctive
about Sutherland's view is the need to resist at all costs the reification of an
imagined transcendent Good to which one can appeal for support in the moral
life. Yet at the same time "the justification for retaining the idea of a
transcendent Good must lie not in what it does, but in the vision to which it
gives rise." Sutherland seems to want to resist Murdoch's suggestion that the
idea of a transcendent Good itself generates virtue. It is through attention to the
needs of the other that the holy life is made possible. Not, therefore, through
attention to a transcendent Good, but to a lived, particular, good.39 If my
reading of Sutherland is correct on this point this may well mean that for
Sutherland the critical principle of a theological truth claim is consequently less
to do with the creative imagination, than it is to do with actions that are
conducive towards particular, lived goods, i.e., human flourishing.40
This picture of Stewart Sutherland raises the question of theological realism.
38
It has to be said that there is some confusion in Sutherland's argument at the end of
Chapter 6 of God, Jesus and Belief. Sutherland himself seems aware of this fact. See p.98.
39 What Sutherland claims is that religion doesn't so much add anything to ethics, in the
way ethics is conceived by Murdoch, rather it is the case that moral philosophy fails to make
the holy life as possible as it could be.
40
The primacy of the moral, and of the concept of the Good in understanding theological
truth claims, is evident in Sutherland. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which the goodness that
theological truths both represent and make possible, is always slightly out of our reach. The
mention of 'vision' is significant, and leads to the suggestion that what might further distinguish
Sutherland's position from Murdoch's is eschatology. In conversation with Stewart Sutherland
(13/3/98) he accepted this analysis of his position and suggested that possibilities must always
maintain an unresolved future dimension that makes goodness a reality, and stated that for him,
"the ideal can never be instantiated in space and time".
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Does an understanding of a theological truth claim in terms of the possibility of
goodness, necessitate realism, or does it slide into anti-realism? In Peter Vardy's
book The Puzzle of God, Sutherland is described as a special kind of realist - a
realist about possibilities.41 But how far away is Sutherland's kind of realism
from Cupitt's?42 For Cupitt also, the language of religion can be a spur for the
good life. Why then is Sutherland's a more adequate theological construction
than Cupitt's? To make sense of why Vardy classes Sutherland as a realist we
first need to see how he defines correspondence and coherence theories of truth.
For Vardy, a realist is,
"someone who holds a correspondence theory of truth i.e. that a statement is
true if it corresponds to a state of affairs which is independent of language and
of the society in which we live."43
An anti-realist on the other hand is,
"someone who holds a coherence theory of truth ie. a statement is true if it
coheres with other true statements."44
Cupitt believes that the possibility of a holy life is real whether or not it
corresponds to the way the universe actually is. For him, 'God-talk' is an
entirely human affair, it neither tells us something about the way things really
are nor depends upon the way things really are for its viability. Reality is what
41
Peter Vardy, The Puzzle of God (London, Harper Collins, 1990), p.51.
42
The literature on metaphysical realism is extensive and difficult to say the least, however,
I have found Hilary Putnam's lucid treatment of the issues involved in his book Realism with






we describe it to be like,
"the surface play of phenomena - words, signs, meanings, appearances - is
reality."45
Although Cupitt would prefer the less pejorative term rcorc-realist to anti-realist,
and no doubt would question Vardy's definition of anti-realism, he would also
reject the kind of realism Vardy describes.46 According to Vardy, Sutherland
is a realist because he believes that the possibility of a view sub specie
aeternitatis actually corresponds to the way the universe is,
"because [he] claims that the truth of Christian language depends on the
universe being such that it makes sense to live a life of holiness"47
Vardy is accurate here, for Sutherland the universe just simply is the kind of
place where it makes sense to live a life of holiness.48 Unlike the
deconstructionists and their theological counterparts, the apparent contradictions
45
Don Cupitt, The Long-Legged Fly (London, SCM Press, 1987), p.20.
46
Cupitt's version of realism is one that many theologians do not accept. As Rowan
Williams says speaking of his own work, "If 'realism' is exactly what Cupitt suggests it is, a
good many traditional theologians might find themselves uneasy with it. I don't think that
anything I have written, for instance, would commit me to the belief that all theological
statements accurately depict some state of affairs in another world, that God can be established
as an 'objective' entity by neutral inquiry, that morality and spirituality are calculated to earn
everlasting repayment Realism is in that sense an Aunt Sally." See, Rowan Williams,
"Religious Realism": on not quite Agreeing with Don Cupitt" in Modern Theology 1:1, (1984),
pp.3-24, p. 18.
47
Peter Vardy, The Puzzle of God, p.58.
ao
In the light of Sutherland's explicit commendation of agnosticism as a respectable
theological stance - see for example God, Jesus and Belief, Chapter 4 - it might be better to
locate Sutherland as a critical realist, for whom the existence (or otherwise) of God, is of
consequence, only insofar as it bears upon the actual task of living. If he is a realist about
anything, Sutherland's realism is a moral realism, though as we shall see Vardy prefers to say
he is a realist about possibility.
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of life do not present any insuperable difficulties since, "disagreement
presupposes rather than excludes the idea of truth".49 Again like Tracy, this
enables Sutherland to maintain a meaningful commitment to the idea that
theology still trades in truth claims without being forced into this quandary of
showing how theological truth evades the charge of totalisation. For Sutherland,
the kind of truth that theology represents is to do with a way of life. Thus, he
affirms Vardy's analysis of his own position as a realist one,
"I accept the need to see the centrality of the belief that the world can be
viewed sub specie aeternitatis, is a claim about the world and not a claim about
the attitudes which men and women may adopt to the world."50
Even more explicitly, in the Chapter in God, Jesus and Belief, on "Theology:
The Articulation of The Possible", Sutherland himself says,
"In the proposed scheme what is being offered is a form of theological
realism."51
Nevertheless, what Sutherland's theological realism seems to be realist about, is
not the existence of God, but about the possibility of goodness.52 Cupitt of
course might also say he was a realist about the possibility of goodness, but
Cupitt's possibility is the possibility of a state of affairs wherein the self is
finally extinguished. The possibility of goodness for Sutherland however, is the








See Peter Vardy, The Puzzle of God, p.57.
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other.53 Sutherland deals briefly with Cupitt in God, Jesus and Belief, and
suggests that Cupitt's attempt to formulate a way of thinking adequate to the task
of living is to combine,
"a projectionist theory about what the meaning of statements about God
amount to", [with] "a strongly existentialist theory which equates belief in God
with a particular form of self-development or self-realisation."54
What Sutherland believes his position retains which Cupitt's does not, is a space
for the self, which is at the same time resistant to the tendencies of
totalisation55.
3. On the Imagined Possibility of Goodness
Sutherland himself highlights where the flaw might he in his argument. To refute
his claim (that talk of God is talk of the possibility of a view of things sub
specie aeternitatis) two arguments can be used. The first suggests that any notion
of a view of things in the light of eternity is simply unintelligible. The second
suggests that the view sub specie aeternitatis is in fact not a view in the light of
eternity but an anthropomorphic view from a human perspective. Sutherland's
claim is that the possibility of a view sub specie aeternitatis, held out in
theological language, must be understood in terms of its intelligibility.56 This
53
See Stewart Sutherland, God, Jesus and Belief, p. 160 for the significance of Christ with




Significantly, Iris Murdoch makes similar criticisms of Cupitt an says his is a "ruthlessly




is where the contribution of the legacy of theism can be made, because
theological language makes the possibility of a view sub specie aeternitatis real
by making it intelligible, and by raising awareness of a possible way of life in
which an individual's thoughts and actions correlate with the whole of reality.
Sutherland's allusion to the story of Franz Jaggerstatter in his early article,
"What Happens After Death", is instructive on this point.57 In the article,
Sutherland asks the question "Is there a possible significance or point to human
life which is not at the beck and call of contingencies?", and further "What sort
of life would give expression to, or show such significance?" He illustrates his
answer with reference to the story of Franz Jaggerstatter. Franz Jaggerstatter was
an Austrian peasant who was beheaded for refusing both to pay taxes to the Nazi
regime, and to comply with conscription. His apparently reckless martyrdom
seemed to serve no good cause, his friends and family would suffer as a result
and his stubbornness would not lead to the overnight downfall of the Nazis.
Sutherland consequently asks "What good came of it?" His answer, is to say that
we cannot ultimately judge the worth of Jaggerstatter's sacrifice according to its
consequences.
Jaggerstatter's story is meant to show us that certain ethical principles can
transcend even the fear of our own death, and furthermore that the significance
57 Stewart Sutherland, "What Happens After Death" in Scottish Journal of Theology Vol
22 (1969), pp.404-418, p.414.
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of an action in the light of these principles cannot be evaluated simply in terms
of their immediate consequences. It is in this sense that the story of Franz
Jaggerstatter's heroism is meant to show us how a life of goodness is possible,
and what constitutes such a life. To see that sometimes what a person does can
go beyond our powers of explanation, is to illustrate the possibility of a life lived
'free from the beck and call of all contingencies'. Sutherland argues that to
consider that such a life is possible, is to show that there is a possible point to
human life which is not at the beck and call of contingencies. Jaggerstatter's life
showed such a thing.
There is, of course, a sense in which Sutherland has not said very much about
the essence of the good life. Sutherland is rightly shy of defining what he calls
the "content" of a view sub specie aeternitatis. To do so would surely risk a
form of totalisation more oppressive than the one he struggles to evade.
Nevertheless, at the same time such shyness runs the risk of incapacitating any
meaningful criticism of claims to goodness. Unless we offer some guidelines
about what a life lived sub specie aeternitatis might look like, then how can we
possibly argue that the mild-mannered and moderate Anglican way, for example,
is any better than the more extrovert (and misleading) interpretations of the good
life, held by groups like the Heaven's Gate cult?58 Consequently, the question
58 The Heaven's Gate cult was a group of Californians who thought that the tail of Hale
Bop comet contained a space ship waiting for them once they had killed themselves. Their mass
suicide revealed the fact that they had carefully and conscientiously planned their own demise
in the full expectation that their beliefs about an after-life would be fulfilled.
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of which critical principle we can apply to adjudicate between rival
interpretations of what the life lived sub specie aeternitatis might be, looms up
before us. How can we judge between the saint whose life is lived sincerely sub
specie aeternitatis and sacrificed for a worthy cause, and the fanatic whose life
is also sincerely lived sub specie aeternitatis and yet is sacrificed for an
unworthy cause? Are we not in the end bound to admit that like Tracy,
Sutherland is also without a critical principle for discerning between the saint
and the fanatic?
Sutherland's suggestion (which might at least go someway towards the
establishment of such a principle), is that what the saint's view of things in the
light of eternity has, that the fanatic's doesn't, is a transcendent set of values that
enables him/her to be self-critical. For the saint, the view sub specie aeternitatis
is therefore free of the kind of (false) certainty, that deludes the fanatic into
thinking that his/her course of action is the only possible one, and therefore
makes possible the kind of self-criticism that is unavailable to the fanatic.59 On
this basis we could also criticise Tracy's model for failing to provide an
adequate means of self-criticism to enable the individual to judge between
holiness and fanaticism. What makes us able to judge between different
interpretations of the life of goodness involves the capacity for a perspective
59
In his article "Certain Hope", A. Phillips Griffiths points out that for Sutherland
uncertainty is the only thing that makes hope real. While I cannot see how hope can be a
meaningful concept without a high degree of uncertainty, Griffiths nonetheless suggests
otherwise and challenges Sutherland for making Christian hope sound, "not only paradoxical but
downright contradictory.", p.453.
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upon things with which we can gain an estimate of our own life. And, as in the
case of Jaggerstatter, this adds a significance to our lives that cannot be reduced
to the consequences that spring from it.60 Although I don't think Sutherland
gives us a definitive answer to the problem of how to distinguish heroic
martyrdom from fanatical martyrdom, I suspect that, at the end of the day, the
core of his answer will involve an orientation towards the problem of
suffering.61 However, the suggestion that a transcendent set of values is
necessary in order that we can judge between holiness and fanaticism is one that
Tracy's model might well benefit from.
That Sutherland believes in the possibility of goodness, and that it makes sense
to live a good life is evident. He believes, furthermore, that religion represents
that possibility. Today, talk of goodness is easily mocked and sometimes
deservedly so when it inclines towards a form of piety that has its back turned
on the reality of suffering. Sutherland's optimism must therefore be tested. The
"paradigm evil event" of the Holocaust is an extreme test, but one that if passed
will render his claims more plausible as a result.62 In what sense was goodness
a real possibility in the Holocaust? Reading a book like Primo Levi's account
60
To say that we have a capacity to view things in the light of eternity is not the same as
saying such a capacity is our possession, and consequently leaves the door open for some kind
of doctrine of grace.
61 Isabel Woollaston's article, "Starting All Over Again: The Criteria for a Christian
Response to the Holocaust" in Theology 93 (1990), pp.456-462, suggests that Sutherland might
respond to this question in this manner.
62 See Stephen Davis ed. Encountering Evil (Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 1985), p.6.
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of the daily sufferings undergone by those interned in Auschwitz during the
Holocaust quickly puts paid to the suggestion that all suffering brings forth
goodness. In Levi's reflections we are constantly reminded that evil also begets
evil and suffering begets more suffering; that to possess morality in a place like
Auschwitz was to create a shortcut to the ovens. Time and again we are
reminded by Levi that those who survived the death camps were those that saved
every scrap of energy for themselves; altruism in Auschwitz was an evil; that the
war of survival raged between victim and victim as well as between victim and
persecutor; that to display weakness at all was to be 'selected' for 'special
treatment.'. "It makes sense to live a life of goodness!" Sutherland's claim seems
to have less resonance in the light of Levi's account of the Holocaust. Push
Sutherland's claim to the limit and it seems nothing but an empty gesture, a
pleasing picture with which to appease our consciences. So is the claim that the
kind of goodness Sutherland calls us to only a trite appeasement of our guilt
after all? Is the life to which Sutherland calls us an illusion on a par with the
possibility of unicorns existing and not a real possibility?
It could be so were it not for the fact that Levi himself refuses to abandon the
belief that sustained him throughout his internment, that all things have purpose,
that somehow,
"the conviction that life has a purpose is rooted in every fibre of man .. [as] a
property of the human substance"63
63 Primo Levi, Is This A Man (Italy 1958), reprinted and translated (London, Penguin,
1979), p.77.
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Consequently, we should not ask whether Sutherland's claim passes the test of
the Holocaust, for it is reality that sets us the challenge. In the darkest of places
at the darkest of hours, is goodness a real possibility or not? In Primo Levi's
ability to see in the events of the Holocaust more than absolute evil we glimpse
the possibility of goodness. What Sutherland is certain of is that the pessimism
that suggests that a life of goodness is not possible, is not merely possibly
wrong, but is actually wrong and fails us as a view of the way things are. To
reject the possibility of human goodness is, for Sutherland, to deny that there is
a distinction between good and evil.64 It is therefore for this reason that I
believe it is justifiable to claim that for Sutherland, the priority of the Good must
mean that the critical principle of a theological truth claim is to be thought of
in ethical terms as the imagined possibility of goodness. What makes the
possibility of goodness real and not merely imagined for Sutherland, is firstly,
that such a possibility is more than an empirical one,
"what is simply empirically possible may or may not be found in the world and
therefore is only possibly real"65
and secondly that it is a possibility that is at the same time,
"a claim about the way the world is."66








fact a vision. The kind of truth claims that Sutherland's life lived sub specie
aeternitatis represent, are therefore in the final analysis visionary truths, or
imagined possibilities. Iris Murdoch of course also suggests that the imagined
possibility of the Good is enough to make the possibility of the good life in
principle become a possibility in fact.
"I attach great importance to the concept of a transcendent good as an idea
(properly interpreted) essential to both morality and religion."67
The question that both Sutherland and Murdoch face is, therefore, why an
imagined possibility of the Good is more capable of genuinely transforming the
human situation than any other imagined possibility. As we shall see in the
Conclusion to this thesis, what might qualify the Good as an imagined possibility
above all other imagined possibilities, is its capacity to halt the play of images
that occur in any means of representation. In so doing, the imagined possibility
of goodness may indeed be more genuinely transformative than the imagined
possibility of self-authenticity.
4. On the Moral Theory Underlying Sutherland's Revisionist Theology
The thrust of Chapters Two and Three of this thesis suggest that an Aristotelian
conception of goodness, stressing the role of practice, can best equip a revisionist
theology in today's situation. The question can therefore be asked how far the
moral theory that underpins Sutherland's revisionist theology concurs with this
suggestion.
67 Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, p.511.
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We have already touched on the Platonic element in Sutherland's work in
relation to Iris Murdoch. How far is the moral theory underpinning Sutherland's
revisionist theology of a Platonic type? The Platonic streak in Sutherland is
expressed in the fact that the existence of goodness (at least as a possibility), is
an ontological reality. For Sutherland the life of holiness is not relative to human
life. The universe is such that it makes sense to live a life of holiness. The life
lived sub specie aeternitatis therefore seems close to the life that Plato
recommended, lived in contemplation of the Platonic Form of the Good.6*
Peter Vardy certainly suggests that Sutherland's ideas have a close affinity to
Plato's moral philosophy, and in general terms Vardy is correct in drawing
attention to the parallel between Plato and Sutherland.69 Yet Sutherland seems
at pains to disassociate himself from overly Platonic interpretations of his
revisionism.
"The finitude and agnosticism which I have stressed in relation to the idea of God
applies also to the idea of the Good".70
In contrast to Murdoch, for Sutherland there is no transcendent Good which we
can reflect upon as an object of attention. Our grasp of the way things are in
reality is conditioned by a view of the world sub specie aeternitatis.
68 See Plato's famous simile of the cave for a description of the implications of the life
lived in contemplation of the Good; The Republic, Bk. VII, trans. G.M.A Grube (Indianapolis,
Hacket, 1974).
69
See Peter Vardy, The Puzzle of God, p.54.
70
See Sutherland, God, Jesus and Belief, p.98.
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"There is no technique not even the Platonic, for seeing either from, or into eternity.
Likewise to see the world sub specie aeternitatis is not to glimpse something called 'the
eternal' or 'the transcendent'. The eternal, the transcendent is not a feature or aspect of
the world. It is a possibility confined within the structures of the world. It is a
possibility that can be recognised ... but its recognition does not presuppose a non-finite
viewpoint, nor a non-finite or transcendent object to be discerned or glimpsed."71
What therefore seems to keep Sutherland from Murdoch's fully blown Platonism
is his refusal to accept that the Good is a transcendent object of attention that
exists in reality. As already mentioned, the only kind of realism Sutherland will
admit to is a realism about the possibility of goodness.
In using phrases like "the eternal is a possibility confined within the structures
of the world", Sutherland's indebtedness to Kant comes out more strongly than
his indebtedness to Plato. (In God, Jesus and Belief, he even goes as far as
describing the book as a "modest footnote to Kant's Religion within the Limits
ofReason Alone".72)
In particular, Sutherland reflects Kant's thinking in his use of the notion of
'regulative principles'.73 For Sutherland, to achieve a life lived sub specie
aeternitatis (even in part), an individual must gain a proper appreciation of
his/her own values in the light of a set of values of a different and superior kind.








God, heaven, hell, sin and redemption, theology fulfds a regulative function in
providing a benchmark against which an individual can measure his/her own
morality.74 However, what is also significant for Sutherland is the idea that both
moral and religious truth claims are of a 'conversational' nature and permit
'mutual modification'.75 Though closely linked to Kant's moral philosophy,
Sutherland therefore includes an element which is not found in Kant and which
is more like an element which is found in Aristotle.76 It is an element which
stresses - in contrast to Plato - the particularity of goodness.
Fundamentally, Kant's moral theory centres upon there being a principle upon
which moral claims can be founded - the Categorical Imperative. For Aristotle,
it is not so clear that such a principle exists. The truth or otherwise, of a moral
claim is only worked out in the life lived in expression of it, (here of course we
would emphasise Sutherland's appeal to the life lived sub specie aeternitatis).
For both Aristotle and Kant, what is ultimately good acts in accordance with
reason. Yet for Kant such action involves the conforming of the human will to
the demands of the Categorical Imperative. For Aristotle on the other hand, such
action involves the fulfilling of the will in happiness and the 'good life'.





Sutherland declares his independence of Kant in a number of places. See for example
God, Jesus and Belief, pp. 15,16.
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focused only on the pursuit of the moral law and the exercise of duty. For
Aristotle, such conditions are not sufficient. For Aristotle, an action is only truly
good if the person who performs it in pursuit of the exercise of duty derives
genuine happiness from doing so.77
"The man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no one would
call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal who did not enjoy
liberal actions; similarly in all other cases."78
The concept of genuine happiness in Aristotle (eudaemonia), parallels Kant to
the extent that it is the idea of virtue as activity in accordance with rational
principles. Yet what makes the distinction between Kant and Aristotle so pointed
is Aristotle's insistence that the virtues are acquired through practice. For
Aristotle, goodness is not merely something intellectual, it involves ingrained
dispositions of character that are acquired through habit.79 There is no
instantaneous acquisition of virtue through the pursuit of duty as Kant would see
it. Virtue, for Aristotle is a much more complex phenomenon and involves
personality, character and relationality. The celebrated 'doctrine of the golden
mean', is an expression of the way that moral decisions are reached in practice
and is not meant to be a formula for adjudicating between moral claims. It is a
77
The apparently individualistic nature of this aspect of Aristotle's ethics is offset by his
stress upon the social nature of happiness. Not only does happiness have a social dimension but
the 'good life' must be taught to us by society.
78
See Nicomachean Ethics, Book I:VIII. 1099al6-19.
79 See Nicomachean Ethics, Book 11:1. 1103al4-bl.
"Ethical virtue comes about by habit hence even its name derives from the word 'ethos', custom
or habit."
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description of what actually happens when moral decisions are made.80 For
Aristotle - in contrast to Plato - that which is universal is only reached through
the particular.
To what extent can we therefore see Aristotelian or Kantian moral theory
reflected in Sutherland's revisionism? We have already mentioned that for
Sutherland, theological language makes the possibility of a life of holiness real
by making it intelligible. This of course seems to commit him to a typically
Kantian framework where religion is allowed scope within the limits of reason
alone. Nevertheless, it is arguable that the role reason occupies in Sutherland's
thinking is significantly different to that which it occupies in Kant's. To make
a life of holiness intelligible for Sutherland, does not seem to be about finding
a single principle by which holiness can be judged to be present or absent, but
appears to be more about finding an adequate response to the problem of
suffering. His Christology gives us more indicators in this direction.
For Sutherland it is important that any conception of the nature of Christ does
not mislead us into believing that the nature of goodness can be simply 'read
off the life of the person of Jesus. As pointed out earlier, Jesus is for Sutherland
a manifestation of human goodness in particularity, an example of what
Kierkegaard would call 'an individual', someone who is,
80 See John Cottingham, Western Philosophy: An Anthology, (Oxford, Basil Blackwell,
1996), p367.
240
"a stranger in the world of the finite but (who) does not manifest his separation from
worldliness by a foreign mode of dress."81
What is unique about Jesus is therefore that he manifests a conception of
goodness which does not contain any external sign of its own vindication. This
is of central importance for Sutherland, and explains the biblical portrait of an
ambiguous Christ who demands to be recognised as goodness incarnate yet still
leaves room for doubt, and thus calls for optimism.*2 Consequently, any
conception of the historical figure of Jesus is for Sutherland, wrong if it allows
an easy progression from, i. Jesus was a good man, to ii. Goodness is a
possibility. This is because such an equation risks reducing goodness to the
activities of a frozen reason, suspended in time. For Sutherland such an
approach,
"distorts the nature of goodness by making it appear as if it were a quality which can
be individuated, described and judged unambiguously to be present or absent."83
Kant would almost certainly have believed that to judge goodness to be
unambiguously present or absent was a prerequisite of any moral philosophy,
and in that sense Sutherland therefore seems to stray from the path of Kantian
moral philosophy. Nevertheless, in discussing the Euthyphro dilemma - the
question posed by Euthyphro in the Platonic dialogue of the same name - both
Kantian and Aristotelian themes can be seen to emerge in Sutherland's thinking.
81
See Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p.367.
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Euthyphro's question asks whether holiness is loved by the Gods because of a
quality it (holiness) possesses, or because it is a quality of the gods themselves.
Despite his insistence that in general moral claims must take priority over
religious claims, Sutherland's response to this question is to argue that the
either/or nature of the question does not fully do justice to the nature of the
subject matter. In rejecting the idea that knowledge can be built upon sure
foundations into a hierarchy of truth claims, or that religious truth can be
revealed, Sutherland also rejects the need to answer the Euthyphro dilemma, and
does so by employing Kantian distinctions.84 For example he argues that a
distinction needs to be made between the propositions, 1. God always wills the
Good; and 2. the God of Christian theology always wills the Good. Since the
proposition, 'God always wills the Good' is for Sutherland an analytic
proposition, it does not contradict his general principle which asserts the priority
of the moral over the religious. It is only the second proposition, 'the God of
Christian theology always wills the Good', which is a synthetic proposition and
which can therefore be applied to his general rule.85
The explicit use of Kantian epistemological categories has a clear purpose. For
Sutherland, whereas the second proposition is in principle open to falsification,






meant to imply the existence of a being called God, but the "ultimate
compatibility indeed the interdependence of moral and religious beliefs."86
What Sutherland hopes to achieve by this claim is a meaningful defence of the
idea that religious and moral truth claims exist in "mutually modifying
conversation", an idea which he says, "is offensive only to those who believe
that they have access to absolute or ultimate truth whether religious or moral."87
Sutherland stresses that this is not a commitment to moral or religious relativism
but merely to the view that all knowledge is only partial.88 In a manner not
dissimilar to David Tracy, Sutherland uses Waismann's notion that certain terms
have an "open texture" that facilitates the mutual modification of religious and
moral beliefs - thus preventing the reduction of one to the other.89
"Part of the strength of the beliefs of many religious traditions rests on this capacity
which some of their central tenets have to be modified and refined to most
circumstances and to live in contexts which would have been unimaginable when these
ideas first took shape."90
Consequently, Sutherland's hope is that the open texture of moral and religious
concepts will allow for his general rule that a religious belief that runs counter








See F. Waismann 'Verifiability' in A. Flew (ed.) Logic and Language /, (Oxford,





privileging of moral beliefs over religious.
It seems therefore, that while Sutherland may echo Kant in some areas, his
determination to avoid privileging either religious or moral beliefs, and his
distrust of foundationalist epistemologies add an element in his moral theory
which can be justly described as echoing Aristotelian themes more than Kantian.
Furthermore, in ascribing to religious and moral beliefs a capacity for mutual
modification Sutherland's work may even in the final analysis be seen to
compliment David Tracy's, in attempting to create a revisionist account of
theological truth claims that sees the distinctiveness of theological truth in terms
of its hermeneutical qualities.
The question can of course be asked whether an imagined possibility of
goodness can survive the rigours of a postmodernist winter. Can it still make
sense to believe with Sutherland, that the possibility of goodness exists beyond
our epistemological grapplings for truth; that the hermeneutic flux that permits
mutual revision does not necessarily involve limitless extensions into a
postmodernist echo chamber? As already stressed, the main force of such a
question is only real if we perceive postmodernism to be a complete threat to
knowledge and understanding. If the theological community allows itself to be
trapped within forms of epistemological foundationalism that refuse to
acknowledge any hermeneutical dimension to the processes of knowledge and
understanding whatsoever, then postmodernism will indeed present itself as
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nothing other than an unwelcome and irksome trend. If on the other hand we
accept that the combined problems of epistemological foundationalism,
metaphysical reductionism and linguistic representationalism that were discussed
in Chapter One are real enough to call for a careful response, then
postmodernism presents itself as an exciting challenge through which the
theological community can renew itself.
How then can the imagined possibility of goodness that theological truth claims
are expressive of, best survive the corrosive 'acids' of postmodernity? How can
the hermeneutic instability that postmodernism propels us towards be arrested in
such a way as to preserve goodness? A Kantian picture of goodness does not
appear to have the resources to withstand attacks upon epistemological
foundationalism and will therefore fail to provide an adequate moral philosophy
for the understanding of theological truth claims that I have been arguing for. An
Aristotelian picture of goodness on the other hand seems to offer more promise.
Postmodernism wishes to resist the collapse of all ontologies into static and
immoveable entities and encourages fluidity, movement and interaction.
Aristotelian ethics perhaps offers a more fruitful interface with many of the key
themes of postmodernity than any other. Aristotle's ethics offer the possibility
of including areas of life other than those narrowly circumscribed by the pursuit
of Kantian duty. Precisely because of this fact they fit better with the type of life
of holiness that Sutherland describes by allowing for both the intellectual and the
relational, and therefore offer a more adequate response to the problem of
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suffering than the Kantian life of duty.91 As Martha Nussbaum has repeatedly
asked, how can a Kantian moral philosophy possibly make sense of the human
experience of love?92 Aristotle's moral philosophy is broad enough to include
everything of real significance in human life whereas Kant's is not.
Consequently, unless a theological description of a life of holiness such as
Sutherland's, is content to limit itself to certain specified spheres of human
experience, the most versatile moral philosophy it can adopt must surely be
Aristotelian. In doing so, the unsettling effects of postmodernism can be offset
against the real and lasting benefits of a genuine turn to goodness in
philosophical and theological circles.
Conclusion
Part Two of this thesis has made a number of claims. We began by discussing
possibility as that which could distinguish theology from philosophy. My starting
point was that theology is, as Sutherland expresses it to be, the "articulation of
the possible".93 Through examining the way that Ricoeur links theological truth
claims with the imagination, I argued for the need to maintain a distinction
91
See Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, pp. 15-29 on the advantages of virtue based
approaches to ethics over act-based or rule-based approaches to ethics in accommodating
relational aspects of living.
92
See Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy
and Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986); and Love's Knowledge, (New
York, Oxford University Press, 1990), where Nussbaum argues for a move away from act-based
moral theory to a more particularist approach based upon literature as a model of moral
reasoning.
q-i
See Sutherland, God, Jesus and Belief Chapter 5, "Theology as the Articulation of the
Possible."
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between different types of imagined possibility. I claimed that some imagined
possibilities, such as the imagined possibility of the existence of mythical
creatures, were less likely to effect the transformation of the human situation
than others, such as the imagined possibility of goodness, or justice. I therefore
questioned whether Ricoeur's suggestion, that theological truth claims represent
the imagined possibility of self-authenticity, distinguished sufficiently between
different types of imagined possibility. At the end of Chapter Five, I
consequently asked what there was in Ricoeur, that would enable us to claim
that the imagined possibility of goodness or justice, was of a different and more
significant type of imagined possibility. In pursuing the same line of criticism
with David Tracy I suggested that in centralising a Ricouerian understanding of
imagined possibility, Tracy fails to be able to distinguish between theological
truth claims that are expressions offaith, and are thereby legitimate, and those
that are expressions of fear or superstition, and are thereby illegitimate. I also
suggested that in adhering so closely to the claim that "the truth claims of art
and religion stand or fall together", Tracy's theology risks collapsing the
distinction between religion and art, and assumes a public scope to the creative
imagination, that may not in fact be the case. This exposes major presuppositions
in Tracy's reasoning. Tracy's approach insists that the image, that which is the
product of the creative imagination, facilitates authenticity. But what if this is not
the case? What if the imagination actually distances us from authenticity? The
final Chapter therefore suggests that to centralise the imagined possibility of
goodness in theology, might escape the weaknesses in Ricoeur and Tracy. Where
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Ricoeur and Tracy seem to be incapable of distinguishing between different
types of imagined possibility, Sutherland at least stresses that the imagined
possibility of goodness ought to have priority in judging between theological
truth claims, and thus provides a way for revisionist theologians to avoid relying
too heavily upon the belief that art does not privilege metaphysics above morals.
It would be illegitimate of me to claim more than this on the basis of what we
have seen. Sutherland's imagined possibility of goodness, is after all an imagined
possibility that at some point must rely upon some means of representation and
therefore upon art. Nevertheless, what I have tried to suggest distinguishes
Sutherland's imagined possibility from Tracy's, is the necessity of a life lived in
verification of it. Without such a life - Sutherland claims - the possibility of
goodness is not real. To me, this claim makes Sutherland's understanding of
theological truth claims, better suited to phronesis models of rationality within
a virtue epistemology, than Tracy's. Coupled with a phronesis model of
rationality, within the kind of virtue epistemology exemplified in Chapter Three
by Linda Zagzebski, Sutherland's understanding of a theological truth claim,
indeed promises to satisfy the demands of both metaphysics and morals.
By focusing theological truth claims on the imagined possibility of goodness,
Sutherland does not need to rely upon the creative imagination as the "power of
the possible", or art as the one particular that has universal scope for the
legitimation of theological truth. Instead, a theological truth is both "theological"
and "true" only insofar as it contributes towards goodness. Sutherland's
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understanding of the type of imagined possibility that theological truth claims
represent thus seems more capable of avoiding the reification of theological truth
claims to metaphysics, than Tracy's does.94
Part Two of this thesis has therefore been an attempt at theological
constructivism. The legitimacy of the exercise was established in Part One. My
chosen focus for this theological constructivism centred upon possibility. What
I believe I have established in Part Two, is that great care needs to be taken by
revisionists in the assumptions they make about art generally. Furthermore, in
focusing upon the creative imagination as the "power of the possible"95
revisionist theologians need to do more work to sufficiently distinguish between
different types of imagined possibility, lest they end up unable to distinguish
between forms of faith and practice that are conducive to the transformation of
the human situation, and forms that are not. In the Conclusion to this thesis I
will briefly indicate where I believe that work might best begin.
94
What is arguable, is of course whether Sutherland escapes reducing theological truth
claims to morals. In my discussion with him, I asked him how he would respond to this
question. His response was to suggest that the question of the distinctiveness of theological truth
must be framed within an understanding of the relationship between the aesthetic, the moral and
the religious, such as that found in Kierkegaard.
95 Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, p.408.
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CONCLUSION
THE IMAGINED POSSIBILITY OF
GOODNESS BEYOND THE IMAGE?
"Thou shalt not make for thyself any graven image, or likeness of anything that
is in heaven above, or in the earth beneath or in the water below; thou shalt
not bow down to them or serve them; for I the LORD thy God am a jealous
God." (Exodus 20:4-5 RSV)
"She [wisdom] is more precious than jewels, and nothing you desire can
compare with her. Long life is in her right hand; in her left hand are riches and
honour. Her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace. She
is a tree of life to those who lay hold of her". (Proverbs 3:15-18 RSV)
This thesis has been concerned with the nature of a theological truth claim. In
particular I have been trying to establish what kind of theological truth claim
might allow for the universal comprehensiveness that religion provides, without
either reducing itself to a moral imperative, or privileging itself over a moral
imperative. I have therefore posed the question as the nature of a theological
truth claim between metaphysics and morals. Under this rubric, the
comprehensiveness and universality that religion represents has been allied with
metaphysics, and the imperative to act virtuously in the face of particularity has
been taken to represent morals. My argument has been to suggest that
theological truth is best understood as the imagined possibility of goodness.
In Chapter One I initially established the field of reference for the thesis by
arguing for the centrality of the notion of revisability in bridging the realms of
religion and ethics. There it was shown that a revisable theological truth claim
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necessitated some form of public rationality. The next two Chapters pursued this
question in various ways and sought to defend the legitimacy of theological truth
in the face of modernity's scepticism towards religion. In these Chapters I
examined praxis understandings of faith and phronesis models of reason, before
in Chapter Four outlining a plausible framework ofmeaning for theological truth
claims in the light of a Kantian understanding of theological truth as forms of
teleological judgement. There, it emerged that theological truth could at the very
least be conceived of as symbolic truth, pregnant with possibility, and that the
province of meaning of a theological truth claim was the human imagination.
Part One of the thesis therefore defends the viability of theological truth claims.
It argues that modernity is wrong if it suggests that theological truth must either
inevitably be reduced to morals, or reified to metaphysics. It is the claim of Part
One of the thesis that there is nothing in theological truth per se that is
suggestive of such inevitability. Likewise it claims that using a model of religion
as a province ofmeaning such as Adina Davidovich's, and following in the spirit
of Kant's Third Critique, theological truth claims can involve moral imperatives
without being reducible to them. In Part One, I therefore hope to have justified
the move into a more constructive theological mode in Part Two. Here, the focus
is no longer on the question of whether theological truth claims are valid or not,
but on the question of the specific nature, and distinctiveness of theological truth.
The heart of this question is dealt with in Chapters Five to Seven, where
imagined possibility is suggested to be that which is distinctive of theological
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truth. After grounding the question of possibility in the work of Martin
Heidegger. I then moved on to explore the promise contained in Paul Ricoeur's
notion of the imagined possibility of self-authenticity. There we saw that the
realisation of possibility is through the exercise of the creative imagination in
narrative and metaphor. My criticism of Ricoeur centred on the claim that he
failed to adequately distinguish between imagined possibilities that were
genuinely transformative, and those that were not. Consequently, I argued that
the imagined possibility of self-authenticity might not possess all that was
necessary for the transformation of the human situation. The next Chapter dealt
with an explicitly theological appropriation of Ricoeur's understanding of the
imagined possibility of self-authenticity in the work of David Tracy. There, I
showed how Tracy deploys Ricoeur's understanding of imagined possibility in
the construction of a fully hermeneutical systematic theology. Tracy's model of
theological truth was subjected to a detailed analysis and led to the conclusion
that, like Ricoeur, Tracy fails to distinguish between different types of imagined
possibility, and consequently leaves us unable to determine holiness from
fanaticism. Furthermore, in this Chapter I also suggested that Tracy's proposals
for theology rely too heavily on the belief that art does not privilege metaphysics
above morals. At this point an important aspect of the argument of Part Two
becomes apparent. In following Kant's understanding of the aesthetic judgement
as found in the Third Critique, Ricoeur and Tracy show us how a theological
truth claim can be redeemed from the ghetto it finds itself in. They show us how
theology can function as the hermeneutic fabric of conversation, and allow for
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a plurality of voices on a range of subjects. Nevertheless, in placing Ricoeur and
Tracy under close examination, it became apparent that art - understood as the
creative imagination - may not yield a sufficiently critical principle for the
adjudication of competing theological truth claims. Art may well allow
theological truth to marry the universal scope of its claims with their particular
contextual expression, but in so doing does it leave us with adequate criteria by
which rival claims can be judged? The premise behind my criticism of Tracy's
model was fundamentally that art is too closely tied to metaphysics for it to do
justice to morals, and that consequently, the kind of comprehensiveness Tracy's
theological truth provides is more liable to assert a privilege over morals than
be subjugated under morals. In plain terms, to refer back to the analogy with the
dilemma of Abraham in the sacrifice of Isaac, if, at the moment when Abraham
stood with his knife poised to plunge into Isaac's heart, the angel had whispered
a Tracyesque theological truth in his ear, then I fear, little would have stayed his
hand.
This observation leads me to an important claim of this thesis. The problem with
all models of theology that build upon the role of the creative imagination in
generating possibility, is that of the projection of an idealised truth into a realm
distant from the actual realm of existence. An imagined possibility is of course
one step away from a real possibility. Imagined possibility may well contribute
to the realisation of possibility itself, but it does not necessarily make such a
possibility real, for the possibilities of existence are - as Kierkegaard knew -
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even more immediate than the possibilities of the imagination.1
"there comes a moment in a man's life when his immediacy is, as it were,
ripened and the spirit demands a higher form in which it will apprehend itself
as spirit."2
In essence, my critique of the idea of an imagined possibility of self-authenticity
in such a moment, concerns how an imagined possibility of self-authenticity can
be distinguished from a fantasised or even deluded possibility of authenticity.
Surely the attentiveness demanded of authenticity can brook no conversation
with fantasy.3 The 'void' of the soul that alone might make sense of the
experience of human suffering, cannot be contented with the appeasements
offered by art. Images must eventually lose their appeal if something as durable
as truth has to be arrived at.
Why we must move beyond art is, therefore, as Iris Murdoch herself suggests,
and Kierkegaard well knew, to do with the tendency for art to distance and
cushion us from reality,
"Art, which consoles and to which we also return for wisdom, tends to or may
seem to, romanticise despair. Innumerable poems, stories, pictures, portray it
in ways we are easily able to tolerate and enjoy. Christ on the cross is an
image so familiar and beautified that we have difficulty in connecting it with
awful human suffering. Grunewald's Christ may make us shudder but we
1
See Kierkegaard's description of the creative despair that resides in the 'moment' in The
Sickness Unto Death tr. H V. and E H. Hong, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1980).
2
Soren Kierkegaard, Either/Or Vol. 2 (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1941). Tr. D
F. and I M. Swenson and W. Lowrie, p. 193.
3
See, Simone Weil Waiting On God: Letters and Essays, (London, Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1951), pp.53-60.
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admire it as a tour de force."4
In fact, for Kierkegaard, it was this cushioning effect of art that created a
melancholic sickness that caused the failure "to will deeply and sincerely"
amongst his contemporaries, and thus trap them in lives of inauthenticity.5
With such a fatal Achilles heel, do we still have the confidence to ground
theological truth in art? A truth that purports to survive the Holocaust, whose
comprehensiveness knows no limits; a truth that promises the purest and highest
authenticity; a truth that as the Psalmist says, survives even in Hell?
"Whither shall I go from thy Spirit?
Or whither shall I flee from thy presence?
If I ascend to heaven, thou art there!
If I make my bed in Sheol, thou art there!
(Psalm 139: RSV)
If art merely provides us with "consoling" images can there be an image of
suffering - even of one so profound as an innocent suffering Christ - that can
approximate to the full emptiness of the fears behind what Simone Weil calls
affliction, or Kierkegaard calls the sickness unto death? An emptiness wherein
the darkness that is encountered is that of an apophatic void in which all images
lose their power? Even in the realm of ordinary experience, the realm where
4 Murdoch is very committed to the power of good art in helping us realise goodness,
nevertheless, not all art is conducive towards goodness, and can reach a point when it ceases to
be an ally of goodness. "A great deal of art, perhaps most art actually is self-consoling fantasy."
What constitutes good art for Murdoch, is a depth of realism, which "is essentially both pity and
justice". Murdoch, Sovereignty of the Good, pp.85-87. Also see, Metaphysics as a Guide to
Morals, p.499.
5
Soren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, Vol 2, p. 193.
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finally all differences are levelled, we know that images sometimes don't
console. Does a photograph replace a dead person for the bereaved? Does a
painted mural on the side of a grim tower block do anything more than relieve
the poverty for a split second, before returning the occupants to reality with the
realisation of all that they don't have? Does art in the end threaten to keep
possibility in the realm of the imagination?
If we admit that this finally is the case then, unpopular as it sounds in a world
intoxicated by the power of imagery, are we therefore obliged to recognise that
the theologians task is after all that of the Protestant iconoclasts, and the
Derridaen critics, in the gradual de(con)struction of the image, through which as
Simone Weil says, the distance which separates imagined possibility from
existent possibility is made aware to us? The only way around this conclusion
seems to be to collapse imagination and existence, and admit that lived
possibilities cannot be distinguished from fantasised possibilities. To say that the
moment wherein reality is apprehended is an imagined moment, and that
consequently images offer not just consolation but a reflection of reality, is one
way around the impasse. But again how are we to judge between an authentic
imagined moment and a mere fantasy in any way other than through recourse to
the life lived as an expression of it? And in judging such a life is the analogy
with art still legitimate? Is an authentically lived life, authentic because it is
creative? Or in the end do we not exhaust the resources art can offer to the soul
and admit that an authentically lived life is so because it is goodl
256
Murdoch is right in suggesting that there appears to be an internal relationship
between truth, goodness and knowledge, whereby,
"cases of art and skill and ordinary moral discernment ..establish truth and
reality by an insight which is an exercise of virtue".6
If this were not the case then the words on this page would indeed be
meaning/&sx But what is such an "insight that is an exercise of virtue"? Are we
here talking about metaphor? Symbol? Analogy? Narrative? Or is this insight
something that extends possibility beyond the realm of the image, and calls upon
deeper and sometimes darker human resources like hope, trust, faith and
courage? For theological truth to remain in the realm of the image - metaphor,
analogy, symbol - is to remain in the world of ideas and of imagined visions of
what might be. What is needed is the kind of lived vision of what is that meets
fmiteness, suffering and evil with something more durable than art. For
Murdoch, the concept of goodness, is that which can meet suffering and evil
head on, for,
"Goodness is connected with the acceptance of real death and real chance and
real transience.."7
It may be suggested of course, that in the process of arguing like this I have
successfully removed theological truth from the realm of the public once and for
all. That, where art at least offers theological truth a way of making
comprehensive claims that do not neglect particularity, I have destroyed such
6
Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, p.511.
7 Iris Murdoch, Sovereignty of the Good (London, Routledge, Kegan & Paul, 1970), p. 103.
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comprehensiveness for the sake of particularity, and am therefore admitting that
the communitarian approaches to theological truth I rejected in Chapter One,
might after all offer a better theological paradigm! This would be a serious
charge, were it not for the fact that my intention is not to make theological truth
immune to cultural criticism, as I think, postliberal and communitarian
approaches do. Furthermore, art does have a place in my argument, as the
imagined possibility of goodness.
The heart of my argument focuses on the publicness that Tracy believes is
characteristic of art. We will remember that reference was made in Chapter Six
to Tracy's inversion of Kierkegaard's view that the moral mode of existence is
public and the aesthetic and the religious modes are alike in existing in the realm
of the individual,
"A direct relationship between one spiritual being and another, with respect to
essential truth, is unthinkable. If such a relationship is assumed, it means that
one of the parties has ceased to be spirit."8
In Kierkegaard's view the confusion that can exist between religious
truth claims and aesthetic truth claims, is not because they are indistinguishable
from each other, there is no doubt that for Kierkegaard the religious mode
constituted the highest passion, but because both are modes of existence that
occur in the realm of the individual.9 For Kierkegaard only the moral exists in
8
Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p.221.
9
See the conclusion of Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling, (Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 1941), tr. W. Lowrie.
258
the public realm! Tracy, as we have seen, not only insists on the publicness of
the aesthetic, but at times even relegates the moral to the realm of the individual.
This may therefore explain a lot. Tracy is guilty of collapsing religion and art,
and leaves us asking what theology has that poetry doesn't already have! It could
be that in the final analysis his mistake is not that art has no place in the nature
of a theological truth claim, but that the place it has is better understood in the
light of Kierkegaard's understanding of an aesthetic-moral-religious continuum.
This way the moral is the realm open to public criticism, and is the ultimate
litmus test of authenticity, even though the achievement of authenticity itself
may require a teleological suspension of morality.
"Whatever is great in the sphere of the universally human must therefore not
be communicated as a subject for admiration but as an ethical requirement. In
the form of a possibility it becomes a requirement.... the good should be
presented in the form of a possibility."10
At the end of this thesis what have I constructively said about theological truth
between metaphysics and morals? I have said that a theological truth claim is
best characterised with the notion of possibility, but that a model of theological
truth as the imagined possibility of self-authenticity might not possess all the
resources necessary to cope with the suffering encountered in the quest for an
authentic life. I have furthermore claimed that the public dimension of such a
quest is better conceived of as a mode of moral existence rather than aesthetic
existence. My claim is that to base the critical principle of a theological truth
claim upon an aesthetic mode of existence risks privileging metaphysics over
10 Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp.320-1.
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morals. A better way to balance the requirements of both metaphysics and
morals, which relies on art to a lesser extent, is with an understanding of
theological truth as the imagined possibility of goodness.
The key question I am faced with concerns what might distinguish an imagined
possibility of goodness from other lesser, imagined possibilities, and how might
representation of it escape the limitations I have described art as having? If I
wish to suggest that there is not a blind leap of faith, between the ethical and the
religious as some have, then it is surely legitimate to expect to be able to see
how the transformative fruits of the imagined possibility of goodness manifest
themselves in the moral life! The difference between the imagined possibility of
goodness and other imagined possibilities lies in the fact that the imagined
possibility of goodness is fundamentally transformative in nature. In The
Sovereignty of Good, Iris Murdoch says,
"Good lives as it were on both sides of the barrier and we can combine the
aspiration to complete goodness with a realistic sense of achievement within
our limitations. .. The concept Good resists collapse into the selfish empirical
consciousness." (emphasis mine)
This then is what qualifies the imagined possibility of goodness, over all other
imagined possibilities. The concept of the Good, provides the possibility of the
genuine acceptance of the other, and thus the real authenticity that Ricoeur and
Tracy seek. The concept of the Good can do this because it can resist being
absorbed by all forms of self-motivation and desire. Goodness - if genuine -
" Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of the Good, p.93.
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escapes desire because it is a gift that comes from without.
The main conclusion of this thesis is that a theological truth claim is an
imagined possibility of goodness. The question that may still require answering
is how such an understanding of theological truth can be expressed
epistemologically so that it escapes the weaknesses of the creative imagination.
This leads to the second conclusion of the thesis, that a phronesis model of
rationality, situated in a virtue epistemology, is one that promises the best
epistemological framework for a model of theological truth as the imagined
possibility of goodness. The precise details of this union is deserving of detailed
attention by theologians. I would suggest that a good starting place might be
with Linda Zagzebski's work on phronesis. With phronesis we perhaps have a
notion that offers an epistemological bridge between the metaphysical and the
moral better than any other we have discussed so far. With phronesis we have
a critical theological principle that does not reduce theological truth to moral
imperatives, nor allow for the privileging of them above such imperatives.
Phronesis is not a principle that can be reduced to the claim that art is what
distinguishes theological truth between metaphysics and morals; yet neither is it
one that claims that art has nothing to do with theological truth. Furthermore,
phronesis is a principle that allows for critical judgements between rival
theological truth claims without incurring verificationist criteria of legitimation.
In focusing upon phronesis we can therefore marry the conclusion of Part One
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of this thesis, with Part Two. In Part One theological truth was accorded an
autonomy that legitimated its description as theological, yet which did not
necessitate the totalisation or subjugation of other truth claims in a cognitive
hierarchy. Phronesis can be that which facilitates a responsible autonomy for
theological truth. It can also be that which holds together apparently conflicting
particular truth claims without reneging on the universal dimension of those
claims. To give phronesis, or wisdom, more attention as a critical theological
principle, will involve an alteration in our understandings of what constitutes
criteria in matters of theological judgement. As I have suggested, and as Chapter
Three argues, phronesis models of reason situated in a virtue epistemology can
be the means by which such an alteration can occur. Of course, caution may
need to be exercised lest the commitment to publicness is relaxed too much. The
conclusion to Chapter Three suggests that, to make phronesis the primary
criterion of theological truth might necessitate a retreat into the notion of
virtuous communities as a way of establishing an answer to the question "Whose
virtue?". This undoubtedly presents a challenge for future theologians to
articulate a non-sectarian form of communitarianism.
The challenge that lies ahead is therefore clear. If (as I have argued) art does
involve metaphysical commitments that distance us from the possibility of
authenticity, and phronesis risks the creation of isolated cults of holiness, then
theology has to find a way avoiding both errors. My hope is that with wisdom
as the judge of the imagined possibility of goodness such a way can be found.
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Theological truth claims can survive the ravages modernity has inflicted upon
them. The best way to do so is not to ground the critical principle of theological
truth in an unfettered creative imagination, but in an epistemology of virtue.
With wisdom, as that form of rationality which is both an epistemological act
and an ethical act, both metaphysical and moral, the imagined possibility of
goodness becomes real, and the transformation of the human situation can begin.
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APPENDIX A:
A: On Traditional Understandings of Theological Language
In Medieval Christian theology three ways of understanding theological language
became dominant.1 The first holds that theological language is not in any way
adequate to an encounter with the divine. This approach suggests that the
ultimate truth of theological language is only accessed via a negation of the
medium it is conveyed by. The via negativa is arguably identifiable in all the
major religions of the world.2 Meister Eckhart, Maimonedes and A1 Ghazali -
all represent important thinkers in the three monotheistic traditions, and have all
appealed to the idea that the truth or referent of theological language is accessed
only through its negation. This is clearly an important tradition which reminds
us of the possible ambiguity of language, however, on its own, it lapses into an
inverted metaphysics which gives us no hope of distinguishing between an
edifying paradox and a destructive and false contradiction. The second way of
understanding theological language in Medieval theology, held, in contrast to the
via negativa, that the referent of theological language can be apprehended
directly. This approach - classically articulated by John Duns Scotus - believes
religious language to be univocal, that is, statements about God are not equivocal
- having more than one possible referent - but univocal, having only one possible
referent. Although used in a number of contemporary theological agendas the
inherent difficulty with it is in maintaining the transcendence of the ultimate
referent of religious language. It is conceivable that a religion with a less
vehemently transcendent deity, than the one that the Christian tradition has
generally defended, might use univocal language more comfortably without risk
of contradiction.3 Nevertheless, for Christianity, univocal language about God
must clearly be used at the expense of the transcendence of its referent. It is
because of the inadequacies of the first two ways of understanding religious
1
See Chapter 2, "Historical Approaches to Religious Language", in Dan Stiver, The
Philosophy of Religious Language: Sign, Symbol and Story (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1996).
2
See W T. Stace, The Teachings of the Mystics (New York, 1960).
I am thinking of the complex, yet deeply personal phenomenon of worship in Hinduism.
Where an individual performs puja, to inteipret an expression like "My God is Krishna"
univocal ly, need not carry the same meaning as it might for the Christian monotheist. Even here
however, we can imagine that univocal language about the individual's relationship with the
deity might become strained.
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language, that a third way was suggested, classically by Thomas Aquinas.4 This
approach holds that religious language is analogical. Aquinas argued that there
must be a mean between equivocal language and univocal language, otherwise
we are forced into one of the two earlier positions. This mean is analogical
language which neither assumes a direct referent (like univocal language), nor
admits to the possibility of any referent (like equivocal language). For Aquinas
all knowledge and language of God is analogical.5
4
For an excellent analysis ofAquinas' doctrine of analogy see Brian Davies, The Thought
of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992). As Davies points out Aquinas was in no
respect entirely original in his presentation of analogy but indebted to a number of 13th century
thinkers, who were in turn indebted to Aristotle.
5
Aquinas' account of the analogical way may, or may not, be thought of as intentionally




While too much talk of an existential 'moment' can easily become lost in clouds
of vaporous mysticism, there is nonetheless a truth in the fact that an
understanding of the spiritual life - which the comprehensiveness of religion
offers, and theological truth claims represent - is aided by existentialist
terminology. Kierkegaard is clearly one of the greatest sources of such
terminology, and has consequently imbued existentialist theology with a
vocabulary that it could scarce function without. Interpretations differ over
Kierkegaard's deliberately ambiguous works - his love of caricature and polemic
contribute to the richness and depth of his work - but there is at least little
dispute that he envisioned the possibility of three "modes of existence".1 The
debate over whether and what kind of continuum exists between the three modes,
the aesthetic, the moral and the religious, is a familiar one for theologians.
Stewart Sutherland's Chapter on Kierkegaard in Faith and Ambiguity, helps clear
away some of the unhelpful myths about Kierkegaard's thought.2 In particular
Sutherland helps us attain a more balanced understanding of the relationship
between Kierkegaard's three 'modes', suggesting that,
"it is not a mistake to suggest that there are three different types or stages of
life discussed by Kierkegaard, but it is a gross error to suggest that the three
different stages, or forms of life are so discrete that the aesthetic and the
ethical play no part at all in the religious."3
Sutherland also stresses that the much debated "teleological suspension" of the
ethical mode of existence, does not commit Kierkegaard to moral relativism, but
is an insistence in reaction to Kant, that a religious mode of existence should not
be used as some kind of foundation for morality.
'
Although reference to all three 'modes' of existence is made in most of Kierkegaard's
works, the contrast between the aesthetic and the ethical is made most pointedly in Either/Or,
while the contrast between the ethical and the religious is made most explicit in Fear and
Trembling. See Patrick Gardiner, Kierkegaard (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988), pp.40-
41.
2
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